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Abstract 
This thesis investigates depictions of male dismemberment at Anglo and Native American 
contact sites in the tales of Edgar Allan Poe.  It argues for Poe’s subscription to a traditional 
theology that posits Neoplatonic concepts of the soul as mandatory for the constitution of 
rational humanity, and contends that he looks critically from this perspective at the contingency 
of national citizenship on property ownership in Jacksonian America.  This investigation 
therefore involves an analysis of the link between property and national subjectivity, with 
emphasis on the recurrent trope in contemporary literature of the male body dismembered by 
‘Indian warfare’, and how this body represents early America’s uncertain claim to its national 
territory and, by extension, the constituting condition of property.  This thesis also assesses 
epistemological and religious formations in Poe’s fiction.  Poe’s tales often express a theological 
anxiety, with tensions created as the knowledge systems that define Poe’s subjectivities 
subordinate spirituality to empirical mensuration and representation.  Dramatizing this shift from 
teleology to epistemology and its disarticulating effect on the self are Poe’s ‘married women’ 
stories.  Keeping in mind links between soteriological paradigms and identity construction, 
methodologies are partially organized around Poe’s presentation of women in his essays and 
tales, with particular emphasis on ‘The Poetic Principle’ and ‘Berenice’.  The interpretive 
apparatus gained by historical contextualization and the assessment of Poe’s epistemological and 
religious formations is then mobilized towards reading the disarticulate male body as a nexus of 
Poe’s concerns about property ownership, epistemology and theology, and analyzing his tales 
pertaining to colonial contact, particularly: ‘The Masque of the Red Death’, ‘Morning on the 
Wissahiccon’, ‘The Man That Was Used Up’, ‘The Journal of Julius Rodman’, and The 
Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket.   
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Introduction: ‘Let Dead Men Sleep in Death’: Land and 
Disarticulate Masculinity in Jacksonian America 
 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge remarks in Table Talk that ‘the American Union has no centre, 
and it is impossible now to make one.  The more they extend their borders into the Indians’ land, 
the weaker will the national cohesion be’.
1  An analogy may be drawn between Coleridge’s idea 
of America and Edgar Allan Poe’s figure of Brevet Brigadier-General John A.B.C. Smith from 
‘The Man That Was Used Up’, an Indian fighter who instantiates a centre-less union and 
cohesion lost through encroachment into ‘the Indians’ lands’: captured and dismembered by 
‘Bugaboo and Kickapoo’ Indians, Smith is physically reduced to an ‘odd-looking bundle of 
something’ dependent on his servant to re-constitute his body with prosthetic limbs.
2  Smith’s 
disarticulation perpetuates a trope reiterated across the literature coincident with early and 
Jacksonian America’s expansion into Indian territories: that of masculinity dismembered at 
contact zones between Native and Anglo-Americans.  Vis-à-vis this historical and literary 
context, this thesis will examine the trope of male corporeal disarticulation at colonial contact 
sites in the fiction of Edgar Allan Poe.  By ‘disarticulation’ I mean the corporeal condition of 
being incomplete, disjointed or dismembered.  The term itself is usually associated with the field 
of forensic anthropology, where it describes the body’s lost integrity.  While ‘articulation’ 
denotes the physical state of being ‘connected by joints’, with variant definitions including the 
conjunction of parts to allow bodily motion, and the act of unifying the body, ‘disarticulation’ is 
contrarily defined as ‘the separation or amputation of a bone at a joint’.
3  In this thesis, I use the 
term ‘disarticulation’ in a broader sense to generally include bodies in an incomplete or 
incohered state.  While imagery of corporeal disarticulation caused by colonial contact is not 
unique to Poe’s literary corpus, or early nineteenth-century American literature, it is worthwhile 
to examine such bodies in these authorial and national contexts because they are nexus points for 
various discourses pertaining to national ideology and, to a lesser extent, theology, and they 
                                                           
1 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Table Talk in The Table Talk and Omniana of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
(London: Oxford Up, 1917), pp. 33-322, (p. 203). 
2 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Man That Was Used Up’, in The Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 405-413 (p. 411). 
3 William D. Haglund and Marcella H. Sorg, ‘Advancing Forensic Taphonomy’, in eds., Advances in 
Forensic Taphonomy: Method, Theory and Archaeological Perspectives, ed. by William D. Haglund and 
Marcella H. Sorg (New York: CRC Press,2002), pp. 3-29 (p. 15). 7 
 
signal ideas both idiosyncratic to Poe’s writing and characteristic of his historical moment.  
Common to this trope both within and outside Poe’s literature is its connection to property, 
particularly the ownership of land.  Poe’s figuration of the link between bodily disarticulation 
and property, and the manner in which he contextualizes it within a nuanced Neoplatonic 
theology, will be analyzed at length in this thesis.  For now, it is necessary to put forward two 
questions which will be answered in this chapter: what is the link between male disarticulation 
and property?  And, how is Poe cognizant of this link?  The second question is answered more 
easily than the first.  Poe’s awareness of male dismemberment as a literary trope is given in the 
figure of Brevet Brigadier-General John A.B.C. Smith, as noted above, as well as in The 
Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, when the Jane Guy explodes into a ‘wild chaos of wood, and 
metal, and human limbs’ to render the Tsalalians ‘desperately mangled’.
4  Yet to ascertain 
exactly why Poe employs these images, and to understand their implications, it is necessary to 
look outside Poe’s literature to the Jacksonian era to see how the trope of male dismemberment 
in early American literature signifies an anxiety pertaining to the nation’s ownership of its 
territory.   
  Analytical engagement with the trope of male disarticulation can be structured with 
theoretical considerations that reveal how the various dismemberments, immolations, and 
scalpings signal Anglo-America’s unsuccessful attempts to displace Native American 
populations as the rightful, ‘indigenous’ inheritors of the national territory.  This national attempt 
at displacement involves an incorporative mechanism in which tribal populations are swept from 
the land and contained inside the imagination of American subjects.   In The National Uncanny: 
Indian Ghosts and American Subjects, Renée Bergland outlines the contingency of American 
subjectivity on claiming the land, and how the ownership of the land involves the psychic 
incorporation of the Native American Other into the American self: 
 
By writing about Indians as ghosts, white writers effectively remove them from 
American lands, and place them, instead, within the American imagination.  One result of 
the internalization of Indians is that the American individuals who “contain” Indians 
thereby constitute themselves as representative Americans, and even as representative 
Americas. [. . .]  As Indians are made to vanish into the psychic spaces of America’s 
                                                           
4 Edgar Allan Poe, The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket (Markham: Penguin, 1976), p. 218.  8 
 
citizens, the psychic space within each citizen is transformed into American territory, and 
each citizen comes to contain an America, to be homo Americanus.
5 
 
The act of incorporating Native Americans into the American imagination in order to own the 
national space and thereby ‘become American’ gains resonance by spelling out the 
psychoanalytic influences of Bergland’s observation, particularly as they pertain to psychic 
identification.  Broadly defined, identification denotes the process of incorporating an external 
Other into the ego with the corollary effects of ego and personality alteration.  In ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’, Sigmund Freud outlines the self’s identification with an exterior other as 
contingent on a process of libidinal attachment followed by loss of the loved object:       
 
An attachment of the libido to a particular person, had at one time existed; then, owing to 
a real or slight disappointment coming from the loved person, the object-relationship was 
shattered.  The result was not the normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this 
object and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something different [. . . .] [T]he free 
libido was not displaced on to another object; it was withdrawn into the ego.  There [. . .] 
[it] served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object.
6 
 
Once the ‘shadow of the object’ falls ‘upon the ego’ a schism of the self occurs between ‘the 
critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification’.
7  The ego’s critical aspect 
thereafter scrutinizes the part of the ego altered by identification as though it were ‘the forsaken 
object’.
8  In dialogue with Freud, Judith Butler also conceptualizes identity, particularly 
gendered identity, as constructed by a series of identifications.  She expands on, and makes 
central, Freud’s theory by refiguring identification as the subject’s ‘intense emotional 
attachment’ to an external Other that results in either ‘wanting to have someone or wanting to be 
                                                           
5 Renée Bergland, The National Uncanny: Indian Ghosts and American Subjects (London: University 
press of New England, 2000), p. 4. 
6 Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London: The Hogarth Press, 1962), XIV, pp. 
243-258 (p.249).   
7 Freud, p. 249. 
8 Freud, p. 249. 9 
 
that someone’.
9  When an emotional attachment to a loved object is disrupted by loss, then that 
loss becomes ‘suspended through a melancholic and imaginary incorporation’ of the Other ‘into 
the psyche’.
10  This installment of the Other into the self ‘establishes the permanent incapacity of 
that “self” to achieve self-identity’, because ‘the disruption of the Other at the heart of the self is 
the very condition of that self’s possibility’.
11 In other words, only through the process of 
melancholic loss and psychic incorporation is the self even capable of becoming a self.   
Although published seventy-one years after Poe’s death in 1849, this passage from 
Frederick Jackson Turner’s The Frontier in American History serves to exemplify Anglo-
American incorporation of the Native American in order to become ‘aboriginal’:     
 
The wilderness masters the colonist.  It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, 
modes of travel, and thought.  It takes him from the railroad car, and puts him in the birch 
canoe.  It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and 
moccasin.  It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian 
palisade around him.  Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a 
sharp stick; he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion.  In 
short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man.
12  
 
An incorporative act is seen in the way the ‘European’ gradually ‘becomes’ Cherokee or Iroquois 
by exchanging the railroad car for a birch canoe, by wearing moccasins, building an Indian 
palisade, and finally shouting war cries and taking scalps.  Yet what stands out is not only the 
process of ‘becoming’ Native American, but how this incorporation is intrinsically tied to 
national territory.  It seems as though, for Turner, there is a principle in the ‘environment’ itself, 
the ‘strength’ of the land, which somehow (yet naturally) transforms the ‘colonist’ into an 
‘orthodox Indian’.  Effectively, Turner’s statement elides America’s historical removal of its 
Native American populations in order to possess their lands, and in this discursive act he reverses 
a process of desire so that it is the land itself that makes the colonist aboriginal, as opposed to 
                                                           
9 Judith Butler, ‘Imitation and Gender Insubordination’, in Inside/ Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, 
ed. by Diana Fuss (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 13-31, (p. 26). 
10 Butler, p. 26. 
11 Butler, p. 26. 
12 Frederick Jackson Turner in Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the 
Subjugation of the American Indian (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 77-78. 10 
 
desiring ownership of the land, displacing its Native American populations, and justifying 
displacement after the fact.  In this regard even though his statement is ideologically laden it still 
hits on an important longing: that of being ‘aboriginal’, claiming indigeneity, and staking a 
rightful ‘native’ inheritance of the land.   
In pointing up psychoanalysis in a historically-based thesis I am not preluding discussion 
of texts and events amenable to naturalizing a ‘universal’ theory, but rather framing an 
examination of a drive to displace that was mobilized in specific ways and for specific reasons in 
Jacksonian America.  Arguably the most important reason was that the displacement of tribal 
populations, most notably through Indian Removal, helped stabilize property claims based on 
speculation.  Andrew Jackson tried to stabilize property values by removing Native Americans 
from the landscape, and in so doing, forcefully enact an incontestable legitimacy of title.  What 
Jackson was looking for was a ‘centre’, or ‘essence’ of land ownership.  Jackson’s desire to 
stabilize ownership through Indian Removal can be illustrated first by looking at the importance 
of land in early America, then at Jackson’s motivation for attempting to locate an absolute title to 
property.  Once the reasons for displacement are outlined we can then analyze how the 
disarticulate male body signals a failure to displace.  
In late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century America land was the major economic 
resource, the major determiner of social status, and the major source of political power.  It 
created most American fortunes, provided the basis for economic development, and fuelled 
private and public business transactions.  On the frontier, land was a medium of exchange and 
served as money when currency was scarce: land titles could pay for services, pay off gambling 
debts, and be directly bartered for merchandise and slaves.
13  Land also dominated the 
eighteenth-century economy: western lands were the single most important source for economic 
development, and most colonial fortunes were made from land, putting landed gentry at the top 
of early American society.
14  Land also played a role in politics, since most leading families 
acquired the prerequisite fortunes and estates to enter political leadership by way of land 
speculation.
15  It was also the major source of public money in early America, because land sales 
provided the American government with revenues without which it could not survive.  Land 
even contributed to bringing about the Revolution: English efforts to contain the settlement east 
                                                           
13 Rogin, p. 79. 
14 Rogin, p. 80. 
15 Rogin, p. 80. 11 
 
of the Appalachian Mountains endangered the value of American land holdings, thereby 
antagonizing leading speculators in western lands, like George Washington, into protecting their 
fortunes.
16   
Those who made fortunes in land did not make them through work or agriculture, but 
through speculation.  Land derived its value from the potential it held for the possibility of future 
settlement or projects, such as crops, towns, roads, or canals, and this potential is what caused 
land to rise in value, and what gave it its commodity importance.
17  The possibility of fortune 
gained through speculation was a primary motive for opening the western lands for migration, 
thinning out the frontier, and pushing it westward.  Not only did speculators lead or sponsor 
pioneer communities, but their influence was often felt in western constitutions written to attract 
settlers, in western demands for greater representation, and in democratic pressures for the cheap 
purchase of western lands.
18  Yet while speculation built fortunes and pushed western migration, 
it was also fraught with legal and financial conflicts about title and ownership.  These land-title 
conflicts were often very complex, and created huge amounts of financial insecurity.
19  
Sometimes conflicts over land title occurred when states issued enormous land grants, or sold 
large tracts, which lay in Native American territories; at other times they arose when states 
issued warrants for lands that were still disputed with other states; still other conflicts came about 
when states issued military warrants for land in unsurveyed, unlocated, and unspecified areas to 
soldiers in the French, Indian, and Revolutionary wars, who then sold these warrants to 
speculators.  All of these causes of conflict enormously proliferated land titles and caused them 
to vary widely in legitimacy and value.
20   
The uncertainty of land-titles was exacerbated by surveyors who were either too 
inexperienced or too loosely bound by moral standards, aiming to acquire large tracts for 
themselves and associates.  They marked lines carelessly, left poor markings on the land that 
vanished over time, or followed natural boundaries, such as rivers, trees and ridges, which were 
transitional and shifting.  Claiming title could be a dubious matter as well.  Typically, a claimant 
registered his land at a land office that was often hundreds of miles from his actual property.  
Then he left to survey the land and returned to enter the boundaries.  Fees were required at both 
                                                           
16 Rogin, pp. 79-81. 
17 Rogin, p. 80. 
18 Rogin, p. 81. 
19 Rogin, p. 90. 
20 Rogin, p. 90. 12 
 
stages, and failure to complete the process invalidated the title.  Not only would the great 
distance between land and office create discrepancies between records and actual frontier 
transactions, but faulty claim-filing would result in imperfect, overlapping titles that no one 
would discover for years, rendering the actual title incapable of being reconstructed.  A series of 
other factors destabilized land titles even further.  Frauds were extensively practiced at every 
step of the land claims process, and forged grants could plague subsequent holders who bought 
their lands in good faith.  Lands could be derived from private agreements with Indian villages or 
elected chiefs.  Squatters could claim property rights that were recognizable in court and which 
conflicted with other legally established claims; and these same squatters’ claims could be 
circulated through sale to speculators or new settlers.  Liens created by imperfectly foreclosed 
mortgages, conflicts among relatives or creditors over inheritance, and failure to pay taxes could 
create conflicting claims to the same land, and the transfer of such imperfect titles only 
multiplied the uncertainties of ownership.
21   
One speculator who made his fortunes through land sales and rose to the status of 
America’s elite was Andrew Jackson.
22  But Jackson too was nearly ruined by the vicissitudes of 
speculation when he purchased land from David Allison, a former Nashville lawyer involved in 
speculations of questionable legality.  Jackson received twenty-five cents an acre from Allison 
for land he bought in Tennessee for ten cents, and used Allison’s notes to buy merchandise and 
establish a store.  The problem was that Allison was on the verge of bankruptcy, and in the 
autumn of 1795 he went broke.  Jackson had endorsed Allison’s notes and now had to pay them 
back as they became due.  To cover the first note, Jackson sold his store and stock for 33,000 
acres of land, and then sold the land.  But as more and more notes became due he was forced to 
sell more and more holdings.  Jackson briefly sought to escape these debts, but eventually he 
paid them all back over several years.  It was a setback from which he never fully recovered, and 
his experience with Allison not only left Jackson with a permanent hostility to paper notes and 
those who tried to escape debts, but, as Michael Rogin observes, it ‘drove him back to the root of 
property ownership’.
23   
Jackson’s quest to find a stable root for property ownership brought him into conflict 
twenty-five years later with Tennessee’s occupancy laws, and with John Overton, his long-time 
                                                           
21 Rogin, pp. 90-91. 
22 Rogin, p. 105. 
23 Rogin, p. 95. 13 
 
friend and the business partner with whom he had bought up several of the Allison lands.  The 
occupancy laws were used to protect holdings against old or forgotten transactions, and many 
established speculators such as Overton favoured them because they secured their own sales and 
holdings.  Of course, absentee and claims speculators, as well as land lawyers, opposed 
occupancy laws.  So did purists over contractual rights, such as Andrew Jackson, who allied 
himself with the litigators and politicians who stood against Overton and occupancy laws.
24  
Jackson’s quarrel with Overton reached back to their dealings with Allison.  In 1811 Jackson had 
made arrangements with Allison’s heirs to secure land Allison had mortgaged, and which 
Jackson had sold.  Jackson’s claims on this land overlapped with Overton’s, who claimed title 
through the original Allison foreclosure in 1798.
25  Overton had sold a considerable amount of 
the Allison property, and now, twenty-five on, he was being forced to defend his ancient 
transactions.  As Rogin explains, ‘“rectifiers” were dangerous in America, because property was 
theft.  Title derived from force and fraud against Indians, from speculation, and from 
manipulation of the law.  The preoccupation with property rights, pursued in litigation, was an 
effort to build a firm foundation on quicksand’.
26  Overton understood these aspects of 
ownership, and knew it was ‘best not to inquire too deeply into original title’.
27  In contrast, 
Jackson allied himself with claims speculators and land lawyers, standing against the rights of 
small farmers and other popular interests, in order to ‘purify’ a history of ‘dubious moral and 
legal title’.
28  Jackson’s search for a ‘pure root’ of legitimate property title would send him back 
to the Native Americans by 1821, ‘not to return their land, but to end all doubts about America’s 
right to it’.
29  The Tennessee elite had no qualms with Jackson’s policies about removing 
Indians, and supported his presidential ambitions.  Jackson’s efforts to ‘ground tainted 
acquisitions in law and natural right’ would come to characterize his political course.
30 
We can read Jackson’s struggle to locate an absolute title to land ownership as a quest to 
stabilize his own masculine identity by discussing the ideological connections between the 
creation of property and the establishment of civic identity.  In his discussion of the American 
Enlightenment, Robert A. Ferguson outlines Kantian principles of politics and natural law as 
                                                           
24 Rogin, pp. 97-98. 
25 Rogin, p. 99. 
26 Rogin, p. 100. 
27 Rogin, p. 100 
28 Rogin, p. 99. 
29 Rogin, p. 100. 
30 Rogin, p. 101. 14 
 
they address ‘realities in American politics’, namely: ‘the freedom of every member of human 
society as a human being’, the ‘equality of each with all others as subjects’, and the 
‘independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen’.
31  Yet while such principles 
should ‘guarantee the basic rights of all persons in the enlightened state’, they also carry 
exclusive qualifications: freedom only thrives in a patriotic government where everyone ‘regards 
the commonwealth as a maternal womb and the land as the paternal ground which he himself 
sprang’; equality does not preclude the inequality of ‘physical or mental superiority’; and the 
independence of the citizen is contingent on the ability to support oneself through property 
ownership.
 32  While Native Americans could claim the ‘land as [their] paternal ground’, any 
assertions to property ownership fall ‘to the charge that relative superiority rightly determines 
degree of possession’.
33  
The importance of land in the construction of subjectivity is further brought into relief 
when considering John Locke’s ‘Of Property’ as a discourse that facilitates ideological access to 
the North American continent.  In By the Law of Nature: Form and Value in Nineteenth-Century 
America, Howard Horwitz notes that Locke’s statement ‘in the beginning, all the World was 
America’ was well known, and, as long as one elides the presence of an already existent Indian 
population, could justify America as ‘the aboriginal liberal experiment in [. . .] creating property 
from wilderness’ due to its absence of European institutions.
 34   This Lockean transformation of 
wilderness into property inextricably involves the self, but also enables the self to come into 
being.  As Horwitz explains, ‘labor engenders property (appropriates nature) because the 
transaction between labor and nature realizes personhood, for, in Locke’s view, labor is 
simultaneously the vessel and constitutive element of the self’.
35  Put another way, the interaction 
between labor and nature is constitutive in ‘two directions’: it creates the ‘property’ of the self, 
and it creates a valued, material property external to self when the self mixes with nature.  
According to Locke, ‘every Man has a Property in his own Person; this no Body has any right to 
                                                           
31 Robert A. Ferguson, The American Enlightenment, 1750-1820 (London: Harvard UP, 1997), p. 156, 
Immanuel Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: “This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice”’, 
in Kant: Political Writings, ed. by Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), pp. 61-92 (p. 74). 
32 Ferguson, p. 156, Kant, p. 74, p.75, p. 78. 
33 Ferguson, p. 156. 
34 Howard Horwitz, By the Law of Nature: Form and Value in Nineteenth-Century America (Oxford, Oxford 
UP, 1986), p 6, John Locke, ‘Of Property’, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Peter Laslett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 285-302 (p. 301).  
35 Horwitz, p. 7. 15 
 
but himself’.
36  Based on the principle that ‘each man owns himself’, the self is enabled to 
appropriate nature by infusing nature with the self.  That is, one creates and owns possessions by 
fixing one’s property in nature through labor.
37  When one ‘mix[es] his Labour’ with nature, he 
‘join[s] to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property’.  At the same time, 
though, it is the act of labor itself which ‘begins the Property’.
38  For Horwitz, ‘this definitive 
property infusing the body and all action is, because divine in origin, a constitutive principle of 
self-possession’.  However, this quadripartite correlation between nature, labor, property and self 
foregrounds a tautological reasoning: ‘self owns property because it owns itself; at the same 
time, the self owns itself only because realized by and invested in property’.  For this reason 
property is essential to constitution of the self.  Although labor is central to the transformation of 
nature to property, because it is already one’s own and expresses the ‘reason granted humankind 
by God’, it is not clear if any one component governs the concatenations from nature to self ‘nor 
what the verifying mechanism is’.  As well, due to the fact that the ‘self not only creates property 
but is realized and known only through property’, the self’s ‘inalienable qualities’ can only be 
realized by alienable attributes.
39 
When considering the correlation between property and the self, Jackson’s quest to find a 
stabilizing root of property title and an incontestable inheritance of the land is also an anxious 
desire to find the condition that could naturalize his own gendered self.  This tie between 
property, particularly land, and the naturalizing essence, or ‘root’, comes into relief by again 
considering psychoanalytically-inflected theory, particularly Homi Bhabha’s model of 
masculinity put forth in his essay, ‘Are You a Man or a Mouse?’.  Bhabha describes masculinity 
as a ‘prosthetic process’ that sets itself up as the privileged position that normalizes and 
naturalizes difference, but also oscillates into a ‘“neurotic” acting out of its power and 
powerlessness’, thereby necessitating a continual interrogation and testing to ‘prove’ its 
naturalness.  As a ‘prosthetic process’, masculinity is molded to a large extent by its national 
context, and Bhabha illustrates the formative effect the nation-state has on masculinity by 
referring to Johann Fichte’s statement in his Addresses to the German Nation (1807-1808), 
which outlines ‘Naturalness [and manliness] on the German side’, and ‘arbitrariness and 
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artificiality [and effeminacy] on the foreign side’.
40  The principle agent for structuring the 
masculine subject in accordance with national ideals is the domestic father, who serves as a 
metaphor for the nation.  The masculine subject perceives the national Father as holding the 
condition that enables the ‘prosthetic’ masculinity to become natural and complete.  When the 
subject identifies with the national Father he sees himself as containing the naturalizing 
condition.  The subject’s instinct for respect stems from his service to the national Father, from 
his struggles to make natural the prosthetic masculinity; or, as Fichte describes amor patriae, 
‘This is the natural love of the child for the father, not as the guardian of his sensual well-being, 
but as the mirror from which his own self-worth or worthlessness is reflected for him’.
41  
However, an anxiety is already manifested due to the gendering of the national paternal 
metaphor, and to the national subject, as it oscillates between naturalness and performance.  
Amor patriae is an ‘anxious love’, particularly ‘when we recall that, in a psychoanalytic sense, 
anxiety is a “sign” of a danger implicit in/on the threshold of identity, in between its claims to 
coherence and its fears of dissolution, “between identity and non-identity, internal and 
external”’.
42  
Read against Bhabha’s model of masculinity, Jackson’s campaign to stabilize the shifting 
values of land speculation signals an attempt to find the naturalizing condition that could ground 
masculinity as a ‘prosthetic process’.  Jackson’s desire for absolute title is emblematic for 
masculine identity in early nineteenth-century America.  Indeed, David G. Pugh points to a 
‘Jacksonian mystique’ that ‘expressed the sentiments of the time’, with Jackson himself serving 
as the ‘nation’s first official prototype of the manliness ethos’.
43  Simultaneously, Jackson did 
not create the memes and worldviews of his era: as John William Ward points out, he was a 
product of them, a man of the times, who embodied an answer to the anxieties which the nation 
felt even before his ascendency to office.
 44  When considering property both as an absolute 
claim to the land, and as the condition that naturalizes the masculine self, anxiety, or the fear of 
‘dissolution’ existent in masculinity’s ‘coherence’, finds its representation in the disarticulate 
body that signals where the ‘absolute’ ownership of the land is jeopardized, where the Native 
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American inheritance fails.  In other instances of early American literature, though, the broken 
male body is both an anxious site, and has some signs of being symptomatic in that it represents 
repressed instincts that cause ‘alterations on the subject’s own body’ because it is not ‘permitted 
to impinge on the outer world’.
45  While symptoms are caused by repression they are actually 
perceived as isolated from the ego, maintaining their ‘existence outside the organization of the 
ego and independently of it’ and owning the ‘privilege of extra-territoriality’.  When the ego 
comes into contact with the symptom it attempts to bind it to itself and ‘incorporate it into its 
organization’.
46  Freud describes the symptom as having ‘a kind of frontier-position with a mixed 
cathexis’, compromising needs for gratification as well as punishment, scrutinized by the super-
ego, but also representing irruptions made into the ego.
47  The male body dismembered by 
colonial contact shares symptomatic qualities, in that it is also ‘extra-territorial’ and occupies a 
‘frontier-position’, but is simultaneously brought about by discursive mechanisms interior to the 
nation.  In cases where the dismembered male body is not treated as a site of anxiety, it stands in 
for a site where access to the land is threatened, but simultaneously where it is re-affirmed, as 
will be discussed in relation to Richard Johnson’s wounded frame in Richard Emmons’s drama, 
Tecumseh; or, the Battle of the Thames, A National Drama in Five Acts.  However, while the 
disarticulate Anglo-American body can re-affirm the national inheritance of the land, this right is 
more often expressed by way of the disarticulate Native American body.   The various meanings 
of the disarticulate body are illustrated through analysis of the popular literature of early 
American, including Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, various captivity 
narratives, The History of Lewis and Clark, and Emmons’s Tecumseh.   
 
Disarticulate Bodies in Early American Literature 
 
Referring back to Kant’s qualifications for national citizenship, we see how citizenship as 
contingent on a ‘paternal’ relationship with the land informs Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the 
State of Virginia, particularly in relation to his ideal of a unary American bloodstock ‘springing’ 
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from the soil.  For Jefferson, the American racial stock needs to become ‘aboriginal’ by bonding 
with the paternal ground, and thereby establishing rightful stakes to the land and national 
citizenship.  In his discussion of the Notes, Kelsall outlines Indian displacement as a process by 
which the Native Americans, whose ‘“rights” [to the land] are derived from “immemorial 
occupancy”’, are defeated by American colonizers, ‘safely lamented, memorialized and 
[culturally] incorporated’, thereby allowing a bond between Americans and the land that reaches 
further back in history, and establishes a more deeply rooted national culture.
48  According to 
Kelsall, Jefferson’s ideas of American land and identity reflect pervasive Fichtean theories 
regarding the volk and reinheit.  The volk are those ‘whose purity comes from their proximity to 
their own land and “the face of the earth”’, for whom the land is a place of hearth and home, and 
the generative seed of the husbandman, representing what is healthy in a nation as opposed to 
what is unsound.  Reinheit refers to the purity of the native stock of the ‘self-generative, self-
sustaining unitary volk’.
49 
Jefferson’s anxiety over preserving the reinheit of the ‘native’ stock is foregrounded in 
his argument that immigration of a foreign stock already indoctrinated by the tenets of ‘absolute 
monarchies’, would ‘infuse’ the American legislature ‘with their spirit, warp and bias its 
direction, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass’.  Racial purity, in contrast, 
would strengthen a government that is ‘more homogenous, more peaceable, [and] more durable’.  
However, in Jefferson’s Notes possibilities for racial corruption already exist, not only in a slave 
population, a ‘blot in our country’, that ‘increases as fast, or faster, than the whites’, but in the 
population of ‘aborigines’ as well.
50  As Boelhower states, ‘throughout the colonial period [. . .] 
it was the Indian as ethnic who raised the first major challenge to the idea of a homogenous 
nation and brought about the first deep laceration in the American quest for identity’.  As the 
instantiation of European-America’s first radical Other, ‘the American self inevitably had to be 
defined in relation to him’.  While the Indian could be removed from ‘the communitary structure 
of the self as American’, he still remains as an ‘absent presence within the assimilationist logic 
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of reductio ad unum’.
51  Anxiety regarding a collapse between self and Other, and the need to 
prevent racial corruption, manifest in a violent act of ‘border maintenance’ in the fourth 
Appendix to the Notes.  Comprised of collected documents, the fourth Appendix details the 
murder of Chief Logan’s family, in which his brother was shot for wearing a white man’s coat 
and his pregnant sister disemboweled and impaled, because of a ‘perceived threat’ in which the 
Indian other had ‘taken on the form of the self, and dishonored the white man’s race’: 
specifically, Logan’s brother put on an American hat and coat, ‘strut[ed] about’ with ‘arms 
akimbo’, and called a white man a ‘son of a bitch’.
52  This action thereby provoked the 
Americans to the murder and symbolic genocide of the alien blood-stock.  In retaliation the 
Indians ‘cut to pieces (and presumably castrated) and scattered (repeatedly)’ a white victim ‘thus 
denying a dead enemy sepulcher in their lands’, symbolically prohibiting American bonding with 
the soil, and undermining the self-generative aspect of the volk.
53   
  While Kelsall discusses specifically the Notes, an American anxiety regarding the 
inability to claim the ‘paternal ground’ and self-generate its ‘race’ manifests in later sites of 
Anglo and Native American violence.  For example, the Journal of Robert McAfee details the 
discovery of deceased American troops disinterred by Indians during the War of 1812: 
 
Came to the bones of 13 or 14 of our countrymen killed at the River Razin the 22
nd 
January last and which had been interred by Col. Johnson the 29
th of June last, the 
Indians having dug them up. (they cry aloud for revenge!) the bones of men lay at 
intervals for three miles until we come to the River Rezin [sic] . . . . The Chimneys of the 
houses in which the Indians, burnt our wounded prisoniers [sic] and their bones burnt to 
cinders yet lie open to the calls of vindictive justice of a much injured country.
54   
 
Here, McAfee directly relates the disruption of American bonding with the land to the integrity 
of a ‘much injured country’, underscoring the need to claim the land, and how such sites of 
violence indicate where identification with the land cannot be made and claims of rightful 
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inheritance to the land cannot be naturalized.  Similar anxieties pervade the popular captivity 
narrative, ‘The Remarkable Adventures of Jackson Johonnet of Massachusetts’ (1793), in which 
the protagonist details how a fellow captive is scalped, ‘struck’ ‘on the head with tomahawks’, 
stripped naked, ‘stabbed’ with ‘knives in every sensitive part of the body, and left’ ‘weltering in 
blood’.
55  Following this scene of dismemberment, Johonnet comes across the site of General 
Braddock’s defeat against French and Indian forces, where the bones of the English army still 
remain ‘unconsumed’ and ‘strewed on the ground’.
56  The underlying message is that unless 
Americans remove the Indians and claim their paternal land then they, like the British, will be 
exterminated from the country.      
  While such tropes of corporeal disarticulation indicate a disruption between American 
subjectivities and their ‘paternal ground’, the ability to regenerate national subjects is also 
contingent on the ability to create property, as outlined by Kant.  This conflation between the 
creation of property and the regeneration of national citizens is fleshed out in the ‘Affecting 
History of the Dreadful Distresses of Frederic Manheim’s Family’, which tells the story of an 
‘industrious German’, Manheim, and his twin teenage daughters, who are all captured by Indians 
while he is ‘at work’, then taken into the woods, where two warriors get into a disagreement 
‘about whose property the girls should be, as they had jointly seized them’.
57  To ‘terminate the 
dispute’, the chiefs of the party decide that the ‘prisoners who gave rise to the contention, should 
be destroyed’.
58  The girls are then stripped, ‘tied each to a sapling’, pitched from knees to 
shoulders with ‘upwards of six hundred’ splinters ‘sharpened’ at one end and dipped in ‘melted 
turpentine’ at the other, and then set on fire, exhibiting a ‘scene of monstrous misery’.  Only after 
they have ‘lost almost every resemblance to the human form’ do the ‘helpless virgins’ finally 
sink ‘down into the arms of their deliverer, Death!!’.
59   
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Although this scene of immolation involves Manheim’s twin daughters, it allegorizes the 
husbandman’s lost regenerative potential as caused by an inability to create property.  Tellingly, 
the Indians arrive while the ‘industrious’ Manheim is ‘at work’, and the immolation of 
Manheim’s virginal, teenage daughters gives physical form to this important disruption, their 
loss of ‘resemblance to the human form’ symbolizing the lost potential for the American blood-
stock to regenerate through the production of property.  Underlining how the daughters 
instantiate Manheim’s lost ability to create property is the way their immolation comes about 
when the Indians argue about ‘whose property the girls should be’, thereby signaling how the 
potential to create property has slipped into Indian hands.  A similar connection between 
property and regeneration is also seen in the ‘Sufferings of JOHN CORBLY’s Family’.  After 
detailing how his infant is ‘killed and scalped’ by Indians, his wife shot ‘through the body’, and 
his son dispatched with a hatchet sunk ‘into his brains’, Corbly refers to his two scalped-but-
living daughters as ‘a great deal of trouble and expense’ due to the fact that he is ‘to worldly 
circumstances, almost ruined’.
60  The image of scalping further entrenches the link between 
property and regenerative loss, because scalps were considered property.
61  Just as Manheim’s 
daughters instantiate the ability to regenerate citizens through the ability to create property, so do 
Corbly’s; and although their ‘labour’ is extreme violence, in scalping the daughters the Indians 
appropriate the Anglo-American potential to create property and regenerate its ‘race’.   
Reversing depictions of Anglo-American dismemberment as symbolic of an inability to 
perpetuate the American ‘race’ by establishing property are depictions of Native American 
dismemberment that serve to affirm America’s right to claim the land and transform it into 
property.  ‘An Encounter Between a White Man and Two Savages’ details an altercation 
between a plantation owner named David Morgan and two Indians, which leaves the first ‘shot 
dead upon the spot’ and the second stabbed in the stomach.  Morgan escapes the conflict, makes 
his way to a nearby fort, then returns to ‘the scene of the action’ with a war party to find the 
surviving Indian ‘in the top of a fallen tree, where he had picked the knife out of his body, after 
which had come out parched corn, &c.’  On first sight the Indian salutes the party with ‘“How do 
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do, broder, how do do, broder?”’; however, the war party’s ‘brotherhood to him extend[s] only to 
tomahawking, scalping, and, to gratify some peculiar feelings of their own’, skinning them both 
and making ‘drum heads of their skins’.
62  While the two Indians embody ‘Indian obstacles’ to 
Anglo-America’s ownership of the soil, they also stand for Indian lands, with Morgan’s victory 
affirming settler rights to invest the new continent with property.  Indeed, both Indians literally 
become property when their skins are manufactured into ‘drum heads’, and before the second 
Indian is even dead he already leaks commodities by way of ‘parched corn’ – a commodification 
emphasized by a ‘devouring’ trope when Morgan bites the Indian’s finger and gives it a ‘severe 
screw with his teeth’ during their initial struggle.
63  The ‘Encounter’ also reflects themes about 
regeneration when the two Native Americans are originally spotted while Morgan watches his 
children work on his plantation, while the Indian’s exclusion from the ‘brotherhood’ of white 
settlers implies his foregone filial bond with the soil that the settlers share.
64   
Another important detail in the ‘Encounter’ is the suggested lowered intellect of the 
Native American when he asks, ‘How do do, broder?’, which serves to illustrate the Kantian 
ideal that relative superiority determines degree of possession.  At the same time, such depictions 
enact Anglo-American projections of irrationality onto Native American minds and bodies, 
thereby serving to stabilize the competitive forms of Anglo-American masculinities that emerged 
in response to the volatile political and economic climate of the new nation’s first decades.  
These competitive ways of being required ‘individual men to internalize in terms of personal 
responsibility the political and economic vicissitudes’ of the times, resulting in patterns of 
anxiety amongst white men that ‘intensified [a] need for management and control’.  One of the 
early nation’s means for establishing stable self-identity, and especially stable national manhood, 
was an act of racial projection against an ‘Other identity whose peculiarities needed “civilizing”’.  
Enacting racial projection relocated the fragmenting anxieties onto white men’s Others, cohered 
a self-narrative of ‘manly control’, and restored a ‘unitary sense of self’ through ‘performance of 
boundary maintenance’.  As Dana Nelson explains, ‘the abstracting identity of white/ national 
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manhood found one means for stabilizing its internal divisions and individual anxieties via 
imagined projections into, onto, against Indian territories, Indian bodies, Indian identities’, and 
she illustrates these white/ national projections in her analysis of Nicholas Biddle’s 1814 edition 
of The History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition.
65   
Recalling Homi Bhabha’s assertion that ‘the narrative and psychological force that 
nationness brings to bear on cultural production and political projection is the effect of the 
ambivalence of “nation” as narrative strategy’, Nelson presents Biddle’s text-as-production as a 
project(ion) of Indians-as-display that ‘thematizes’ national manhood, specifically by 
strategically editing the original Lewis and Clark journals into narratives of ‘national 
achievement’, of ‘civilization borne into the wild’ by white American men.
66  This thematization 
of national manhood is grounded in a scopophilic rhetoric that paradoxically performs white 
rational masculinity by placing Others on display.  By continually displaying ‘Indians’ while 
allowing Lewis and Clark to resist ‘the bodily captation involved in being put on display’ 
themselves,
67 Biddle’s History enacts a ‘fantasy of masculinity’ of ‘non-self-conscious selfhood 
endowed with absolute control of a gaze whose directionality is irreversible’, itself a narrative 
performance for Others.
68  In particular, ‘“Indianness” qua difference’, especially ethnographic 
difference, is persistently reiterated and ‘evaluated from the vantage of rational manhood’: 
‘Indian appearance (“diminutive stature,” “ill-shaped,” “thick ankles”), Indian clothing (“the 
women are clad in a peculiar manner”), Indian behaviors (dancing, gambling, thieving), [are] 
always surveyed’ and contrasted.  More importantly, however, national masculinity is 
maintained by Indian ‘systems of ignorance and superstition’ that recall white rational 
superiority and lend a ‘material advantage to national claims’.
69  The correlation between rational 
superiority and territorial claims for the nation is evinced by the Corps of Discovery’s expedition 
onto an Indian burial mound: 
 
[I]t was not till after four hours march that we reached the object of our visit.  This was a 
large mound in the midst of the plain [. . . .]  [T]he Indians have made it a great article of 
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their superstition: it is called the mountain of Little People, or Little Spirits, and they 
believe that it is the abode of little devils, in the human form, of about eighteen inches 
high and with remarkably large heads; they are armed with sharp arrows, with which they 
are very skillful. . . .  The tradition is, that many have suffered from these little spirits. . . .  
This has inspired all the neighboring nations, Sioux, Mahas, and Ottoes, with such terror, 
that no consideration could tempt them to visit the hill.  We saw none of these wicked 
little spirits; nor any place for them, except some small holes scattered over the top: we 
were happy enough to escape their vengeance, though we remained some time on the 
mound to enjoy the delightful prospect of the plain.
70 
 
Not only does the burial mound offer a ‘vantage [for] geographical survey’, but it confirms the 
‘heroic rationality’ of the Corps of Discovery as representatives of the American nation.  As 
Nelson explains, ‘the expedition literally and with symbolic import goes out of its way to stand 
on the bones of dead Indians in order to register its territorial sovereignty and rational 
superiority’.  Biddle thereby confirms national claims by literally elevating American manhood 
over Indian bodies and identities.
71 
  We can see how Lewis and Clark’s ascension over the burial mound recalls Thomas 
Jefferson’s exploration of the ‘Barrows’
72 in the Notes, particularly in shared themes of ‘rational 
superiority’ over Indian bodies.  Like Lewis and Clark, Jefferson approaches the mound 
rationally, employing empirical observation and methodology in his examination of the burial 
site, noting, ‘it [is] of a spheroidical form, of about 40 feet in diameter at the base, and had been 
of about twelve feet altitude, though now reduced by plough to seven and a half’; and, in order to 
‘examine its internal structure’ he makes ‘a perpendicular cut through the body of the barrow’ 
that ‘pass[es] about three feet from its center, [is] opened to the former surface of the earth, and 
[is] wide enough for a man to walk through and examine its sides’.
73   
Yet while Jefferson’s terminology conforms to an empirical system his vocabulary is also 
interesting for the corporeal imagery it calls forth: opening the ‘body’ of the barrow recalls 
Jefferson’s lament that ‘science had not yet performed such invasive procedures as would yield 
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definitive evidence for racial/ bodily difference’.
74  In a sense, the barrow is both a substitute and 
synecdoche for Indian interiority, and what Jefferson discovers inside confirms that Indian 
‘essence’ is irrational and disordered, and wants the rational, civilizing tendencies naturally 
associated with ‘whiteness’:   
 
I first dug superficially in several parts of it, and came to collections of human bones, at 
different depths, at six inches to three feet below the surface.  These were lying in the 
utmost confusion, some vertical, some oblique, some horizontal, and directed to every 
point of the compass, entangled, and held together in clusters by the earth.  Bones of the 
most distant parts were found together, as, for instance, the small bones of the foot in the 
hollow of the scull, many sculls would sometimes be in contact, lying on the face, on the 
side, on the back, top or bottom, so as, on the whole, to give the idea of bones emptied 
promiscuously from a bag or basket, and covered over with earth, without any attention 
to their order.
75 
 
Of particular emphasis here is the Indians’ ‘utmost confusion’: they lack mobilization toward a 
specific direction, their bodies are disarticulate and positioned ‘promiscuously’, connoting want 
of reasonable restraint, and they are without ‘attention’ ‘to order’.  Their ‘confused position[s]’ 
are only underscored by their tendency to further fragmentation: ‘the sculls [are] so tender, that 
they generally [fall] to pieces on being touched’ and the skeleton of an infant ‘[falls] to pieces on 
being taken out’ of the sepulcher.
76  This lack of order inherent to Indian interiority positions the 
‘aborigines’ outside of rational discourse in Jefferson’s Notes, and becomes manifest in the 
fragmented aboriginal societies.  Jefferson describes the Indians as possibly emerging from 
‘antiently [sic] three different [racial] stocks’ which ‘separated into so many little societies’ 
because they ‘never submitted themselves to any laws, any coercive power, any shadow of 
government’.  Thus, while ‘great societies cannot exist without government’ the ‘Savages 
therefore break them into small ones’,
77 and ‘fall to pieces’ into groups of ‘10 or 12 men’ or a 
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‘few women’, which, like the barrows, ‘will probably disappear in time’.
78  In his analysis of the 
Notes, Malcolm Kelsall observes that for Jefferson, ‘the land had already been cleared and the 
aboriginals had melted away from the landscape (seemingly through some unexplained process 
apparently marked by the coming of the bees which are the sign of the approach of the 
agricultural settlements of the whites)’.
79  Positing Indian extinction as contingent on their own 
lack of rationality at once distances European-American involvement from aboriginal extinction 
and underscores America’s ‘material advantage to national claims’ based on rational superiority.  
For Jefferson, just as Lewis and Clark, ‘defining “Indians” provided an opportunity for 
scientifically validating whiteness qua civilization, pedagogically mapping it for the body politic 
while extending it politically across the continent’.
80  Projecting and positioning Indians as 
irrational justified national claims to the continent and cohered American identity at the cost of 
disarticulating Indian bodies.    
     While dismembered Anglo-American bodies demarcate anxious assertions to ownership 
of the soil, and Native American disarticulation affirms settler rights based on relative 
superiority, dismembered masculinities can also simultaneously indicate where assertions to the 
land fail as well as where they are confirmed.  One such body is the ‘shattered’ figure of Colonel 
Richard M. Johnson.  Vice-President of the United States from 1836-1840, he was also a veteran 
of the War of 1812, and was noted for presumably killing Chief Tecumseh in the Battle of the 
Thames in October, 1813.
81  Johnson’s fight with Tecumseh, and his subsequent injuries, 
occurred when American troops led by General Harrison overtook the retreating British Army, 
who had secured themselves geographically with the Thames River flanking their left, and a 
swamp occupied by British-allied Indian forces on their right.  Harrison ordered Johnson to 
charge the British.  Johnson, however, divided his regiment into two battalions, sent his brother, 
James, and one battalion against the British, and attacked the embedded Indians himself, 
spearheading the charge with twenty volunteers called ‘The Forlorn Hope’.
82  Although 
romanticizing events, ‘eye-witness’ Samuel R. Brown recounts: 
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The Colonel most gallantly led the head of his column into the hottest of the enemy’s 
fire, and was personally opposed to Tecumseh.  At this point a condensed mass of 
savages had collected.  Yet, regardless of danger, he rushed into the midst of them – so 
thick were the indians [sic] at this moment that several might have touched him with their 
rifles.  He rode a white horse and was known to be an officer of rank – a shower of balls 
was discharged at him – some took effect – his horse was shot under him – his clothes, 
his saddle, his person was pierced with bullets.  At the moment his horse fell Tecumseh 
rushed towards him with an uplifted tomahawk, to give the fatal stroke, but his presence 
of mind did not forsake him in this perilous predicament – he drew a pistol from his 
holsters and laid his daring opponent dead at his feet.  He was unable to do more, the loss 
of blood deprived him of strength to stand . . . he was wounded in five places; he received 
three shots in the right knee and two in the left arm.
83 
      
After the American victory at the Thames, Richard Johnson’s bullet-ridden body became both a 
source of patriotism and public curiosity.  In 1814, Niles’ Weekly Register gushed that although 
Johnson ‘received several wounds in various parts of his body, it gives us great pleasure to state 
that his general health is perfectly re-established, and he has the happy prospect of entirely 
recovering his left arm and hand, which were much shattered’; and Richard Rush called Johnson 
‘a man upon crutches; his frame all mutilated; moving with difficulty yet an object of patriotic 
interest with everybody’.
84   
  Although the Battle of the Thames occurred in 1813, Poe would have been familiar with 
the historical narrative because it was recalled during Johnson’s campaigns for Vice-Presidency 
in 1836 and re-election in 1840.  Indeed, William Whipple contends that Poe’s character, John 
A.B.C. Smith, is based on Johnson because of the ‘obvious similarities: the swamp fight, the 
prodigies of valor, the shattered body’.  Of singular note during Johnson’s campaigns was the 
attention made of his wounds, often with Christ-like undertones suggestive of national 
martyrdom.  After recalling Johnson’s ‘scarred and shattered frame and limping gate [sic]’ in an 
1835 eulogy, Mr. Holt, a Kentucky representative, said Johnson ‘poured out his blood like water’ 
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in his battle against the ‘savage myrmydons’; and the May 25, 1835 edition of the Washington 
Daily Globe claimed that Johnson’s wounds ‘began to bleed afresh’.
85   
Public fascination with Johnson’s ‘shattered frame’ was also exploited in the Indian 
drama, Tecumseh, with a final scene of implied apotheosis: injured with ‘death wounds [that 
will] not bring death’, Johnson lies on the stage as several characters cheer his victory and ‘The 
Goddess of Liberty descends from the clouds in a car’.
86  Written by Richard Emmons to 
promote Johnson’s vice-presidential bid, in its day, Tecumseh met with mixed reviews.
 87  With 
language that predicts John A.B.C Smith’s ‘lower limbs’ described as ‘ne plus ultra of good 
legs’,
88 the February 1, 1834 edition of Niles Register refers to Tecumseh’s attempts at historical 
authenticity as ‘ne plus ultra of the ridiculous’, and continues, ‘If it is the intention of Col. 
Johnson’s friends to name him for vice-presidency, they ought promptly to forbid or suppress 
these bombastic proceedings if they can’.  Johnson, for his part, enjoyed the play, and in a letter 
to his friend Thomas Henderson said ‘a very crowded Audience huzzah[ed] etc to the death of 
Tecumseh etc.  I have more friends than ever by hundred’.
89       
  While Emmons’s Tecumseh is mostly forgotten today, it is still useful toward an analysis 
of Poe’s work.  Indeed, to some degree Poe’s American-based satire, ‘The Man That Was Used 
Up’, addresses productions like Tecumseh, not least of all because they exemplify the ‘literary 
nationalism’ that Poe disdains when he notes, ‘our reviews urged the propriety’ ‘of strictly 
“American” themes’ and ‘we found ourselves daily in the paradoxical dilemma of liking, or 
pretending to like, a stupid book the better because (sure enough) its stupidity was of our own 
growth, and discussed our own affairs’.
90  More importantly, tales such as ‘The Man That Was 
Used Up’ parallel Emmons’s vision of Indian warfare, ‘used up’ identity, and the American 
struggle for land, even while Emmons mobilizes these tropes for nationalistic ends and Poe 
critiques them to question the construction of national subjectivity.   
Of prominence in both authors’ texts is the trope of being ‘used up’, associated with 
dismemberment by Poe, and correlated with being devoured in Tecumseh.  Imagery of ‘using up’ 
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or devouring is mentioned throughout Emmons’s drama, most often as a threat used by the 
Americans and Indians, and, significantly, not by the British: the Kentucky soldiers, who call 
themselves ‘alligator horses’, boast they’ll ‘make a snack’ of English General Proctor, and ‘use 
him up, bones and all’; while Tecumseh wants to ‘swallow up [his] enemies’, orders his soldiers, 
‘Glut thy wrath’, and threatens to ‘consume’ Kentucky.
91  The British, in contrast, are positioned 
more subserviently in the eat-or-be-eaten land struggle of Tecumseh in that they always display 
anxiety at being consumed: Proctor fears the Americans will ‘barbacue’ [sic] the British and 
‘feast upon [their] scorching quivering limbs!’, while the British villager, Cloutier, believes 
Kentuckians ‘think no more of eating a child than a pig’, and comforts his son with the words, 
‘You are safe in your daddy’s arms.  They shall eat me first.  How that big fellow snapped his 
teeth at thee!’.
92   
  On one level, British anxiety over being ‘used up’ reflects an over-arching ideology that 
juxtaposes American manliness against a British lack of integrity.  While Americans talk about 
‘test[ing] the temper of [their] steel[s]’ and ‘bar[ing] their bosom[s] to repel the enemies of 
[their] country’ for the ‘twentieth time’, the British Colonel Chambers calls his sword ‘useless’, 
and worries about being ‘unman[ned]’.
93  This lack of manliness is also displayed by Proctor, 
who cries ‘“Alas!  We are undone!”  I must away’ when he hears of Johnson’s attack; ‘grasps the 
hilt of his sword, and occasionally draws it partly from his scabbard’ when addressed by 
Tecumseh; and offers the Indian chief ‘a military sash and epaulettes’ in appeasement.
94  Also, 
after bartering with Indians about the price of scalps, Proctor touches his own head and says 
‘’Tis safe; I feel it safe’.
95  His anxiety is mirrored by Jerry, his aide, who yells, ‘I’ve lost my 
scalp! ‘tis gone’, then ‘feel[s] his head with his hand’ and states, ‘Oh! it’s – Yes, it’s all right’.
96     
  Yet while the British tendency to ‘come undone’ in Tecumseh affirms an ‘unmanliness’ it 
also recalls an epistemological condition that correlates coherent subjectivities with the ability to 
bond with the American soil, an ability historically denied to the British for having been expelled 
from America after the Revolutionary War.  In short, their ‘devourability’ stems from their 
inability to claim American soil as their paternal ground: just as the Indians in Jefferson’s Notes 
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‘deny a dead enemy sepulcher in their land’, prohibiting their bonding with the soil, Tecumseh 
tells Proctor, ‘the fowls of heaven shall eat thee’, implying that he will be ‘used up’ and made to 
disappear from the country.
 97  However, this disjuncture between the English and the land as 
depicted by Emmons also stands in for a specific event in American history.  In his encounter 
with the Kentucky soldiers Cloutier mentions the dichotomy between being buried and ‘used up’, 
saying, ‘I feel more satisfied to have my son buried than to be eaten by these Kentuckians’, then 
recalls ‘Proctor the Great – the hero of Raisin!’ before a Kentuckian is restrained from assaulting 
him.
98  By mentioning the Raisin River, Cloutier recollects an event from the War of 1812 when 
five hundred American troops defeated British forces in Frenchtown, Michigan, without 
casualties, but, after failing to fortify their camp, were captured and killed by Indian forces.  
Even prisoners who Proctor promised to protect ‘were victims of the most grewsome [sic] 
savagery’.
99  In association with this reference to the Raisin is the aftermath, when American 
troops were disinterred from their burial grounds, as noted by McAfee above, thereby bringing 
into relief a site where American identification with the land was disrupted by America’s 
aboriginal inhabitants.   
  Reference to the disinterred American dead recurs when Tecumseh halts Indian troops 
from scalping a fallen American soldier, saying, ‘Shame! Let dead men sleep in death’.
100  Here, 
the noble Indian’s affirmation of America’s right to bond with the New World discursively 
surmounts an historical event where this right was destabilized; and this affirmation is 
underscored by its chronological placement in Emmons’s drama: Tecumseh verifies America’s 
sense of geographical bonding, falls in battle moments later, then utters last words reminiscent of 
Chief Logan’s speech: ‘The Red Man’s course is run; I die – the last of all my race’.
101  In short, 
he acknowledges American entitlement to the land, then dies, along with the rest of his ‘race’, 
making way for the rightful inheritors to the land.  Assuring the completion of America’s 
displacement of the Indian are the ghosts of the ‘Red Men’ who, unlike the fallen American, 
cannot ‘sleep in death’.  As Tecumseh’s brother, Prophet, states, ‘Let the Pale-face die – the Red-
man live [. . . .]  Wander no more ye ghosts, wrapped up in folds of darkness’, and ‘vengeance, 
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come forth; appease thy troubled ghosts, and avenge the red man’s fall!’.
102  These sentiments 
are reiterated by Tecumseh, who ‘hears the spirits shriek – Revenge!’ and orders his troops to 
raise their voices ‘on high, and, to the shrieking ghosts hold converse’.
103  The Indians ‘wander’ 
after death as spirits and ghosts, because they are disconnected from the land due to the arrival of 
the ‘Pale-faces’. 
  In Tecumseh, the Americans’ ultimate triumph of the War of 1812, then, is not against the 
British, but the Indians, who represent America’s real obstacle to claiming their part of the New 
World and the generating national subjects.  The correlation between Indians and the American 
inability to regenerate is made clear when the Indian, Maypock, offers Proctor scalps from 
‘infants’ and tells Prophet about the ‘bride and bridegroom’ and ‘baby’ he murdered.
104  The 
British, in contrast, are never drawn as a threat.  Their removal from the country is constantly 
alluded to by their tendency to be ‘used up’.  In a sense, the British represent what Americans 
would be without land, and in this regard embody projections of American anxieties.  By 
‘coming undone’ at points of colonial contact, as Proctor repeatedly does (mostly in regard to 
character, but with symbolic corporeal disarticulation as well), the British embody America’s 
own fears of a destabilized identity caused by a disrupted relationship with the land.   
Serving as a foil to Proctor is Johnson, who maintains his masculine identity as the ‘foremost of 
Kentucky’s sons’ even though wounded by Tecumseh.
 105  In part, Johnson’s integrity is 
grounded in the fact that he is the Indians’ natural successor and therefore has a manly ‘purity’ 
which ‘comes from [his] proximity to [his] own land and “the face of the earth”’.  This 
succession, or displacement, of the Indian is suggested in the similarity of wounds shared by 
Johnson and Prophet’s ghosts.  While Prophet envisions Indian ghosts ‘opening their wounds, 
steaming hot blood’, Johnson says ‘I faint – my blood’ before ‘sink[ing] upon the stage’.
106    As 
a successor to the Indians’ ownership of the land, as well as a reference to the River Raisin 
Massacre, Johnson’s wounded body has two contrary and simultaneous meanings: first, it recalls 
a site where American proximity to the land is questionable; but, secondly, the fact that Johnson 
retains his masculine integrity despite his wounded frame necessarily points to his naturalized 
bond with the land, so his wounds also confirm and celebrate national claims to the continent.  In 
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this regard, Johnson’s broken self recalls the paradoxical reasoning in Locke’s ‘Property’ that 
Horwitz outlines: ‘self owns property because it owns itself; at the same time, the self owns itself 
only because realized by and invested in property’.  Similarly, Johnson is wounded and 
incomplete because his claim to the land is contested; at the same time his masculine self is 
stable despite his wounds because it is ‘realized by and invested in [the] property’ of the New 
World. 
Just as Johnson’s relationship to the land is paradoxical and cannot be resolved, his 
corresponding open wound cannot be healed, as indicated in the final scene of Emmons’s drama.  
Here, Johnson’s martyrdom enables American regeneration, as suggested by the subplot of 
Lucinda and Edward, two separated lovers reunited at the play’s end after recognizing Johnson 
as their ‘deliverer’.
107  Yet although Johnson counters Maypock’s murderous actions, Johnson 
himself remains undisturbed on the ground, the characters waving the American flag over his 
bleeding body.
108  The curtain falls without any closure of his wounds.  To the contrary, his 
wounds will remain open and ‘bleed afresh’ during his bid for vice-presidency; and as a trope, 
the image of the open wound will recur in contemporary depictions of white-Indian struggles 
over land such as the Second Seminole War (1835-42).  Compare, for example, Johnson’s 
injuries with those sustained by Ransom Clarke during the Dade Ambush: 
 
Clarke received his first wound in the thigh, about 1 o’clock, outside the breast work, 
which brought him to the ground.  He soon recovered himself, and crawled and limped 
in.  He placed himself along it and commenced firing in that position, but in the act of 
elevating the musket, received a wound between the elbow and right shoulder.  He still 
continued to fire and load, but again received two wounds, one in the head from buck 
shot, and a small rifle ball in the back.  He still kept on till about 4 o’clock, when he 
received a ball on the right scapula from a negro; who, when he fired, cried out, “There 
damn you.”  This disabled him, and he fell on his face, and continued motionless.
109 
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The article relating to Clarke’s injuries is subjoined in the August 20
th, 1836 edition of Niles’ 
National Register with an ‘official document’ from Washington which discloses that ‘Clarke 
received five wounds in battle’ and ‘the wound in his shoulder is yet open, and an expoilation 
[sic] of the bones occur[s] almost daily’.
110  By referring to Ransom Clarke I wish to outline a 
particular trope which Poe would have been familiar with and which would structure the images 
of disarticulate masculinity in his own corpus.  On a narrative level, Clarke’s wounds are similar 
to Johnson’s because they are ‘death wounds that will not bring death’ and continue to ‘bleed 
afresh’.  Further, just as Johnson’s shattered frame is an object of ‘patriotic interest’, Clarke’s 
narrative is linked with a national struggle, presented with ‘a view of showing what men suffer in 
defense of their country’ and displaying ‘the condition he has been reduced in that country’s 
service’.
111  Like Johnson, Clarke embodies an ambivalent state for the American self; namely, 
the anxious condition of being at once a national subject and not a national subject, of being 
founded on paradoxical grounds.   
  In bringing to a close discussion about the link between property and the foundation of 
the civic self as a context for Poe’s fiction it is important to acknowledge that this link became 
less vital in defining subjectivity over the course of America’s transformation from a 
Jeffersonian rural republic to a Jacksonian nation characterized by industrialization and 
economic booms.  While Enlightened tenets remained pervasive into the 1830s, they were 
challenged by Jacksonian democracy and the concurrent social changes.  Specifically, ownership 
of private property, and the financial independence it facilitated, was de-emphasized as essential 
for full democratic citizenship as states steadily eliminated voting restrictions from the 1790s to 
the 1820s; and by 1828 many white males over the age of twenty-one enjoyed voting privileges 
regardless of property ownership.
112  As well, due to the increase in manufacturing 
establishments promoted by the Embargo of 1807, and made necessary by the British blockades 
during the War of 1812, Jefferson’s utopian ideal of a ‘nation of husbandmen’ had begun to 
disappear before he was even retired from the presidency.   
  However, the notion of a fundamental connection between property – particularly land – 
and identity still persisted.  Alexander Hamilton, one of the Founding Fathers, wrote the political 
philosophy underpinning early America’s new industrialism.  Hamilton was convinced that 
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social stability was contingent on a firm alliance between government and business, and stated 
that no society could succeed ‘which did not unite the interest and credit of rich individuals with 
those of the state’.
113  Behind this premise was a deep-seated conviction that society would be 
governed best by an aristocracy based properly and enduringly on property.  Congressman 
Daniel Webster of Massachusetts supported Hamilton’s argument when he declared that ‘power 
naturally and necessarily follows property’ and that  
 
a republican form of government rests not more on political constitutions than on those 
laws which regulate the descent and transmission of property [. . . .]  It would seem, then, 
to be the part of political wisdom to found government on property; and to establish such 
distribution of property, by the laws which regulate its transmission and alienation, as to 
interest the great majority of society in the protection of the government.
114 
 
Webster’s sentiment was echoed by Benjamin Watkins Leigh of Virginia, who asserted that 
‘power and property may be separated for a time by force or fraud – but divorced, never.  For, so 
soon as the pang of separation is felt, . . . property will purchase power, or power will take over 
property’.  In short, neo-Federalists such as Hamilton, Webster and Leigh subscribed to an 
ideology that linked power and property together, and sought to retain their political and 
economic ascendency by restricting the governmental franchise with property qualifications that 
prevented the flight of political power from propertied men.
115   
This correlation between property and power further extended to one between the amount 
of property owned and the degree of political influence held.  As one Chancellor Kent stated at 
an 1821 New York convention, ‘society is an association for the protection of property as well as 
of life, and the individual who contributes only one cent to the common stock, ought not to have 
the same power and influence in directing the property concerns of the partnership, as he who 
contributes his thousands’; and Jeremiah Mason repeated a similar ideal: ‘as the wealth of the 
commercial and manufacturing classes increases, in the same degree ought their political power 
to increase. . . .  I know this aristocracy of wealth is apt to be evil spoken of.  But in a country 
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where wealth greatly abounds, I doubt whether any other foundation for a stable government can 
be found’.
 116 
  It was the emphatic link between political agency and land which Jacksonian Democrats, 
such as Martin Van Buren, argued against when they expounded Universal Suffrage and urged 
ownership of personal property, instead of exclusive territory, as a qualification for voting rights.  
At an 1821 New York convention to modify the state constitution, Van Buren aligned the 
Federalists with the aristocratic corruption of Britain by noting their precedence of property over 
natural rights of suffrage:       
 
What, sir, said he, was the cause of the corruptions which confessedly prevail in that 
portion of the representation in the parliament of Great Britain?  Was it the lowness of the 
qualification of the electors, in comparison with the residue of the country?  No. . . . I will 
tell you, sir, said Mr. V. B. what is the cause – it is because the representation in question, 
is a representation of things, and not of men – it is because that it is attached to territory, 
to a village or town, without regard to the population; as by the amendment under 
consideration, it is attempted here to be attached to territory, and to territory only. . . .
117  
 
In contradistinction, anti-Jacksonianists such as Philip N. Nicholas argued that ‘personal 
property is fluctuating – it is frequently invisible, as well as intangible – it can be removed, and 
can be enjoyed as well in one society as another.  What evidence of permanent interest and 
attachment [to America], is afforded by the ownership of horses, cattle, or slaves?’.
118   ‘Lasting 
ownership of the soil of the country’, on the other hand, is ‘durable’ and ‘indestructible’, ‘and the 
man who acquires, or is proprietor of it’ is one of the ‘chosen people of God’, and ‘connects his 
fate by the strongest of all ties, with the destiny of the country’.
119  For Nicholas, such arguments 
for permanent interest reflect not only the American Bill of Rights, which states ‘that all men 
having sufficient evidence of permanent, common interest with, and attachment to, the 
community, have the Right of Suffrage’, but the larger Enlightened epistemologies that inform it, 
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particularly the social contract.  He argues that ‘suffrage is a conventional, and not a natural 
right.  In a state of nature, (if such a state ever existed except in the imagination of the poets,) 
every man acts for himself and is the sole judge of what will contribute to his happiness’.  But 
when the same man ‘enters into the social state [. . .] to guard himself against violence, and to 
protect him in the enjoyment of the fruits of his industry’ he must surrender a portion of his 
natural rights to governmental powers in order to ‘secure to him such portion of those rights he 
retains’, or other rights that emerge from his new social position.
120  This contractual basis of 
society foregrounds how Representation and Suffrage are strictly social institutions as opposed to 
‘natural’ rights.  The Bill of Rights recognizes this distinction and the manner in which natural 
rights are modified upon entrance into the social state. 
  This link between self and property pertained not only to rights to full citizenship, but 
character as well.  In 1834 Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, a Bostonian judge, explained the 
‘diversity of poverty and riches’ as an ‘order of Providence’:  ‘Why are not all the flowers of the 
field equally beautiful and fragrant?  Why are not all the fruits of the earth equally rich and 
wholesome?  And why [. . .] towers the oak in grandeur to heaven, while the shrub at its base is 
trodden under feet?  Will vain regrets, and still vainer discontent change the course of nature?’  
The implication that ‘grandeur’ is attributed to the wealthy, and ‘base[ness]’ to the poor is stated 
more explicitly in the December 1832 edition of the American Quarterly Review: ‘the lowest 
orders of society ordinarily mean the poorest – and the highest, the richest [. . . .]  Sensual 
excess, want of intelligence, and moral debasement distinguished the former – knowledge, 
intellectual superiority, and refined, social, and domestic affections, the latter’.
121  Such 
sentiments, as well as Nicholas’s 1831 argument during the Virginian convention to modify the 
state constitution, suggest that while Universal Suffrage inexorably passed to the propertyless 
classes, thereby altering the definition of American citizenship, vestiges of the Enlightenment 
link between self and land still pervaded the popular mind in the Jacksonian era.
122  Vis-à-vis the 
historical and cultural context of Poe’s corpus, we see how property was interconnected with 
identity, and how the anxious possibilities of disrupting the ‘inalienable self’ through the 
alienation of land become manifested as broken masculine bodies in the contemporary popular 
media.   
                                                           
120 Nicholas, pp. 91-92. 
121 Schlesinger, p. 14. 
122 Ibid. 37 
 
 
Edgar Allan Poe in Jacksonian America 
How does Poe figure into this historical context of Native Americans, property and the 
self?  On the surface it seems that colonial issues about Indian Removal are peripheral to his 
concerns.  Indeed, as D.H. Lawrence asserts, ‘Poe has no truck with Indians or Nature.  He 
makes no bones about Red Brothers and Wigwams’.
123  It would be easy to agree with 
Lawrence’s argument: only three of Poe’s works explicitly deal with Native Americans as a 
theme, and one of these, The Journal of Julius Rodman, was left unfinished.  Two other works, 
‘The Philosophy of Furniture’ and ‘The Business Man’, mention Native Americans in passing: 
the former essay-story oddly notes that the ‘Kickapoos are very well in their way’ regarding 
‘internal decoration’, and that a carpet ‘should not be bedizened out like a Riccaree Indian – all 
red chalk, yellow ochre and cock’s feathers’, while the ‘business man’ of the latter tale 
implements the scheme of the ‘Eye-Sore trade’ by building a ‘mud hovel’ or ‘pig-sty’ of ‘either 
Esquimau, Kickapoo, or Hottentot’ style near the site of a new mansion and then demanding 
payment to have it removed.
124  Yet even while the ‘Red Brothers’ are mostly absent from Poe’s 
fiction, they maintain an organizing absence, providing the structuring economy for Poe’s ideas 
about property and ownership.   
The reason why Native Americans play a vital role in Poe’s perceptions of property can 
be explained by assessing how Poe considered himself and his literary endeavours within 
Jacksonian America.  Michael Kimmel and David Leverenz both outline three typologies of 
early American masculinity which, although never fully existent in reality, are useful for 
studying the class basis for gender codes and understanding how Poe related property to the 
self.
125  The first ideology of manhood, and the one characteristic the era, was the new middle 
class, or ‘self-made men’, who dominated early American definitions of manhood.
126  These 
‘new men’ derived their identities from the public sphere, based their worth on work and 
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entrepreneurial competition, and affirmed their values through accumulated wealth, status, and 
geographical and social mobility.
127  The second typology of masculinity refers to a much larger 
producing class of artisanal workers that defined manhood through freedom, pride of craft, and 
citizenship, and believed that independent men of relatively small means were both entitled to 
full citizenship and best equipped to exercise it.
128  The last of the typologies, the patrician 
paradigm, describes a colonial elite comprised of merchants, lawyers, politicians and landed 
gentry who expressed masculinity through property ownership, patriarchy, and republican ideals 
of citizenship.
129  The patrician typology was also was an ideal inherited from Europe, and 
looked to England for cultural prescriptions of behaviour.
130  At their best, the patrician types, or 
Genteel Patriarchs, as termed by Kimmel, were dignified aristocrats committed to upper-class 
codes of honour, with exquisite tastes and manners and refined sensibilities.  Those defined by 
this typology exhibited the ideals of a Christian gentleman, embodying love, kindness, duty, and 
compassion through philanthropic work, and a deep involvement with family.  Many of the 
Founding Fathers, such as Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and James Madison 
exemplified Genteel Patriarchy.
131  The Genteel Patriarchs also believed in their right to lead 
their country by virtue of their title, and in this regard they were aligned by Kant’s exclusive 
qualifications for citizenship pertaining to relative superiority and independence as contingent on 
property ownership.
132  We can see some of the beliefs of the Genteel Patriarchs spelled out by 
James Madison in the Federalist Papers, when he states, the ‘most common and durable source 
of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.  Those who hold and those 
who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society’.
133  As Madison 
explains, social divisions occur because all men are created unequal, with some better at securing 
property than others.
134  Put differently, ‘the diversity in the faculties of men from which the 
rights of property originate’ makes the dream of a ‘uniformity of interests’ ‘impractical’.  The 
‘first form of government’ is to protect these diverse, and from ‘the protection of different and 
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unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property 
immediately results’.
135 
Embedded within America’s class differences, Poe placed himself within the patrician 
paradigm, subscribing to notions of entitlement and assumptions of an inherent superior ability to 
create property.  Simultaneously, he was caught up in contemporary market expectations that 
emphasized ‘self- and money-making’.
136  As Leland S. Person explains, Poe was impelled by 
both these paradigms of manhood, and worked to establish ‘an alternative model of gentility 
through the medium of his writing’, to make ‘textuality itself the source of true aristocracy’.
137  
His solution for creating both a self and living through writing in a society that defined 
masculinity in economic terms was to found a literary journal, to capitalize writing.
138  This link 
between property, manhood and writing is evinced in Poe’s letter to Frederick Thomas: 
‘Literature is the most noble of professions.  In fact, it is about the only one fit for a man.  For 
my own part, there is no seducing me from the path.  I shall be a litterateur, at least, all my life; 
nor would I abandon the hope which still leads me on for all the gold in California’.
139  However, 
of particular note in Poe’s statement is not only that he defines the literary profession as the ‘only 
one fit for a man’, but that he locates value outside of material gain, and even outside of 
textuality.
140  In the same letter, Poe continues,  
 
[Did] it ever strike you that all which is really valuable to a man of letters – to a poet in 
especial – is absolutely unpurchaseable?  Love, fame, the dominion of the intellect, the 
consciousness of power, the thrilling sense of beauty, the free air of Heaven, exercise of 
body & mind, with the physical and moral health which result – these and such as these 
are really all that a poet cares for.
141 
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For Poe, it is not necessarily the material production of ‘letters’ that makes the man.  Rather, 
value is found in what is abstract and ‘unpurchaseable’: ‘love’, ‘the intellect’, ‘beauty’, ‘the free 
air of Heaven’, ‘moral health’ – such nonmaterial things give the ‘poet’ his worth.  While such 
flowery language may be seen as nothing more than sentimentality, it actually signals what is 
very important and intrinsic to Poe’s fiction; specifically, the ‘unpurchaseable’ abstractions Poe 
mentions reflect a Neoplatonism grounded in Platonic epistemology and Christian soteriology.  
When read against this Neoplatonism, Poe’s letter points out exactly what he considers as having 
ultimate value: that is, the human soul immortalized through the theological concept of the Holy 
Spirit, and which comprehends Platonic Ideality through Eros and love.  For Poe, such a soul is 
essential for the creation of true property, and enables one to become a ‘true man’ analogous to 
the True Man, Christ.   
  This Neoplatonism can be made to corroborate the values of the patrician paradigm, with 
the artistic, Christian soul being the inherency that gives the artist his unequal-because-superior 
‘dominion of intellect’ that enables him to create property.  Poe’s ‘elevated’ intellect, which 
reflects his elevated soul, is one of the diverse ‘faculties of men from which the rights of 
property originate’, and a ‘different and unequal’ faculty ‘of acquiring property’ from which 
‘different degrees and kinds of property’ immediately result.  This is not to argue that Poe had no 
worldly concerns, or that he was ‘a dreamer – dwelling in ideal realms’.
142  True to his class, Poe 
valued land as the proper prerequisite for citizenship and political involvement, disdaining the 
social shift towards universal suffrage based on personal property.  This disdain is expressed in 
Marginalia, when Poe states that the ‘nose of the mob is its imagination.  By this, at any time, it 
can be quietly led’; and, at the risk of conflating Poe’s voice with his narrators’, his 
condescension from his position of genteel patriarch is suggested in ‘Mellonta Tauta’, when the 
narrator explains how early nineteenth-century America ‘started with the queerest idea 
conceivable, viz: that all men are born free and equal – this, in the very teeth of the laws of 
gradation so visibly impressed upon all things both in the moral and physical universe’, and 
when the same narrator observes that every ‘man “voted,” as they called it – that is to say, 
meddled with public affairs – until, at length, it was discovered that what is everybody’s business 
is nobody’s, and that the “Republic” (so the absurd thing was called) was without a government 
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at all’.
143  Poe conflated the values of the patrician paradigm with his own Neoplatonic ideas, 
particularly privileging land ownership in his aesthetic theories.  For Poe, the highest ideal of 
personhood, or manhood, is the commingling of spiritual property with land.  Such a union 
between the soul and the earth through an artistic labour lends the artist perfectibility, as 
described in greater detail in Chapter Three.   
  In order for the artist to achieve this perfectibility two aspects are required: the elevated 
soul and an incontestable ownership of the land.  In Poe’s fiction, these two principles are 
embodied by women and Native Americans, groups of people who, along with African-
Americans, were barred from property ownership in Jacksonian America, and, on a more 
ideological level, were precluded from the universal, Enlightened precepts that influenced early 
American politics.
144  In Commentaries on the Laws of England William Blackstone puts forth a 
definition of marital union that involved a conflation of identities and established a legal plight 
for married women that lasted well into the nineteenth century in Anglo-American culture: ‘By 
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of 
the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into 
that of the husband’.
 145  With her new ‘suspended’ status the wife becomes a femme-covert, a 
‘hidden’, ‘protected’, or ‘covered’ woman; and under this principle, ‘of an union of person in 
husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them 
acquire by marriage’; for example, ‘a man cannot grant anything to his wife, or enter into 
covenant with her’ because the ‘union of person’ means that to ‘covenant with her would be only 
to covenant with himself’.
146  This legal conflation of identities, which relegates women as 
aspects of male identities, is theologically enacted in Poe’s corpus.  That is, Poe writes women as 
reflections of the male soul.  As detailed in Chapter Two, the occlusion of female identity by the 
male reflection is appurtenant of a larger Neoplatonic matrix.  While the second Chapter focuses 
on Poe’s literary philosophies, what also emerges is the way Poe hinges much of his aesthetic 
thought around idealized women.  For this reason, even though the focus of this thesis is on 
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Poe’s depictions of male disarticulation vis-à-vis colonial contexts, it is necessary to discuss 
Poe’s depictions of women, because they are key to understanding not only his theories, but how 
he constructs male identity in a more general sense.  
Gaining insight into Poe’s literary principles, and understanding the logic that asserts 
women instantiate male essence, requires an assessment of both the Platonic and Judeo-Christian 
ideas that structure Poe’s theoretical essays, particularly ‘The Poetic Principle’ and ‘The 
Philosophy of Composition’.  Platonic considerations include the ontology limned in the 
Timaeus about a perfectly ordered universe built according to the plan of a Creator, with the 
material world reflecting an Ideal counterpart.  More significantly, discussion of Platonic 
epistemology also encompasses ideas put forth in the Symposium, especially the concept of the 
‘ladder of erotics’, in which a lover leads a beloved through various fields of study and 
definitions of love until they arrive at Beauty, the Ideal truth that brings one close to the Creator 
and enables immortality.  These Platonic ideas are transposed into a Judeo-Christian frame, 
where Eros, or love, is written as an aspect of a Holy Spirit that also unifies one with God and 
immortalizes the mortal soul.  With the syncretisation of Platonism and Judeo-Christianity, 
women, particularly in a marital context, embody the lover who leads one to Beauty and 
immortality; at the same time, their love elevates their husbands’ souls as an aspect of the Holy 
Spirit.  Chapter Two explores this Neoplatonic dynamic within the larger subject of Poe’s artistic 
theory, and extrapolates on Poe’s writings of women, using examples from literary critics who 
influenced his writing, such as Augustus Schlegel and H.N. Coleridge, and his own short story, 
‘Berenice’.  Exploring these aspects of Poe’s philosophy provides an interpretive apparatus to 
examine male dismemberment in Poe’s writing.    
  While the elevated soul in Poe’s writing is facilitated by an identificatory collapse of 
women into male selves, another ego incorporation enables a naturalized claim to the national 
soil; specifically, the incorporation of the Native into the European-American self.  Chapter 
Three bridges the methodologies put forward in Chapter Two with Poe’s ideas about land and 
land ownership, through examination of the short story, ‘The Oblong Box’, through an in-depth 
assessment of the national ‘root’ as outlined by Schlegel, and through mobilization of  Poe’s and 
Schlegel’s theories to interpret how Poe defines the perfect artist, or ‘true man’, as owning both 
property and an elevated spirit in ‘The Domain of Arnheim’.  Chapter Four will examine Poe’s 
perception of Native Americans by looking at ‘The Mask of the Red Death’, a lesser-known tale 43 
 
called ‘Morning on the Wissahiccon’, and excerpts from his literary criticism.  Simultaneous acts 
of relegation and displacement define Poe’s construction of Native Americans.  On one hand, 
Poe annuls Native Americans’ claims to the land based on their ‘inherent’ deficiency of a 
properly elevated soul that can be invested into nature, and that can feel and express national 
Ideality.  This aboriginal lack of divinity is tied to a lack of rationality in accordance with 
Neoplatonic discourses as well as a Lockean epistemology that equates spirit, consciousness and 
personhood.
147  On the other, even though Poe extols the poet for having the properly attuned 
soul that can ‘feel’ and express the national root, and while he also portrays the artist’s 
investment of divinity into the land as contingent on property ownership, he also presents 
indigeneity as an essential part of the national root.  Implicitly, the poet’s ability to ‘feel’ or 
sense the national Ideal through his elevated soul gives him an essential and indigenous 
connection to the national territory.  This bipartite construction of Native Americans is 
embedded in an early American ideology that considers tribal groups wards of the government, 
and prohibits them from devising property to any other source than the government, as enacted in 
the trade and intercourse acts of 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, and 1802.  Effectively, Native 
Americans held land, but title ultimately rested with the American government.
148  This 
preclusion from title was justified by definitions of reason that strategically excluded tribal 
populations; and these definitions of reason stemmed from early American perceptions of 
property that were based on Locke’s ‘Rule of Reason’, which stated that God gave the world ‘to 
the use of the Industrious and Rational (and Labour was to be his Title to it;) not to the Fancy or 
Covetousness of the Quarrelsome and Contentious’.
149  As Ferguson asserts, questions remain 
implicit in Locke’s ‘statement of relative capacities and disproportionate rewards’, such as, ‘who 
are the rational, and why do they deserve a greater benefit?  How are the wrongfully contentious 
to be identified, and by what means are they deprived of property?’.
150  An answer can be 
gleaned by referring to Benjamin Franklin’s statement, ‘So convenient it is a thing to be a 
reasonable creature [. . .] since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a 
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mind to’.
151  In other words, the outcome of conflict is determined by ‘who first defines and then 
exercises reason’.
152 
Yet in addition to this bipartite conceptualization of Native Americans, Poe also 
sympathizes with them to an extent.  As Bergland observes, the ‘Red Death is the ultimate Indian 
ghost, the disembodied phantom of inescapable racial hatred and ineradicable national guilt’.
153  
Chapter Four will discuss how Poe engages with colonial guilt within a Neoplatonic frame in 
‘The Mask of the Red Death’, and place these colonial themes in context of Poe’s debate against 
Transcendentalism, which he presents as detrimental to the soul’s elevation through the Spirit.  
For Poe, the ways Native Americans have been ‘at all points unmercifully despoiled, 
assassinated, and dishonoured’ reveal and indict a society as lacking the Spiritual virtues of love 
and charity.
154  This is not to draw Poe as overly sympathetic to Native American plights.  In her 
study of Emerson and Indian Removal, Bethany Schneider notes how Emerson’s protests against 
the forced evacuation of Cherokees to Indian Territory are really protests against the underlying 
assumption of Removal policies, that Indian Removal relied on a separation of sovereignty from 
place.  According to Schneider, the ‘unsutured nation’ for Emerson is not the Cherokee’s; rather, 
‘removal “deprives” Emerson and other white Americans of a certain naturalized white 
sovereignty’.
155  In this regard, the American confiscation of tribal lands through Removal or 
military force can signal where naturalized ownership of the land fails even while it signals 
where it is ‘destined’.  Chapter Five utilizes the methodologies gained from previous chapters to 
facilitate interpretive leverage into Poe’s tale, ‘The Man That Was Used Up’, and continue 
discussion of questions about colonial guilt.  This chapter will also examine how Poe reiterates 
the trope of male corporeal disarticulation at colonial contact sites as a result of precluded access 
to land.  At the same time, Poe displays the disarticulate corpus as one lacking the elevated 
immortal soul, and, in this sense, it also symbolizes an indictment against a society that foregoes 
the ideals of love and Spirituality.  Chapter Six will use the same methodologies presented in this 
thesis to interpret scenes of colonial violence, dismemberment and putrescence in The Narrative 
of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket.  An interpretive framework for examining Pym is 
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constructed through discussion of Poe’s epistemological concerns in his novel, especially in 
regards to his disagreements with pantheistic philosophies, and Transcendentalism in particular.  
Analysis will also involve reading Pym’s journey as an allegorical search for the national ‘root’, 
with its unreachability expressing Poe’s criticism against early America for its preoccupation 
with property and not the values associated with national Ideality and an elevated spirit.    
In attempting to express the spiritual ‘root’ of the nation Poe both converges and diverges 
from Jackson’s quest to find a ‘root’ of property ownership.  In one respect, Poe sublimates the 
drive to create a stable root for property ownership, emphasizing the divine aspects of property 
creation already existent in Locke’s theory; and he implicitly endorses America’s rightful and 
indigenous inheritance of the national territory, even if he does not entirely endorse Indian 
Removal.  Simultaneously, Poe sets himself apart from the marketplace ideologies of manhood, 
and values the spiritual property that he perceives the poet with ‘artistic sensibilities’ as owning.  
Put differently, Poe sees America’s ‘self-made men’ as lacking the soul elevated by the Christian 
ideal of the Holy Spirit, and, by extension the values of charity and love.  Indeed, as John 
William Ward observes, ‘Perhaps the most severe condemnation that can be made of nineteenth-
century America is that it equated charity and love with a lack of manhood’.  This relegation of 
such ideals is due to the fact that early America emphasized a type of character, one that was 
‘expansive, self-reliant, aggressive’, and anything opposite to these traits was ‘at best unworthy, 
at worst unmasculine’.
156  The broken male body in Poe’s corpus ultimately condemns early 
American society, and while its context is Jacksonian America’s political and economic scene, 
for Poe, it also points to a larger, theological concern.  This theological backdrop will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Two: ‘The Most Poetic Topic in the World’: 
Women and Neoplatonism in Poe’s Fiction and Theory 
 
Introduction   
 
In Fables of Mind: An Inquiry Into Poe’s Fiction, Joan Dayan states, ‘When Poe claims 
certainty he wants to be doubted; when he taxes himself with the labours of composition (or the 
presence of uncertainty), he wants to be trusted’.  Poe says least when he appears to say most, 
and consciously sets up a kind of ‘knowing’ in his fiction in order to ‘expose and subvert’ it.  His 
description of ‘the bright orbs that shine in heaven – in the waving of the grain-fields – in the 
slanting of tall, Eastern trees – in the blue distance of mountains’ that repetitively circles in a 
sequence of ‘in’ for half a page, and his regalement of great truths – such as the ‘Immortal 
instinct’, ‘sense of the Beautiful’, and ‘wild effort to reach the Beauty above’ – mock ‘exquisite 
jargon’, and establish the pattern for the ‘falsely assertive thinking in the periphrasis of his 
monomaniacal narrators’.  Images of the ‘human brain’ leaning to the ‘Infinite’, fondling the 
‘phantom of the idea’ in hopes of ‘intellectually believing it when it is conceived’, and the ‘class 
of superior intelligences, to whom the human bias alluded to may wear all the character of 
monomania’, martial against tendencies to ‘seek groundless principles of unity’, and expose 
‘false illusions in the impulse to metaphysics’ and ‘pretensions to knowledge’.
157   
  On one hand, Dayan’s reading provides interpretive leverage into Poe’s fiction, 
especially his critique of an empiricism that subsumes the phenomenal world to mensuration and 
trades phantasies for epistemological limits.  On the other, Dayan dangerously conflates the 
narrators of Poe’s essays with those of his fiction.   The homogenization of these distinct voices 
enacts a post-modernism that figures Poe almost as antecedent to sensibilities that emphasize the 
constructed nature of knowledge, and the reduction of ‘great truths’ to surface representation.  
While such methodology is important, it overly modernizes Poe, and neglects his historical and 
philosophical context.  Namely, that when Poe speaks of the soul’s ‘pure elevation’, our ‘wild 
effort to reach the Beauty above’, or the ‘divine’ yet ungraspable ‘joys’ glimpsed at through 
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music he is not constructing a hoax, but aligning himself with a critical tradition grounded in a 
Neoplatonism that fuses Platonic thought with Christian doctrine.
158  Marked by metaphysical 
concerns, and the soul’s existence and function in the dichotomies between the eternal Ideal and 
the mutable world and the corruptible and incorruptible body, this criticism is put forth in works 
such as Schlegel’s A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature.  Prominent tropes in 
this critical work includes questions of soteriology, the attainment of the Ideal through Beauty 
and love, and ‘mystical’ undercurrents of meaning.   
This Neoplatonism organizes much of Poe’s fiction and criticism.  Eric W. Carlson 
observes in ‘Poe on the Soul of Man’ that many of Poe’s early tales are marked by a 
‘Neoplatonic and Pastoral vision’ depicted as ‘dreams’ and ‘memories’ of a ‘lost paradise or 
Eden’.
159  This recurrent vision is: ‘Al Aaraaf, the realm of Platonic Beauty.  Symbolically, it is 
also the flower-bedecked and richly perfumed isle of Zante, and the Valley of Many-Coloured 
Grass where Eleonora and her cousin dwelt.  It is the classical Helen symbolizing the beauty of 
the soul’.
160  It is an ‘ideal that has brought the lost wanderer back to “his own native shore,” his 
essential self, his soul’.  And it ‘represents the potential of harmony of self with nature, of self 
with soul’, and ‘of soul with some transcendent, Platonic Beauty’.
161 Although Carlson traces 
these Neoplatonic strands to the possibility of a ‘Collective Unconscious’ and his thesis that 
Poe’s ‘central theme’ is ‘Man’s search for his soul’ and his ‘discovery of the psychic potential’ 
realized ‘in a rebirth of the unified and creative self’ as brought about through ‘the death of the 
“ordinary life”’, he unearths important tropes in Poe’s corpus: the representation of Platonic 
beauty, the ideal woman as a symbol of the soul’s realization, the attainment of a Platonic ideal, 
and a fictive context that takes for granted a Neoplatonic universe in Poe’s writing.
162         
  This Platonic-Christian cosmology outlined in Poe’s criticism and the critical tradition he 
subscribes to provides the setting for many of his tales.  Again, it is important to distinguish 
between the narrative voice of his critical essays, and the first-person narrators of his fiction.  
While Poe’s criticism clearly gestures to a Platonic and Christian teleology, his fiction depicts 
characters that are often purblind by a strict empiricism or ‘false’ metaphysics, or too fixated on 
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material gain, to comprehend spirituality.  Vis-à-vis the limits of epistemology, Dayan correctly 
observes that Poe’s characters are often trapped by the ‘pretensions’ and ‘false illusions’ of 
knowledge; but she does not consider how this knowledge alienates Poe’s fictional scholars from 
their divinity.  It is this disjuncture between the ‘false illusions’ of an epistemology that supposes 
an encompassed divinity and a ‘real’ Neoplatonic Universe that provides the central tension in 
many of Poe’s tales.   
  Against the contextual backdrop of Neoplatonic thought and criticism this chapter will 
present a general model for analysing identity construction in Poe’s fiction.  It will consider how 
Poe depicts women as signifiers of the male soul, and will build a methodology around this 
depiction to gain interpretive insight into Poe’s engagement with the notion of epistemological 
limitation and the way he represents the American preoccupation with property.  Poe’s 
representations of the married body provide a useful site around which to construct an 
interpretive methodology for several reasons.  Most significantly, Poe’s positioning of women as 
signifiers of the state of the male soul and its ability to achieve soteriological completion means 
that the relationships between Poe’s scholarly narrators and their wives dramatize the soul’s 
condition within an epistemology that either precludes Spirituality or collapses the Spirit into the 
material world.  Within such an enactment the female body signals the limit of systematic 
knowledge, the point where a natural teleology becomes an artificial epistemology.
163  As well, 
the identificatory collapse between the male and female selves is translated not only from a 
theological framework, but a judicial one as well, due to property laws that transformed the 
married woman into the femme covert, or ‘hidden woman’, whose rights to ownership were 
transferred to her husband, as discussed in the previous chapter.  Considered within an early 
American ideology that made full citizenship contingent on property ownership, the 
identificatory collapse pertaining to marriage not only means a spiritual completion but, more 
pragmatically, a legal one as well for the male subject.  Since the married body ties together 
concerns about property and the body with theology it is beneficial to consider how women are 
depicted in Poe’s fiction in order to understand the theological slant that effects how Poe writes 
the body in relation to property ownership.    
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  The texts utilized in this chapter to construct an interpretive methodology of Poe’s 
literature are works which Poe was arguably familiar with, as indicated through direct references, 
or as evinced by contemporary criticism, with the only exception being Mather Byles’s A 
Discourse on the Present Vileness of the Body, And It’s [sic] Future Glorious Change by Christ, 
which is utilized to illustrate the idea that the lack of the Holy Spirit leads to bodily 
disarticulation, particularly putrescence, in Poe’s work.  This methodological chapter is 
presented in subsections, beginning with an outline of Platonic epistemology as presented in the 
Timaeus and Symposium in order to discuss the basic binary of the Ideal and material worlds, and 
to present how the ideal, or Beauty, is achieved through artistic creation.  The next section looks 
at how Platonic epistemology influences Poe’s aesthetic methodologies put forth in ‘The Poetic 
Principle’ and ‘The Philosophy of Composition’, and considers how women are figured in Poe’s 
aesthetics as agents that enable the male poet to achieve Beauty, and divinity.  Discussion on 
‘The Poetic Principle’ will also include the Judaeo-Christian aspects of Neoplatonic syncretism, 
beginning with an analysis of Pauline soteriology, particularly the figures of Adam and Christ 
and how they are associated with earthly and celestial imagery.  Methodological discussion then 
relates to Mather Byles’s sermon in order to gain insight into the earthly and putrescent body 
which recurs in Poe’s literature.  The following subsection discusses Neoplatonic works that 
influence how Poe depicts women, including Augustus Schlegel’s A Course of Lectures on 
Dramatic Art and Literature (1803), Henry Nelson Coleridge’s Introduction to the Greek Classic 
Poets (1830), and Baron Friedrich Heinrich Karl de la Motte Fouqué’s Undine (1818).  In-depth 
analysis of Poe’s tale, ‘Berenice’ will then follow to corroborate methodological points and to 
move the thesis forward to discussion about Poe’s representations of property. 
    
Platonic Structures in Poe’s Criticism 
  As Ross Murfin & Supriya M. Ray explain, the philosophy of Neoplatonism derives from 
the syncretism of Christianity and Platonic thought.
164  When discussing the influence of 
Neoplatonism on Poe’s criticism and fiction it is easier to begin by outlining the major Platonic 
contributions to Neoplatonism first, particularly in regards to the concept of Eros and how it 
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relates to identity, and then evince how Platonism structures Poe’s ideas related to art and the 
self.  The reason for starting with Plato is that his concepts provide more of an organizing 
structure to Poe’s ideas about art and Beauty.  A useful starting point to discuss Neoplatonism 
derives from a Pythagorean idea that lends mathematical and musical concepts as framing 
postulates for Platonism.  This idea is the Pythagorean discovery that mathematical principles 
govern musical intervals.  The Pythagoreans believed that this principle was not only a basic law 
of the universe, but of its microcosm, man, who, in order to contemplate the harmonious 
universe, must also possess a numerical principle within.
 165  As Aristotle explains the 
Pythagorean inter-relation between the self and Universe, ‘There seems to be in us a sort of 
affinity to musical modes and rhythms, which makes many philosophers say that the soul is 
harmonia, others that it possesses harmonia’.
166  In other words, the soul itself is a harmony, and 
a growing knowledge of the cosmos cultivates a divine knowledge of the self.  This connection 
between music, numbers and souls is generalized in Pythagorean thought to be the basis of any 
true knowledge of the cosmos, as exemplified in the idea of the ‘music of the spheres’, a 
cosmological paradigm that correlates musical octave and sestet scales with the seven planets 
and fixed stars, with each ‘sphere’ emitting a corresponding note.
167   
  Pythagorean echoes are heard in the Platonic idea that true morality is a harmony of the 
soul, and that the human soul mirrors the Soul of the World.  In his account of divine creation, 
Timaeus, Plato limns this connection between the individual and World souls against the 
background of a Cosmos whose intelligibility and harmonious order are explained by the idea of 
a Creator, or ‘Demiurge’, working to plan, and forming the unique world from a perfect, eternal 
model.
168  This basic binary between the ideal eternal model and its physical, earthly reflection is 
the under-riding logic not only for the world’s creation, but of creation in general for Plato.  In 
Platonic reasoning, when an artificer utilizes a perfect, eternal model then the art he creates is 
necessarily beautiful; however, when an artificer uses an earthly model that has already come 
into material existence, then his art will not be beautiful because it fails to reflect Ideality.
169  The 
Universe is constructed by the Architect in accordance with the binary between the Ideal and 
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physical worlds; or, as Plato states, ‘it is plain that’ the Architect ‘fixed his gaze on the eternal, 
for the Cosmos is the fairest of all that has come into existence and the best of all causes’.
170  
Appurtenant to the creation of the perfect Universe is its imbuement with a soul.  The Platonic 
‘World Soul’ is a tripartite entity structured from an ideal component that is ‘indivisible and 
remains always the same’, a mutable component ‘which is transient and divisible in bodies’, and 
a component that is midway between the eternal and mutable that is ‘compounded out of the 
twain’.
171  With the presence of a soul owing to the providence of the Creator, the Universe 
comes into existence as a Living Creature, within which all other creatures are portions.
172   
Two details of Plato’s description of the universe that are particularly important to this 
chapter are: the way Beauty necessarily involves a reflection of Ideality, as discussed in greater 
detail below in relation to ‘The Poetic Principle’; and the world soul’s tripartite ordering, with an 
intermediary component between the Ideal and earthly aspects.  This triune structure is evinced 
not only in the construction of the human soul, but in the construction of the physical universe 
through the four elements.  For Plato, human souls are composed from the residue of the Soul of 
the Universe, with their mortal frames constructed ‘around the immortal principal of the soul’ in 
order to give the soul ‘all the body to be its vehicle’.
173  In addition to the immortal soul the 
human frame is also imbued with a second ‘mortal’ soul that carries within it all the ‘fearful and 
unavoidable passions’, including pleasure, pain, the ‘foolish counsellors’ of rashness, fear, anger, 
hope, as well as ‘irrational sensation’ and ‘all-daring lust’.  In order to avoid pollution of the 
divine soul, the ‘isthmus’ of the neck is set between the two souls, with the mortal soul in the 
thorax of the body, and the divine soul in the head, so that it can listen to reason and subdue the 
desires.  The third soul, which is subject to appetites for food and drink, is ‘tied up’ in the 
stomach, as though ‘it were a creature which, though savage, they must necessarily keep joined 
to the rest to feed’.
174  
The elemental construction of the universe also has a tripartite organization: the universe 
is first moulded from earth and fire by the Creator with the two intermediary elements of air and 
water added later.  The earth is associated with the mutable, material world, and fire with what is 
‘indivisible’ and ‘always the same’, with water and air connecting the mutable and ideal 
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elements and bringing harmony to the whole.
175  These elements also correspond with the 
constitution of humanity; for example, bone is made from sifted earth kneaded with marrow and 
alternately placed in water and fire until it is soluble to neither, while the stars, which are 
wrought from fire, are equal to the number of souls in the world, with each soul corresponding 
with a star.
176  This elemental idiom becomes significant when placed within the Neoplatonic 
context and inter-articulated with Christianized meanings. Looking ahead slightly in this thesis, 
these elements become tied to the Christian soteriological dichotomy between the flesh and the 
Holy Spirit, with earth imagery often related to the flesh and body, and fire, water, and air 
representing, if not the Holy Spirit, then at least a conduit to divinity.  For example, in 
Tertullian’s treatise, ‘On the Flesh of Christ’, he ponders, ‘what is flesh but earth in an especial 
form?’, and he asks the reader to think of ‘the muscles as clods; of the bones as stones; the 
mammillary glands as kinds of pebbles’, to look ‘upon the close junctions of the nerves as 
propagations of roots’, to see ‘the hair as grass, and the very treasures of marrow within our 
bones as ores of flesh’.
 177  In contrast, the Holy Spirit is compared to each element except the 
earth: such as a flame, breath, wind, baptismal water.
178  While these elemental comparisons are 
already in the Bible, they are emphasized in Neoplatonically-inflected literature. 
Another aspect of Plato’s conceptions of identity that is important to this thesis is the use 
of education and knowledge to apprehend and create the Beautiful as a reflection of the Ideal.  
Within Platonic epistemology the method for attaining divinity is intrinsically tied to the 
accumulation of proper knowledge, as well as through acts that create Beauty by reflecting the 
Ideal.  Plato explains that of the three human souls, the one that remains in repose becomes 
weakest, while the soul exercised most becomes strongest.  For this reason, it is important to 
service the divine soul, lest the mortal ones gain mastery over the self, and cause the preclusion 
of immortality.  Plato states, ‘God has given to each of us, as his daemon, that kind of soul which 
is housed in the top of our body and which raises us – seeing that we are not an earthly but a 
heavenly plant – up from earth toward our kindred in heaven’.  He who devotes himself to ‘true 
thoughts’, and to exercising the divine soul above the others, ‘must necessarily and inevitably 
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think thoughts that are immortal and divine’, and thereby ‘lay hold of truth’ and ‘partake of 
immortality’ so far as it is possible for human nature to do so.  One strengthens the divine soul 
by learning ‘the harmonies and revolutions of the Universe’ so that the soul is brought back into 
its inherent accord from which it was distorted at birth.  By achieving harmony between the 
divine soul and ‘intellections and revolutions of the Universe’, and ‘duly magnifying that 
daemon’, or divine soul, within the human frame one establishes a life that is ‘supremely 
blessed’.  In contrast, those devoted to ‘lusts’ or ‘contentions’ ‘must of necessity be filled with 
opinions that are wholly mortal’, thereby foregoing immortality.
179   
The idea that knowledge and education harmonize the divine soul with the divinity of the 
Universe has a parallel in Plato’s Symposium, in which the education of erotics leads to the 
realization of the Beautiful.  The Platonic quest for the beautiful is motivated by the human 
impulse to generate.  As Plato explains, mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be immortal, and 
its sole way to accomplish this is through regeneration, be it sexual regeneration, regeneration of 
the soul, or the production of new knowledge.  Although senescence creates loss, youth is 
perpetuated through reproduction.  This corporeal aging and becoming is analogous with the 
terms of the soul, whose passions, desires, pains, and fears are never self-same, but always 
coming to be and always perishing.  The same is said for knowledge and science, because 
forgetfulness of knowledge is the exiting of science from the mind, while studying instils a fresh 
memory to replace the departing one.  Thus through perpetual and simultaneous gain and loss, 
every mortal thing is preserved, not by remaining the same as does the divine ideal, but by a 
regenerative process in which what is old replaces itself with what is young.  In this way, the 
mortal shares in immortality.
180 
  The difference between mortal and divine regeneration is outlined in the distinction 
between biological pregnancy and what Plato calls being ‘pregnant in soul’.  While biological 
pregnancy furnishes ‘immortality, remembrance, and happiness’ through the procreation of 
children, those pregnant in soul ‘conceive those things’ that are ‘appropriate for soul to conceive 
and bear’, such as prudence and virtue, and the things created by ‘all the poets and all the 
craftsmen who are said to be inventive’.  As Plato describes how one ‘pregnant in soul’ 
engenders beauty: whenever a youth is pregnant in his soul with virtues he desires to produce 
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‘offspring’ and so searches for the beautiful with which he might generate.  When he meets a 
beautiful, generous and naturally gifted soul he cleaves to it, and becomes suddenly fluent in 
speeches about virtue, and tries to educate his beloved.  In this way, by contacting the one who is 
beautiful, the one pregnant in soul engenders ‘offspring’ through the arts, and whether the lover 
is present or absent, ‘he holds the beautiful one in memory and nurtures with him what has been 
generated in common’, thereby creating ‘children’ which are beautiful and immortal.
181  
  This relationship between the one pregnant in soul and the one who is beautiful is the 
liminal step of the ladder of erotics which leads to perfect revelations of the beautiful, and which 
follows a series of stages: after the lover, or one pregnant in soul, engenders beautiful speeches 
he must realize that the beauty of one body may be found in any body, and thereby become a 
lover of all bodies, believing that affection for only one body is petty.  From there the lover must 
believe that the beauty of souls is more honourable than that of the body, and so cleave to 
someone who has a beautiful soul, even if only a slight youthful charm.  After these pursuits, the 
lover leads his beloved to the sciences, and in looking at the vast beauty of sciences no longer 
remains content with the beauty of one person or practice, ‘but with a permanent turn to the vast 
open sea of the beautiful’, beholds it and gives it birth in ‘many beautiful and magnificent 
speeches and thoughts’.  Within this field of science the lover must discern a certain 
philosophical science that has beauty as its object, and having pursued his education to this stage 
will ‘suddenly glimpse something wonderfully beautiful in its nature’, the ‘very thing’ ‘for 
whose sake alone all the prior labours were taken’.  Basically, the student encounters the eternal 
and immutable ideal, described as: ‘something that is, first of all, always becoming and neither 
coming to be nor perishing, nor increasing nor passing away’; that is ‘not beautiful in one respect 
and ugly in another, nor at one time so, and at another time not’; that is not imagined as a 
corporeal form with ‘a kind of face or hands or anything else in which body shares’; nor as ‘any 
speech or any science’.  Rather, this form of beauty is ‘as it is alone by itself and with itself, 
always being of a single form; while all other things that share in it do so in such a way that 
while it neither becomes anything more or less, nor is affected at all, the rest do come to be and 
perish’.
182    
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  Thus by pursuing his education in the erotics, the student climbs a ladder of knowledge 
that leads to the ‘perfect end’ of beauty found in the ideal.  Beginning with ‘beautiful things’ and 
using them as steps, the student proceeds upwards for the sake of beauty: ‘from one to two, and 
from two to all beautiful bodies; and from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits; and from 
pursuits to beautiful lessons; and from lessons to end at that lesson, which is the lesson of 
nothing else than the beautiful itself; and at last to know what is beauty itself’.  After arriving at 
the divine beauty that is ‘pure, clean, unmixed, and not infected with human flesh’ or ‘other 
mortal foolishness’, the student is able to engender the ‘true’ because he ‘lays hold of the true’, 
as opposed to engendering ‘phantom images of virtue’ by laying hold of phantom images.  Once 
he grasps hold of the beautiful and true and engenders true virtue, ‘it lies within him to become 
dear to god and, if it is possible for any human being, to become immortal as well’.
183   
 
‘The Poetic Principle’ 
  Having outlined some of the main ideas in Platonic epistemology pertaining to identity, 
Beauty, and the inter-relation between Beauty and the self’s divinity, we can now discuss how 
Plato’s ideas figure in Poe’s own critical theories.   In ‘The Poetic Principle’, the Platonic 
concept of beauty prominently figures in Poe’s division of the ‘world of the mind’ into the 
faculties of Pure Intellect, Taste, and Moral Sense.  While Moral Sense is tied to Conscience, 
duty and obligation, and Intellect is concerned with Truth and Reason, Taste ‘informs us of the 
Beautiful’ and ‘contents herself’ by ‘waging war’ upon Vice solely on the grounds of its 
disproportion, deformity, and ‘animosity to the fitting’, and bringing the ill-formed and 
discordant back to ‘the appropriate, to the harmonious, in a word, to Beauty’.
184  Poe’s partial 
definition of Beauty as proportion and harmony harks to Pythagorean and Platonic models, while 
the connection between Taste and Beauty makes Beauty’s recognition contingent on the ‘ladder’ 
of  knowledge.  The correlation between Taste and accumulated knowledge can be seen by 
considering Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful.  For Burke, Taste refers to ‘the faculties of the mind which are affected 
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with, or which form a judgement of the works of imagination and the elegant arts’.
185  On one 
hand, Taste is natural and ‘nearly common to all’, in that we all experience ‘pleasure arising 
from a natural object, so far as each perceives it justly imitated’, ‘satisfaction in seeing an 
agreeable figure’, and sympathy proceeding ‘from a striking and affecting incident’.  On the 
other hand, proper judgment is not in the capability of everyone.  This is because it is from the 
‘difference in knowledge that that what we commonly, though with no great exactness, call a 
difference in taste proceeds’, and ‘critical Taste does not depend upon a superior principle in 
men, but upon superior knowledge’.
186   
The discerning powers of Taste are related to the Senses, Imagination, and Judgment, or 
the ‘natural powers’ with which humanity engages with the objective world.
187  ‘Imagination’ 
denotes the creative power of ‘representing at pleasure the images of things in the order and 
manner in which they were received by the senses, or in combining those images in a new 
manner and according to a different order’.  It is ‘incapable of producing any thing absolutely 
new’ and can only ‘vary the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses’.  It 
is also the province of pleasure, pain, fear, hope and all the passions connected with them.  For 
since the imagination is ‘only the representative of the senses’, it is only ‘pleased or displeased 
with the images from the same principle on which the sense is pleased or displeased with the 
realities’.
188  Taste is a response and product of the Imagination, in that it includes the affect 
given by a natural or imitated object.  In this regard, its principle is uniform to everyone: there is 
no difference in the manner of how people are affected, or in the cause of affection, but rather in 
the degree of difference, which stems from either ‘a greater degree of natural sensibility’, or 
from ‘closer and longer attention to the object’.  In its most general definition, Taste is ‘partly 
made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the 
imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty’.  ‘Wrong Taste’ is caused by a 
defect in judgement, which may arise from a natural weakness of understanding, or much more 
commonly, from a failure to exercise the proper faculties, as well as ‘ignorance, inattention, 
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prejudice, rashness’, obstinacy and in short, all the vices which ‘pervert the judgement’ and 
induce us to suppose there are ‘no settled principles of reason’.
189 
  Burke’s definitions of Taste and Imagination influence how Poe sets limitations on 
mimetic art.  ‘Just as the lily is repeated in the lake, or the eyes of Amaryllis in the mirror’, says 
Poe, ‘so is the mere oral or written repetition of these forms, and sounds, and colours, and 
odours, and sentiments, a duplicate source of delight’; yet this ‘mere repetition’ is ‘not poetry’.  
The poet who ‘simply’ recreates the sensible world, even with a vivid ‘truth of description’, falls 
short of the Ideal, and ‘has yet failed to prove his divine title’, because there is ‘still a something 
in the distance which he has been unable to obtain’.  Representations which merely duplicate the 
empirical world – the repeated images of the lily ‘repeated in a lake’, the eyes repeated in the 
mirror – can only reiterate it ad infinitum, not transcend it.  Such representations are products of 
the Burkean Imagination, duplicate images of reality recreated as empirically experienced or as 
arranged in a new order – and, as such, their ‘mere repetition is not poetry’.
190  In contrast, the 
poetic work not only duplicates reality, but does so in a way that reflects the World Soul, that 
acknowledges ‘something in the distance’ beyond the material.  In short, just as the Platonic 
Architect creates the necessarily beautiful by copying the Ideal, so does Poe’s poet by fixing his 
gaze only on the Ideal and not the ‘phantom’ objects of the physical realm.   
  Just as beauty reflects the Ideal in Platonic epistemology, Poe also calls the divine 
‘something’ beyond the physical realm the Beautiful, and connects it with humanity’s realization 
of its soul.  Poe’s idea, ‘An immortal instinct deep within the spirit of man is thus plainly a sense 
of the Beautiful’, recalls Plato’s ‘immortal principle of the soul’, or the divine component of the 
tripartite soul around which the mortal body is constructed.  Again, the divine soul in Timaeus is 
the one that lays hold of truth and partakes of immortality, and must be tended to by learning the 
harmonies of the Universe.  Poe transports this Platonic definition of soul into his own essay.  In 
his description of purely mimetic art Poe states, ‘We still have a thirst unquenchable’ that 
‘belongs to the immortality of Man.  It is at once a consequence and indication of the perennial 
existence’.
191  In other words, the ‘immortal instinct’ – or immortal soul – ‘thirsts’ for the Ideal 
element which enables it to realize its own divine, ‘perennial existence’, but which cannot be 
found in the physical realm.  The ‘Beauty’ Poe describes is therefore the Platonic Beauty that 
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‘raises’ humanity ‘up from earth toward our kindred in heaven’, and reminds us we are not 
‘earthly’ but ‘heavenly’ beings.  It is the glimpse of immortality which human divinity strives 
for, that situates our thoughts on the divine and immortal, and which enables us to partake of 
immortality.   
This Platonic thread can be followed in the modes that Poe allows for Beauty’s 
instantiations.  The ‘struggle to apprehend the supernal Loveliness’, what Poe terms the Poetic 
Sentiment or Principle, can take shape in arts such as painting, sculpture, architecture, dance, the 
‘Landscape Garden’, ‘very especially in Music’, but most importantly in Poetry.  Says Poe, 
‘when by Poetry, or when by Music’ ‘we find ourselves melted into tears’, we weep through ‘a 
certain, petulant, impatient sorrow at our inability to grasp now, wholly, here on earth, at once 
and for ever, those divine and rapturous joys of which through the poem, or through the music, 
we attain to but brief and indeterminate glimpses’.  It is through Music that ‘the soul most nearly 
attains the great end for which, when inspired by the Poetic Sentiment, it struggles – the creation 
of supernal Beauty’, and music comes to structure Poetry through such devices as metre, rhythm, 
and rhyme.  In fact, Poe emphasizes Poetry’s inherent musicality, defining the ‘Poetry of words’ 
as ‘The Rhythmical Creation of Beauty’, and asserting that the ‘union of Poetry and Music’ 
offers the ‘widest field for the Poetic development’.
192  These Platonic undertones gain resonance 
from a Pythagorean logic of ratio, proportion and arithmetic that influences the poem’s design.  
Its structure must follow ‘the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem’ and be 
of limited length so that its brevity is in ‘direct ratio to the intensity’ of the poem’s ‘intended 
effect’.  With a reading time of no longer than a ‘single sitting’ a poem can achieve ‘true poetical 
effect’ because its duration is made to ‘bear mathematical relation to its merit – in other words, 
to the excitement or elevation’.
193     
Poe even states explicitly the elevating affect Beauty has on the soul.  I provide at length 
two quotes from ‘The Poetic Principle’: 
 
That pleasure which is at once the most pure, the most elevating, and the most intense, is 
derived, I maintain, from the contemplation of the Beautiful.  In the contemplation of 
Beauty we alone find it possible to attain that pleasurable elevation, or excitement of the 
                                                           
192 ‘Poetic’, pp. 203-204. 
193 ‘Composition’, pp. 268-269. 59 
 
soul, which we recognize as the Poetic Sentiment, and which is so easily distinguished 
from Truth, which is the satisfaction of Reason, or from Passion, which is the excitement 
of the heart.
194   
 
Thus, although in a very cursory and imperfect manner, I have endeavoured to convey to 
you my conception of the Poetic Principle.  It has been my purpose to suggest that, while 
this Principle itself is strictly and simply the Human Aspiration for Supernal Beauty, the 
manifestation of the Principle is always found in an elevating excitement of the soul, 
quite independent of that passion which is the intoxication of the Heart, or of that truth 
which is the satisfaction of the Reason.
195 
 
This correlation between Beauty and the soul’s elevation is repeated in ‘The Philosophy of 
Composition’: ‘That pleasure which is at once the most intense, the most elevating, and the most 
pure, is, I believe, found in the contemplation of the beautiful’, so that when ‘men speak of 
Beauty’, they refer ‘just to that intense and pure elevation of soul – not of intellect, or of heart’.  
What particularly stands out in each of the above passages is the recurring juxtaposition between 
Beauty on one hand and Truth and Passion on the other, a dichotomy that reinforces Beauty as 
absolute and distinct from the phenomenal world.  This distinction is maintained in Poe’s 
explanation of Truth and Passion as attainable to an ‘extent’ in poetry, but only as functions that 
‘serve in elucidation, or aid in the general effect’ of a poem, such as ‘discords do in music, by 
contrast’.  The relegation of Truth and Passion is due to the fact that Truth ‘demands a precision’ 
(implying mensuration) and Passion ‘a homeliness’ (implying corporeality) that are ‘absolutely 
antagonistic’ to Beauty’s elevating powers.
196    
As the ‘satisfaction of the intellect’ and object of ‘Reason’, Truth denotes rational fields 
of study so far as they are strictly empirical.
197  In a sense, Truth is analogous with the middle 
‘rungs’ of the Platonic ladder, the fields of science that lead one to Beauty, but cannot instantiate 
Beauty itself.  Poe maintains that if through the attainment of Truth ‘we are led to perceive a 
harmony where none was apparent before, we experience at once the true poetical effect, but this 
                                                           
194 ‘Poetic’, p. 205. 
195 ‘Poetic’, p. 217. 
196 ‘Composition’, pp. 269-270. 
197 ‘Composition’, p. 270, ‘Poetic’, p. 202. 60 
 
effect is referable to the harmony alone, and not in the least degree to the truth which merely 
served to render the harmony manifest’.
198  This idea of Truth as a vehicle to ‘harmony’ but 
lacking its own inherent divinity recalls Burke’s model of determining if art’s affecting power is 
attributable to the mode of representation or to the object being represented: if the object 
‘represented in poetry and painting is such, as we have no desire of seeing in the reality’ then 
art’s affect resides in the skill of imitation, not the ‘thing itself’; however if the object is ‘such as 
we should run to see if real’ then the ‘power of the poem or picture is more owing to the nature 
of the thing itself than to the mere effect of imitation’.
199  Burke’s model calls into relief Truth’s 
inherency, that as an empirical and representative construct Truth may point the way to the 
Beautiful, but the agency for elevation lies with the divine object itself.   
Poe figures Passion as detrimental to the soul’s struggle for Beauty through contrast with 
Platonic notions of love: ‘For in regard to passion, alas! its tendency is to degrade rather than to 
elevate the Soul.  Love, on the contrary – Love – the true, the divine Eros – the Uranian as 
distinguished from the Dionaean Venus – is unquestionably the purest and truest of all poetical 
themes’.
200  In The Symposium, Plato explains the difference between Uranian and the Dionaean, 
or Pandemian, types of love through the doubled figures of Aphrodite and Eros.  The Uranian 
Aphrodite is the daughter of Uranos, from whom she receives her name.  The second Aphrodite, 
called Pandemus, is the daughter of Zeus and Dione.  The two Erotes correspond with the two 
Aphrodites and are also Uranian and Pandemian.  True to its namesake, the Pandemian Eros is 
indiscriminate, belongs to all, and is the type of Eros ‘good-for-nothing’ people experience.  
Unconstrained by noble ideals, those with this type of Eros not only fall in love with bodies over 
souls, but also have no compunction about loving the ‘stupidest there can be’ because their only 
goal is the act itself.
201  This attachment to the physical and not lasting means Pandemian love 
itself is not lasting, and once the ‘bloom of the body’ leaves so does the pandemian lover. 
Uranian Eros contrasts the Pandemian in its attraction to character instead of body.  Its 
attachment is life-long because it bonds with what is lasting.  In brief, Uranian love is beautiful 
and divine whilst Pandemian love emphasizes corporeality.
202   
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When Poe calls Uranian love the ‘purest and truest of all poetical themes’ he establishes 
Eros as a corollary to Beauty, and in this regard further embeds his criticism within Platonic 
epistemology.  As a vehicle to Beauty, Eros has similarities with Truth in that both are earthly 
manifestations that can lead to the divine and immortal, but can be detrimental to the process of 
achieving Beauty if mistaken for Beauty itself.  The function of Eros as a conduit to Beauty is an 
informing principle both explicit and implied in The Symposium and is commensurate with Poe’s 
own conceptualization of Beauty: Plato says eros is not ‘of the beautiful’, but of ‘engendering 
and bringing to birth in the beautiful’; he defines Eros as a ‘great daemon’ who exists in the 
transitive space between god and mortal, mortal and immortal, capable of ‘interpreting and 
ferrying’ things between the two realms, and Agathon notes that ‘everyone whom Eros touches 
proves to be a poet, “though he be without the Muses before”’.
203  The process as to how Eros 
enables beauty’s creation is outlined by the ladder of erotics when the person ‘pregnant in soul’ 
cleaves body and soul to another beautiful and naturally gifted soul, thereby inspiring the 
creation of Beauty in poetry, speeches and art.  As suggested in Plato’s creation story on the 
origins of humanity, the force that compels this corporeal and spiritual union is Eros.  Although 
this story is well-known, it is still worth recounting because of its importance to the way Poe 
depicts Beauty, particularly in relation to women. 
In Plato’s creation story, humanity was originally constituted of three sexes, the male and 
female, as well as a third androgynous sex with attributes of both.  The shape of the androgynes 
was round as a whole, with the sides and back forming a circle.  Each had four arms and legs, a 
cylindrical neck, one head, two faces set in opposite directions, four ears, and two sets of 
genitals.  They had awesome strength but were too proud and attempted to displace the gods by 
ascending to the heavens.  Because of this, the gods decided to cut the androgynes in two to 
make them weaker yet at the same time more numerous and useful.  When the humans were split 
in half their faces were turned forwards so that they might face their cut and remain more 
orderly, and they were then healed and smoothed into human shape.  However, desiring their 
missing halves, the ‘split’ humans threw their arms around each other, entangling themselves in 
their desire to grow together, and began to die off from hunger and inactivity based on their 
unwillingness to ever be apart.  Zeus took pity on the humans and supplied another device by 
arranging their genitals to the front of their bodies so not only would generation be possible, but 
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there would be satiety in their company that would allow them to attend to the rest of their 
livelihoods.  Thus, because humans are separated from their ‘other halves’, they all have, ‘inborn 
in themselves, Eros for one another – Eros, the bringer-together of their ancient nature who tries 
to make one out of two and to heal their human nature’.  And because of this split each person is 
a ‘token human being’, always searching for the other token and desiring ‘conjunction and fusion 
with the beloved, to become one from two’.  Love is this ‘desire and pursuit of the whole’.
204    
In ‘The Poetic Principle’ Poe lists the ‘modes’ of Architecture, Music, Poetry, etc. by 
which Beauty is reified, and delineates Truth and Passion, which both juxtapose, as well as 
provides the steps toward, Beauty.  Poe also illustrates the ‘simple elements’, or sensible 
experiences, that ‘induce in the Poet himself the true poetical effect’: the ‘songs of birds’, ‘harp 
of Aeolus’, ‘blue distance of mountains’, ‘half-hidden brooks’, ‘sequestered lakes’, and ‘far-
distant undiscovered islands’ suggest Neoplatonic themes of music and of something ‘beyond’ 
the immediately empirical.
205  But what resonates most with Neoplatonic ideals is the female 
figure when Poe states that poetical effect is felt in  
 
the beauty of woman, in the grace of her step, in the lustre of her eye, in the melody of 
her voice, in her soft laughter, in her sigh, in the harmony of the rustling of her robes.  He 
deeply feels it in her winning endearments, in her burning enthusiasms, in her gentle 
charities, in her meek and devotional endurances; but above all, ah, far above all, he 
kneels to it, he worships it in the faith, in the purity, in the strength, in the altogether 
divine majesty of her love.
206 
 
These sentiments recur when Poe interprets Byron’s ‘Stanzas to Augusta’: ‘It is the soul-
elevating idea that no man can consider himself entitled to complain of Fate while in his 
adversity he still retains the unwavering love of woman’; and more famously, when Poe says, 
‘the death then of a beautiful woman is unquestionably the most poetic topic in the world, and 
equally is it beyond doubt that the lips best suited for such topic are those of a bereaved lover’.
207  
Associations with ‘beauty’, ‘melody’, ‘harmony’, ‘the most poetic topic in the world’, and the 
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‘soul-elevating idea’ establish women as corollary to the achievement of divine Beauty, and 
within the model of Plato’s erotics they are the ‘beautiful’ and ‘gifted’ whom the artist, ‘pregnant 
in soul’, cleaves to in order to engender the Beautiful.  Uranian Eros is therefore the force that 
compels the poet towards the feminine Other, or as Poe explains, the poetic effect is induced, 
‘above all’, in the ‘the altogether divine majesty’ of a woman’s love.  Thus, while the divine love 
between a poet and woman is not the only inspiration for Beauty, it is ‘above all’ the most 
significant.  What sets it apart from say the ‘volutes of the flower’ or ‘slanting of tall eastern 
trees’ is that, as an aspect of Uranian love, it is also the ‘desire and pursuit’ of completion.  In 
this regard Beauty and immortality are engendered through the communion with the ‘other half’ 
that gives ‘wholeness’ to the self.  This inter-relationship in which the female figure signifies the 
other ‘half’ of the artist’s identity gains resonance when considered within a Judaeo-Christian 
theological framework to become a central trope in Poe’s dramatizations of the conflict between 
the empirical and spiritual self. 
 
Pauline Soteriology and Poe’s Corpus  
The syncretisation of Platonic with Christian tropes recurs throughout ‘The Poetic 
Principle’: Poe calls Beauty ‘an ecstatic prescience of the glories beyond the grave’, states, ‘We 
are often made to feel, with a shivering delight, that from an earthly harp are stricken notes 
which cannot have been unfamiliar to the angels’, and says of Tennyson, ‘No poet is so little of 
the earth, earthy’.
208  We can see a similar conflation in ‘Pinakidia’, where Poe relates the 
Symposium to the Genesis creation story when he states, ‘that man at first was male and female, 
and that, though Jupiter cleft them asunder, there was a natural love towards one another, seems 
to be only a corruption of the account in Genesis of Eve’s being made from Adam’s rib’.
209  Yet 
why does Poe specifically employ an earth trope in relation to poetry and the Platonic referents 
of Beauty and music through the ‘grave’ and ‘earthly harp’?  And what is the logic that prompts 
Poe to tie together two basically unrelated narratives as though one was a retelling and 
‘corruption’ of a Christian precedent?  This subsection will lay the groundwork for an answer to 
these questions by discussing in detail the Judeo-Christian ideals of love, charity and the Holy 
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Spirit as well as the New Testament binary between the figures of Adam and Christ.  Studying 
these concepts will facilitate a clearer understanding of theological tropes in Poe’s criticism, and 
the ways in which how Poe constructs identity in general, as well as Poe’s conceptualizations of 
women, which will be discussed in more detail in the succeeding subsection. 
   To begin with the religious concepts of love, charity and the Holy Spirit, Christian 
doctrine emphasizes love as the Greek philosophical idea of agape, or preferential love, as 
opposed to Eros, which connotes sexual intimacy.  Agape love is used to describe the boundless 
love of God, as well as the idea that God is love and that ‘whoever lives in love lives in union 
with God and God lives in union with him’.
210 It is also the term used to describe the love that 
binds the Christian community.
211  In Christian theology, the highest form of agape love is 
charity, which stands in for a whole-hearted love awakened and sustained by God’s prevenient 
love for humanity, and whose originating source and ultimate end is God.  Charity has a broad 
denotation that includes: the love of God bestowed on humankind through Christ and the Holy 
Spirit, the love required of human beings for God, and the disinterested love human beings have 
for one another, including acts which reach out to sinners or enemies.  It is also the wellspring of 
all religious and moral motivation and the greatest of the virtues because it conjoins one to God 
and directs one’s activities toward eternal happiness so that, as a result, all sin is in some sense a 
degree of offence against charity.
212   
  The motivating force of charity is the Holy Spirit, the third Person of the Holy Trinity, 
who works in humanity through one’s own voluntary capacities.
213  It is through the power of the 
Holy Spirit that Christ was raised from the dead to gain immortal life; and this same Spirit that 
transformed Christ’s human existence also transforms those who are baptized into the Church.  
As St. Paul notes, ‘If the Spirit of God, who raised Jesus from death, lives in you, then he who 
raised Christ from death will also give life to your mortal bodies by the presence of his Spirit in 
you’.
214  The Holy Spirit is therefore ‘at the heart of Christian existence’, because it is not only 
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the source of Christ’s transformed human existence, but the bond of the Christian Church.
215  
Through the Holy Spirit, Christians become baptized into the one body of Christ and the Church, 
with all being given ‘the one Spirit to drink’, or, as St. John notes, ‘We are sure that we live in 
union with God and that He lives in union with us, because He has given us His Spirit’.
216  The 
Holy Spirit therefore has a communal aspect because it unites the Church to the Holy Trinity and 
to each other in love and communion of the Holy Spirit.  Within this new life humanity becomes 
‘Spirit-permeated’, living ‘not in the flesh’, but ‘in the Spirit’.
217   
  While love, charity and the Holy Spirit are defined as the bonds of the Church’s body, 
they are also metaphorically the bonds that make individual bodies complete by raising them to 
immortality.  The effect of the Spirit on the body’s integrity can be seen by considering in-depth 
both St. Paul’s distinction between the flesh and Spirit, as well as their soteriological unity.  Of 
particular importance to this consideration are the inter-articulations of Platonism with the 
dichotomy between the material and divine, and more specifically, the corporeal and spiritual, 
which characterizes Christian soteriology.  The dichotomy between the flesh and the Spirit is 
connected in the epistles of St. Paul with the central image of the dichotomy of Adam and Christ, 
which can also be understood as the antonymous binaries of corruptible-incorruptible, natural-
spiritual, earthly-heavenly.
218  For Paul, Adam is associated with corruption, nature and earth 
because of his originary place in the history of sin and death.  In eating from the Tree of 
Knowledge Adam disobeyed God and introduced sin to the world.  As a result of his sin he 
became guilty of death.
219  Death is universal because sin is universal.  The universality of sin 
stems from each person’s choice to disobey God, a precedent set by Adam’s first 
transgression.
220  Thus, within Pauline Scripture, Adam’s story explains the origination of sin 
and its corollary of death, or as Paul states, ‘as by one man, sin entered into the world, and death 
by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned’.
221  By living ‘in Adam’ one 
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becomes a sinner who not only bears the nature, but the form as well of the fallen first man, the 
man of death and dust.
222 
Adam, the ‘corruptible man’, is juxtaposed with Christ, who is aligned with life and 
immortality throughout Paul’s writings.
223  For example, in Colossians 3. 4 Paul states, ‘Your 
real life is in Christ and when He appears, then you too will appear with Him and share His 
glory’, and in Corinthians 15. 45 he says, ‘so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living 
soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit’.  Christ, the ‘Last Adam’, is the ‘life-giving 
Spirit’, the agent and pattern for the new eschatological humanity.  Those who believe in Christ 
as God’s act rise in a body similar to His, a body of both flesh and spirit, a ‘vile body’ 
transformed by Christ so that ‘it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body’.
 224  In this regard 
Christ is the ‘first-born of many brethren’, the True Man marking the end of the old era of death 
and facilitating the original image God laid out for humankind which was forfeited by Adam.
225     
  Paul’s description of the salvational union of Adam and Christ, or flesh and spirit, utilizes 
a pattern of earth (flesh) and celestial (spirit) tropes that progresses towards their conflation in 
the new humanity as a victory over death. In Corinthians 15 Paul poses the questions, ‘How are 
the dead raised up? And with what body do they come’?
 226  The earth imagery in his answer 
figures death as a necessary precursor to the resurrected spiritual body: calling Christ ‘the first 
fruits of them that slept’, and drawing an identification between Christ and His believers, Paul 
states, ‘that which thou sowest [sic] is not quickened except to die.  And that which thou sowest, 
thou sowest not that the body shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat or other grain’.  
More explicitly, Paul states, ‘It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.  There is a 
natural body, and there is a spiritual body’.
 227 Paul’s description of the risen body’s new form 
involves an idiom of star imagery when he states there are ‘celestial bodies, and bodies 
terrestrial; but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial another’, implying 
the creation of a new ‘celestial’ flesh distinct from the earthly flesh of ‘men’, ‘beasts’, ‘fishes’, 
and ‘birds’.
228  Paul’s explanation of the terrestrial body’s transformation into a celestial one, and 
the important distinction between the two types of flesh, is a keystone passage in Pauline-
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inflected soteriology:  ‘The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is the Lord from 
heaven.  As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they 
also that are heavenly.  And as we have born the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the 
image of the heavenly’.  By bearing ‘the image of the heavenly’ through its conflation with the 
Spirit the earthy body loses its corruptibility to become celestial and immortal: ‘So when this 
corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then 
shall be brought to pass the saving that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory’.
229        
  The syncretistic conjoinment of Paul’s Christology with the Platonic world view can be 
followed through the Neoplatonic writings of the Church Fathers, particularly the natural 
theology of St. Augustine.  Augustine drew on Neoplatonism to describe the soul’s gradual rise 
away from material distractions to a union with God, and there is much of the Plato’s influence 
in Augustine’s search for truth.
 230  In Book VIII of The City of God Augustine’s intellectual debt 
to Plato is made plain when he extols the Platonists for approaching ‘nearest’ to Christian beliefs, 
stating they ‘have recognized the true God as the author of all things, the source of the light of 
truth, and the bountiful bestower of all blessedness’.
231  The Platonists believe God is ‘the cause 
of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding, and the end in reference to which the 
whole life is to be regulated’.
232  For their beliefs, they stand apart from philosophers who 
suppose ‘the principle of all things to be material’ and whose minds are ‘enslaved to their 
bodies’.
233 
Yet at the same time Augustine extols Platonic philosophy he also subsumes it to, and 
makes it serve, Christian doctrine.  As Classical cosmology is entwined in the dominating 
framework and syntax of natural theology it becomes inscribed with Judaeo-Christian meaning.  
As Augustine explains Platonic philosophy he also naturalizes Christian doctrine and provides its 
under-riding structure even as he positions Platonism subserviently to carry new Christian 
connotations.  Socrates’s teachings, for example, are remade as referents of the Pauline earth-
spirit dichotomy and rubrics on purification from sin to achieve immortality when Augustine 
emphasizes that the Socratic study of morals is attributable to Socrates’s unwillingness ‘that 
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minds defiled with earthly desires should essay to raise themselves upward to divine things’.
234  
This implicit corroboration of Christian soteriology continues when Augustine states that the 
Socratic study of morality is prompted by the mind’s desire to discover the ‘cause of things’, and 
such causes are ‘ultimately reducible to nothing else than the will of the one true and supreme 
God’.  Because of this, the ‘cause’ can ‘only be comprehended by a purified mind’.  Socratic 
diligence given to the ‘purification’ of life ‘by good morals’ frees the mind ‘from the depressing 
weight of lusts’, and enables it to rise ‘upward by its native vigour to eternal things’.
235        
Plato’s Ideal-material dichotomy easily bears the Pauline struggle between the body and 
spirit as well.  As Augustine explains, the Platonists see ‘that no material body is God’ and so 
rise above ‘all bodies in seeking for God’.  They see ‘that whatever is changeable is not the most 
high God’, and therefore transcend ‘every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the 
supreme’.
236  Part of the process of achieving union with God is through morality, which has 
similarities to charity.  Defined as the ‘question concerning the chief good’, morality is ‘that 
which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be blessed, if only we make all our actions 
refer to it, and seek it not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake’.  For this reason it 
is the beatific ‘end’, because ‘we wish other things on account of it, but itself only for its own 
sake’.
237  The end of moral study is not found in the mind or in corporeality, but in ‘the 
enjoyment of God’, much as ‘the eye enjoys light’.  It is an enjoyment derived from loving ‘the 
true and highest good’, which ‘according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a 
philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life, and he 
who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God’.
238 
The way the Holy Spirit is depicted as affecting the integrity of the body in Poe’s fiction 
recalls the difference between corruptible and incorruptible bodies in Pauline discourse.  
Specifically, corruptible bodies lack the sustaining divinity of the Holy Spirit, thereby remaining 
‘earthy’ and, in Poe’s fiction, become disarticulate or putrescent.  This connection between 
putrescence and a spiritual lack can be illustrated by way of Mather Byles’s A Discourse on the 
Present Vileness of the Body, And It’s Future Glorious Change by Christ (1732), which spells 
out the physical differences between the ‘glorious’, immortal body and the ‘vile’, mortal body.  
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In his Discourse Byles explores of the characterizing question in Pauline scripture, presented as 
an epigram from Philippians 3.21, ‘Who shall change our vile Body, that it may be fashioned 
like unto his glorious Body?’  Like Paul, Byles utilizes the same earth-related and Adamic, as 
well as celestial and Christic, imagery, and unifies these binaries in the figure of the immortal 
body fashioned unto Christ’s.  However, Byles goes a step beyond Scripture to describe the 
immortal condition of the unredeemed body, making what he terms a ‘short Improvement of the 
noble Doctrines’.
239  Although no evidence directly connects Poe to Byles, Byles’s sermon on 
‘glorious’ and ‘vile’ bodies, coloured as it is by an ‘extravagant gothic tinge’, sheds meaning on 
the recurrent image of putrescence in Poe’s writings, and for this reason is worth discussion.
240   
Byles references the Adamic tropes of sin, dust, earth and death to describe the vile body, 
emphasizing its derivation both etymologically and physically from ‘Humus; the moist ground; 
the Clay; the low Earth’,
241 and underlining that the human ‘Body is of the Earth, earthy’, and 
that ‘Dust it is, and to Dust it shall return’.  For Byles, the human form’s original element is 
‘mean and despicable’, carrying a ‘Humiliation even in its Origin and Constitution’ and an 
inherent ‘Vileness’ due to the ‘primitive Materials out of which it was framed’.
242  It is a 
‘beauteous Arrangement of finer Dust’ fashioned ‘out of the clay’ and ‘abject Earth’, and ‘taken 
from the common Globe, into which it must quickly fall and resolve again’.  Our aspects, 
‘flush’d with Health and Beauty’, ‘owe their Existence to the same Clods of Earth which harbour 
our Brethren, the Worms’, which ‘wait to feast upon the mouldering Carcase; and riot in our 
wasting Flesh’.
243  ‘Let the Proud Creature look down to the Earth and view the Dust from which 
he sprung’ says Byles and juxtaposes the sin of pride with a description of the earthy body taken 
from Genesis, ‘And the Lord God formed Man out of the Dust of the Ground’.
244  Byles then 
traces humanity’s earthly constitution to ‘Adam in Paradise and Innocence’, who ‘might in this 
sacred sense, have own’d a Vile Body’, noting that ‘Original Sin is communicated thro the Veins 
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of the guilty Parent’, and that the ‘Spirit which God has infused’ into the human form becomes 
‘depraved and polluted by’ the body. 
245   
Tropes of earth and mortality are further illustrated as Death’s triumph over the 
unredeemed corpus: ‘A Thousand different Fevers stand ready to seize this Body’ proclaims 
Byles, ‘to torment it’, ‘burn away its Life’, ‘lick up the finer spirits, and snap the Vital Cord’.
246  
‘The Face where Beauty now triumphs, will appear cold, and wan, and dismal, rifled by the 
Hand of Death’, and ‘the most beauteous, or learned, or pious Head will grin a hideous Skull.  
Our broken Coffins will shew [sic] nothing but black Bones, and black Mould, and Worms and 
Filth’.
247  Byles asks ‘Are these the Cheeks that glow’d so fresh, and bloom’d so lovely?  Are 
these the Lips that smil’d so graceful, and pour’d out such a gliding Stream of Eloquence and 
Musick?’  He answers, ‘Lo, the Body is laid in the Dust, and the Worms cover it.  Polluted 
Vermin crawl over every part of the elegant Form’ and ‘enchanting Face’.  The body is ‘folded 
in a winding Sheet’ and ‘nailed in a black Coffin’, where the ‘Skin breaks and moulders away; 
the Flesh drops in Dust from the Bones’, the Bones ‘are covered with black Mould, and Worms 
twist about them.  The Coffins break, and the Graves sink in, and the disjointed Skelleton [sic] 
strews the lonely vault’.  The once shapely figure leaves ‘its Ruins among the Graves’, lies 
‘neglected and forgot’, moulders ‘away without a Name’, and scatters ‘among the Elements’.
248   
Byles’s use of the Platonic referents, ‘Beauty’ and ‘Musick’, presupposes a human soul 
in communication with the immortal and ideal, and prefaces an important question for him: if 
one remains impenitent and foregoes immortality, then what becomes of personal identity bound 
in totality to the decomposing body?  The context for this question can be found in Locke’s An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in which Locke expresses his own eschatological 
concerns in his amalgamation of the soul with consciousness and personal identity.  He states, 
everyone has ‘in himself an immaterial spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the 
constant change of his body keeps him the same; and is that which he calls himself’.  Since the 
soul is the self, ‘we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the 
resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same 
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consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it’.
249  Byles’s anxiety about the 
annihilation of the soul, and hence consciousness, emerges in the questions that consider its link 
with its disintegrating shell: ‘“And were these Bones once living like ours? and must ours be as 
they?”  This hideous Skull, the frightful Jaw fallen, and the black Teeth naked to the Eye, was it 
once a thinking Frame, covered with a beauteous Skin?’
250  
His answer follows two possible tangents.  On one hand, the body of earth and clay 
remains in its deathly state throughout eternity.  Byles says to his Christian congregation, God 
‘shall change OUR vile Body that it may be fashioned like his.  Ours; none but ours’.  While the 
‘Unbeliever and Impenitent’ will also be resurrected on the Second Coming, ‘how wide the 
Difference between the one and the other, at the great decisive Day!’  The ‘feeble Bodies’ of the 
nonbelievers will be ‘changed into Bodies strong to bear the Wrath of the Almighty GOD.  Their 
dying and dead bodies shall be changed into Bodies of an immortal Constitution’ and become 
‘Bodies that must live forever in unsufferable [sic] anguish’.  Immortal, but living-in-death, the 
‘corrupt and filthy’ bodies of the nonbelievers ‘shall be changed into ten thousand Times more 
hideous and loathsome Figures: Fit to be Inhabitants of Hell, and Companions for Devils’.  Their 
bodies ‘shall be blacken’d in the finish’d Image of the Devil’, ‘seized and rack’d’ with ‘Pains 
and Torments’, and ‘shall feed the Flames of the horrible Furnace’ where the ‘darkness of the 
Grave shall be changed for the outer Darkness’.
251   
On the other hand, the loss of identity – the loss of a Name scattered ‘among the 
Elements’ – is prevented by the immortal body given by the Holy Spirit through Christ’s 
salvation.  Punning on ‘members’ of the congregation, and on Christ’s human limbs, Byles calls 
the followers of Christ, ‘Members of our Lord JESUS’, connecting Christ’s resurrection with 
their own, and he asserts ‘GOD shall raise the Dead, by the Man whom he hath ordained, 
whereof he has given Assurance unto all Men that he raised him from the Dead’.
252  The vile 
body’s transformation from the ‘STATE of DEATH’ and its revival ‘from the Condition of 
Curse and Corruption’ are guaranteed despite death’s destructive properties: although ‘the 
Worms have feasted themselves upon our Last Dust’, explains Byles, ‘they shall refund it, and 
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give back every Attom [sic]: All that really belongs to our numerical Body’.
253  Byles has a 
specific interest in the way ‘Bodies may dissolve, and scatter among the Elements’ and how one 
Element is ‘perpetually loosing [sic] it self in another’, and this elemental idiom structures the 
way he describes the body’s deterioration and resurrection: ‘the invisible Bones may moulder to 
finer Dust, the Dust may refine to Water, wander in a Cloud, float in a River, or be lost in the 
wide Sea, and [sic] undistinguished Drop among the Waves.  They may be sucked up by the Sun, 
and fall in a Shower upon the Earth’ to flourish in a ‘Spire of Grass’ or a ‘Flower or a Blossom’.  
Yet though ‘our Dust’ will ‘wander’ ‘throughout the whole material Creation’, ‘it shall all at 
once rush together’ on Judgement day ‘and start up a compleat [sic] Man’; the ‘Dust shall be 
called together; the Bones shall harden’, ‘the Joints connect’, ‘the Sinews shall brace with an 
immortal Strength’, and ‘the Skin cover all with everlasting Beauty’.
254   
The earthy body reformed and made immortal through Christ and the Holy Spirit is then 
drawn in imagery that recalls fire, light and stars.  As Byles explains, a body ‘fashioned like unto 
CHRIST’S’ is one that is ‘made splendid and illustrious’, just as the ‘Body of CHRIST is a 
shining Body’ that ‘scatters Light and Glory round about it’, and he cites several Scriptural 
examples to corroborate this description: ‘Saul was struck blind, dazzled with the unsufferable 
[sic] Blaze’ from the ‘Body of the Son of GOD’; our bodies will ‘put on a shining form; shoot 
like a Flame from the Grave, and glitter like a Ray of Light up the Ether’; and ‘They that be wise, 
shall shine as the Brightness of the Firmament, and they which turn many to Righteousness, as 
the Stars for ever and ever’.
255  In addition to fire and celestial tropes, Byles also mentions air 
and ethereality to describe the resurrected body, again citing Scripture to support his assertions: 
the body of Christ ‘could ascend and descend with equal ease’, ‘stand aloft in the Air, without 
any visible Support’, ‘rise up gradually from the Ground’, ‘tower away through the upper Skies, 
to the World above’, and Byles adds that all these ‘mysterious and astonishing Powers’ will be 
bestowed on the new eschatological humanity.
256 
Having now looked at principal Christian definitions of love and spirituality, as well as 
corporeality as figured against the Pauline dichotomy of Adam and Christ, we can now answer 
the questions presented at the beginning of this subsection.  When Poe asserts Tennyson ‘is so 
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little of the earth, earthy’ he makes a negative comparison with Adam and what Adam 
represents; the inference is that the Beauty of Tennyson’s poetry is not only ‘soul-elevating’ in a 
Platonic sense, but a Spiritual one as well, with the ‘elevating’ properties of Tennyson’s art 
implicitly reflecting of the soteriological ‘status’ of Tennyson’s soul.  The syncretism between 
Beauty and the Holy Spirit is suggested again when Poe mentions the ‘earthly harp’ that strikes 
notes ‘which cannot have been unfamiliar to the angels’, with the music, or ‘harmony’ from the 
‘earthly’ harp metaphoric for ‘earthly’ humanity’s union with Ideality and God;  and this idea of 
a union with God through Beauty is stated again when Poe defines Beauty as ‘an ecstatic 
prescience of the glories beyond the grave’, suggesting a ‘glorious’ immortality gained through 
the Holy Spirit, with its correlations with love and charity.   
The syncretism of Beauty with the Holy Spirit necessitates a transformation of the 
definition of love; specifically, the uniting power of Eros is sublimated into Christian agape love 
and charity.  This sublimation means that the unifying power of Eros between the lover and 
beloved is redefined somewhat so that it not only leads to Beauty, but to a union with God; and 
the idea that love leads to Beauty as well as a union with God organizes Poe’s depictions of 
women.  That is, the ‘divine majesty’ of a woman’s love elevates her lover’s soul not only 
through Beauty but through the Holy Spirit, elevating his mortal soul into an immortal one.  
Within this paradigm, Poe’s connection of Adam and Eve with Plato’s story about humanity’s 
search for its ‘other half’ to attain Beauty turns the Genesis creation story into an exemplar for a 
particular conceptualization of men’s relationships with women: Adam, representing the men of 
clay, is searching for the ‘other half’ whose love will elevate his soul towards a union with God.  
With this idealization of women, an identificatory collapse occurs that occludes individual 
female identity; specifically, women become spiritual reflections of men, or indicators for the 
male soul’s potential to achieve salvation.  This spiritual conceptualization of the female body 
does not entirely originate with Poe, and is derived in part from Neoplatonically-inflected critical 
theories.  The following subsection will discuss these theories put forward by Schlegel, and H.N. 
Coleridge, and how these theories are illustrated in Baron Friedrich Heinrich Karl de la Motte 
Fouqué’s Undine, in order to lend greater clarity to Poe’s depictions of women. 
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‘The Mirror of God’: Neoplatonic Figurations of Women. 
  The discussion of women as spiritual aspects of the male self can be methodologically 
framed by ideas put forward by Frederick Goldin in The Mirror of Narcissus in the Courtly Love 
Lyric (1967).  In his book, Goldin outlines a model of courtly love in which the lady is the 
knight’s reflection of spiritual interiority.  Goldin’s model of medieval courtly love lyric is based 
on the medieval concept of the mirror, in which its reflection is one of Platonic Ideality, and 
which can be consulted in order to know what one is and what one ought to be.
 257  This Mirror 
of Ideality partially derives from a theological idea that the soul is a Mirror of God that must 
remain ‘pure’, because one ‘cannot get images’ from a ‘soiled mirror’, ‘nor can the soul that is 
filled with worldly cares and over which the flesh spreads darkness receive the illumination of 
the Holy Spirit’.
258  As a reflection of Ideality, the ‘Mirror of God’, served a particular political 
and philosophical function for the medieval noble classes by justifying their earthly society as a 
reflection of the heavenly community of God attended by his angels.  By peering into the Mirror 
of God a nobleman could find the certainty of his personal worth.  But how could he be certain 
he deserved the wealth and privilege of his high class, and how could he be sure of his 
membership of that class, despite his deeds and acts?
259   
The idealized lady gave the knight this certainty.  She saved him from the torture of an 
indefinite and unattainable idealized self-image by embodying that image herself.
260  In her, the 
knight found values that were unchanging and enduring, that existed before he discovered them, 
even before the existence of the lady, in whom they are embodied to perfection.  As an arbiter of 
virtue, the rewards of her favour marked a publically recognizable moral progress, thereby 
signifying the courtly man’s earthly salvation.
261  The lady is what the courtly man can never be, 
but what he wants to become and longs to aspire to.
262  Basically, the lady is the knight’s own 
image perfected, his own form enhanced by courtly grace and virtue.  Goldin states, ‘As the 
knight believed the lady was a mirror of perfection, so he believed that in casting his own image 
in that mirror he would be united with the ideal, the light of the world, the living form of Beauty.  
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She was to be his hope, a mediator between himself and something imperious and impossible’.
263  
Courtly love began with the idealized image of the knight’s own perfection, an image which later 
took on the form of an honoured lady.
264    
The idea that the female body reflects the idealized male self can be expanded on by 
examining two works of critical theory that Poe was familiar with: Augustus Wilhelm Schlegel’s 
The Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (1803) and H. N. Coleridge’s 
Introduction to the Greek Classic Poets (1830).  Schlegel’s work was based on lectures given in 
Vienna in 1808, and was originally published in German between 1809 and 1811.  Since Poe 
could not understand German he most likely read John Black’s English translation of the 
Lectures published in London in 1815 and Philadelphia in 1833.  Schlegel is particularly 
instrumental to the formulation of Poe’s own aesthetic ideas, and the intellectual debt Poe owes 
to Schlegel has never been disputed, partly because Poe’s appreciation of Schlegel’s theories is 
well documented.  As Burton Pollin points out, nine of Poe’s ‘Pinakidia’ entries liberally quote 
the Lectures, and many of Poe’s literary borrowings from Schlegel often border on plagiarism.
265   
Schlegel constructs such a relationship between men and women characterized by the Mirror of 
Ideality in his own description of the Chivalrous spirit as a ‘new and purer spirit of love, an 
inspired homage for genuine female worth’ that reveres women as ‘the pinnacle of humanity’ 
and enjoins them to religion ‘under the image of a virgin mother’ who infuses ‘into all hearts a 
sentiment of unalloyed goodness’.  Standing in relation to the revered woman and Chivalrous 
spirit is the chivalrous man, in whom Christianity claims ‘a dominion over the whole inward man 
and the most hidden movements of the heart’, whose ‘moral independence’ and prescribed ‘laws 
of honour’ motivate him to self-sacrificing deeds, and who consecrates ‘unconditionally certain 
principals of action, as truths elevated beyond all the investigation of casuistical reasoning’.
266   
Schlegel’s portrait of the courtly romance involves an interplay between internality and 
externality – between the ‘inwardness’ of an integrally Christian man and the outward ‘image of 
a virgin mother’ who compels his moral progress through chivalrous acts. The characteristic and 
significant detail in this interplay is the synonymisation of women with the ‘virgin mother’, 
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which immediately figures the female image with spiritual properties.  Indeed, Schlegel even 
describes women in salvational terms: they infuse men’s hearts with ‘unalloyed goodness’, and 
enable Christianity to claim the ‘inward man’, motivating him to achieve a ‘truth’ ‘elevated’ 
beyond all ‘casuistical reasoning’.  Uniting the Christian man with his ‘inward’ reflection is the 
Chivalrous spirit, which has connotations of the Holy Spirit as a ‘purer spirit of love’.  Basically, 
Schlegel rewrites the courtly romance as a metaphor for the male soul elevated by his love for an 
idealized woman, with the love being an agape love associated with the Holy Spirit.  Women in 
this paradigm are doubly ‘identity-less’, with all falling ‘under the image of a virgin mother’, yet 
at the same time signifying male interiority in that they serve as the prompts that enable 
Christianity to claim the ‘inward man’.   
  The soul-elevating union between men and women is outlined again in the Introduction 
to the Greek Classic Poets by Henry Nelson Coleridge, who also writes this relationship as the 
union between Platonism and Christianity, with the former representing the flesh and the latter 
representing the Spirit.
 267  Coleridge relegates the ‘ancient’ arts, considering them ‘Pagan’, 
grounded in ‘sensual theory’, and marked by the ‘passion of Appetite’.  While he admits a union 
between the ancient and modern – or Pagan and Christian – theories he firmly places the agency 
for spiritual salvation with writings influenced by Christian thought, which he associates with the 
‘passion of Affection’.  This distinction between Appetite and Affection, and their union to 
create Beauty, is drawn in Coleridge’s brief history of the evolution of the literature of love from 
Plato to Shakespeare.  Beginning with Plato, Coleridge explains that while Platonic love is 
‘indeed a high and noble effort of pure imagination’, its ‘reciprocal appetency of spirits, 
springing from a predestined and immovable sympathy, was not the human love which could be 
sung upon the lyre’.  In the middle stage of the history of the love poem, represented by Petrarch 
and the minor pieces of Dante, ‘the love had become human’ even though it remained 
‘uninspired by any real passion’.  This imperfect improvement on the love lyric is due to the fact 
that Petrarch is unable to unite the two ‘modes of thinking and feeling into one action of the 
heart’: he is ‘passionate here, metaphysical there’, but unable to combine the two modes, to 
‘Platonize, as it were, humanity, and to humanize Platonism’.  The perfecting of the theory of 
love is attributed to the English poets.  The works of Spenser and Shakespeare express ‘that 
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exquisite intermingling of philosophy, passion, and domestic fondness, which we all feel at once 
to be the true desideratum of the virtuous mind, and believe to be the best earthly consummation 
of our imperfect nature’.  In this domestic union the ‘spirit is loved for itself alone’ because ‘it is 
loved through the medium of the purified passions’; and Coleridge quotes a passage from the 
Symposium for corroboration, ‘Itself alone by itself, eternally one and single’, another translation 
of Plato’s description of the Beautiful, ‘alone by itself and with itself, always being of a single 
form’.  In other words, divinity is realized through the union of marriage, which may also be 
understood as the union between Platonism and Christianity, or between the earthly and spiritual 
– or as Coleridge states: ‘Beauty is the virtue of the Body, as Virtue is the Beauty of the mind, 
and that Love is imperfect which affects to reject either the one or the other’.
268      
  Coleridge’s depiction of love as corollary to Beauty easily harks to the Platonic ladder of 
erotics in which Eros compels the lover toward his beloved in a union that progresses towards 
the Beautiful.  An important distinction though is that Coleridge writes Plato’s erotics within the 
context of Christian-sanctioned marriage, thereby inscribing it with Christian meaning and 
history, even though a history abridged towards his own literary theory.  Defining marriage as an 
‘indissoluble’ bond that declares women ‘equal objects of its precepts and joint-heirs of its 
promises’, and acknowledges ‘love and care’ as the ‘rights of a Christian wife at the hands of a 
husband’, Coleridge attributes the ‘gentle’ yet ‘almost despotic empire’ the ‘fairer sex’ ‘exercises 
over the stronger’ to Christian chivalry.  He explains that although the ‘barbarism’ and 
‘corrupting priesthood’ of the dark ages destroyed a great deal of the ‘mysterious dignity’ which 
the Gospels conferred on women, Christian sentiments of marriage were revived in the Crusades, 
‘never thenceforth to be obscured but in an eclipse of Christian civilization itself’.  This revival 
of marriage was due to the emergence of the Chivalry, whose duty was not only to ‘defend the 
weak in all cases’, but to ‘relieve, at any hazard, a woman from difficulty, and to protect her 
from danger or insult at the expense of his life’.  Hence, the courtesy and dignified submission to 
women begun with the knight and inherited by his successor, the gentleman, grew out of the 
reverential attention to women, the same reverence that produces ‘that more august conception of 
the wedded union’.  When this ‘dignified submission’ becomes ‘kindled into passion for some 
one in particular’ it is transformed into ‘the sacred and enlivening flame, by which every faculty 
                                                           
268 Henry Nelson Coleridge, Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets Designed Principally For 
the Use of Young Persons at School and College (London: John Murray, 1830), pp. 31-32. 
 78 
 
of the mind is developed, every affection of the heart purified, and which alone can promise 
happiness on earth, by a satisfaction of the instinctive appetite in the light and under the sanction 
of a spiritual union’.
269  In other words, the marital union is ‘soul-elevating’ for the husband in a 
way that recalls Platonic Beauty.  Yet even while Coleridge’s structure is Platonic his language 
ascribes immortality to Christian doctrine: the ‘mysterious dignity’ conferred by the Gospels, the 
‘enlivening flame’, the ‘light’, the ‘spiritual union’, are all part of the idiom of the Holy Spirit as 
well.  They are also Coleridge’s referents to women and therefore also figure women’s love as an 
agency for male salvation.  The marital union of man and woman is therefore akin to the 
soteriological union of flesh and Spirit.   
The ideas that love is an aspect of the Holy Spirit that can elevate the soul to immortality 
and a union with God, and that one’s ‘other half’ is an indicator of the soul’s potential to reach 
salvation as a reflection of spiritual interiority can be illustrated in another work that is 
influential to Poe’s literature, Fouqué’s Undine. Originally printed in German in 1811, English 
prose translations were published in 1818, 1830, and 1839, and reprinted in 1824, 1840, 1844, 
and 1845.
270  Burton Pollin states that ‘Undine provided Poe with a rather inconveniently small 
and frail peg on which to hang several of his favourite principles in literary criticism’; yet I 
would argue that Poe’s extolment of Undine is reflective of the way Fouqué’s novel displays 
many of the Neoplatonic ideals Poe subscribes to, and thereby speaks to something more 
fundamental than Pollin suggests.
271  Poe writes highly of Undine in his review of an 1839 
translation, relating it back to American literary identity, and praising its theological themes.  For 
Poe, the republication of Undine, ‘in the very teeth of our anti-romantic national character, is an 
experiment well adapted to excite interest’, and that during the ‘crisis caused by this experiment’ 
it is the ‘duty of every lover of literature to speak out, and speak boldly, against the untenable 
prejudices which have so long and so unopposedly enthralled us’.  Poe calls on such romantic 
readers ‘to make head, by all admissible means in his power, against that evil genius of mere 
matter-of-fact’, and asks them to ‘make use of a careful analysis of the work itself’ ‘with a view 
of impressing upon the public mind at least his individual sense of its most exalted and 
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extraordinary character’.
272  Writing about the story itself, Poe states that a ‘mystic or under 
current of meaning, of the simplest and most easily intelligible, yet of the most richly 
philosophical character’ inflects Fouqué’s work, and that ‘Undine is a model of models, in regard 
to the high artistical talent which it evinces’, with ‘various beauties’ and an ‘absolute’ ‘unity’.
273  
Speaking on the novel’s religious themes, Poe points out ‘the rapturous death of Sir Huldbrand in 
the embraces of his spiritual wife’ and asks, ‘What can be more divine than the character of the 
soulless Undine? – what more august than her transition into the soul-possessing wife?  What 
can be more intensely beautiful than the whole book’?
274  Examining Undine will not only shed 
light on the way Poe writes women as spiritual reflections of men, but enable interpretive 
leverage into his colonial-themed stories as well.   
A detailed analysis of Undine is outside the scope of this thesis; however, a brief synopsis 
of Undine will outline its tropes relevant to this chapter.  The story of Undine begins with the 
arrival of a knight, named Sir Huldbrand, to the cottage of an elderly Fisherman, who lives on a 
secluded peninsula separated from the outside world by a haunted forest.  The Fisherman offers 
Huldbrand shelter for the night, and during his stay a storm arises, which creates a flood that 
prevents the knight from leaving back through the forest.  The Fisherman and his wife introduce 
Huldbrand to Undine, their adopted daughter, who was found after their original daughter 
disappeared.  Huldbrand and Undine fall in love, and by chance an elderly priest, Father 
Heilman, gets ship-wrecked onto the shore of the peninsula just in time to marry the young 
couple.  After their marriage Undine tells Huldbrand that she is of a race of ‘water-spirits’ that 
are human beings in ‘outward nature’, but are ‘coupled’ with a ‘great evil’; that is, the water 
spirits ‘moulder and pass away, soul and body’ after death, so that while human beings ‘wake to 
a purer life’, the water-spirits ‘remain where the sand, and the flint, and the wind and the wave, 
remain’.  However, Undine can gain a soul through ‘the most intimate connexion of love with a 
being of the earth’.
275 
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  After the marriage the storm clears, and Huldbrand, Undine, and Father Heilman leave 
the peninsula through the haunted forest.  While in the forest they briefly encounter Undine’s 
uncle, Kuhleborn, a powerful water-spirit who can transform from human shape into a body of 
water.  On the other side of the forest Huldbrand and Undine meet Bertalda, the princess of a 
kingdom.  Eventually it is revealed that Bertalda is the Fisherman’s original daughter whose 
place was taken by Undine.  Bertalda, Huldbrand, and Undine travel to Huldbrand’s castle, 
Ringstetten, which quickly becomes haunted by Kuhleborn through a courtyard well that Undine 
must seal up to prevent his returning.  While at Ringstetten, Bertalda and Huldbrand fall in love, 
and in a heated moment Huldbrand shuns his wife, causing the water-spirits to reclaim her.  
Before she leaves, Undine warns Huldbrand to remain faithful to their wedding vows or she will 
not be able to protect her from Kuhleborn.  Huldbrand and Bertalda decide to marry anyway, but 
just before the wedding night Bertalda orders the well to be reopened so she can get its purifying 
water to remove her freckles.  Undine rises from the well, locates Huldbrand, and kills him. 
  Drawn with Platonic elemental imagery, the organizing trope of Undine is the human 
soul’s elevation through love, particularly the love associated with the Holy Spirit which also 
creates a union with God.  The union of earth and Spirit is suggested with slight melodrama in 
Undine’s initial scene, when the ‘green earth’ of the peninsula extends ‘far into a large lake’, so 
that ‘the land seem[s] to have forced itself into the water from affection to the clear, blue, shining 
stream; while the water with loving arms grasp[s] after the delicious fields’.
276  The imagery of 
earth and water easily recalls the Platonic elements, with water being an intermediary to the 
divine element of fire, so that the scene is metaphoric not only for a union compelled by Eros 
leading to Beauty, but also of love leading to a union with God.  This imagery is repeated 
somewhat in the novel’s final scene as well in a parallel between Undine and Huldbrand, as a 
spring bursts from the ground where the spirit of Undine stands and spreads to surround 
Huldbrand’s grave.
277   
  The theme of the soul’s elevation through a union of love is drawn straight-forwardly in 
Fouqué’s novel through the transformation of Undine’s mortal soul into an immortal as brought 
about by her marriage to Huldbrand.  As cited above, this transformation is stated explicitly, but 
is also suggested through a dispositional change.  Previous to her marriage Undine is described 
                                                           
276 Undine, p. 1. 
277 Undine, p. 205. 81 
 
as wearying to ‘the patience of Job’, and her opinions prompt the Fisherman to upbraid her with 
the statement, ‘That sounds as if Turks and heathens had brought you up’.
278  During the 
marriage ceremony Undine mocks ‘the bride-groom and her foster-parents, and even the 
reverend priest’, and when Father Heilman instructs Undine to ‘attune’ her ‘soul’ so ‘that it may 
harmonize with the soul of’ her ‘bridegroom’, Undine responds, ‘But if one happens to have no 
soul? – What then, pray you, becomes of your tuning’?
279  Following the wedding night, 
Undine’s behaviour is altered in accordance with her new soul-bearing condition: she implores 
the priest in ‘humble words’ for ‘his pardon for her follies’ and entreats ‘him to pray for the 
welfare of her soul’; she is ‘still, friendly, cautious’, her behaviour that of a ‘mother of a family’ 
as well as ‘a tender bashful being’; and she gazes at her husband with looks that convey ‘a whole 
heaven of love and modest devotion’.  Father Heilman comments on her changed condition as 
well, stating, ‘the heavenly goodness yesterday gave to you a treasure by the hands of me, 
unworthy – use it as it should be used, so will it advance your earthly as your eternal welfare’.
280 
  Juxtaposing Undine’s transformation from a soulless to soul-bearing state are her uncle 
Kuhleborn, and her rival, Bertalda.  Characteristically associated with the colour white, as a ‘tall 
white figure’ with a ‘body as white’ as foam, and ‘of gigantic dimensions’, Kuhleborn’s colour 
and stature recall the Bible’s several depictions of divine reification, lending him spiritual 
connotations.
281  At the same time, though, Kuhleborn is also described as ‘a soulless spirit 
formed of the elements, a creature of the outer world, insensible to feelings of the world 
within’.
282  Basically, Kuhleborn represents the earth-bound, unredeemed and mortal human 
soul.  This soulless, and loveless, state of being insensible to the ‘feelings of the world within’ is 
outlined in Kuhleborn’s comparisons with Huldbrand, the Fisherman, and Father Heilman, the 
agents of charity who serve to help Undine realize her immortality.  Upon Huldbrand’s arrival at 
the cottage, he is initially mistaken by the Fisherman to be ‘the image of a tall, gigantic being, 
white as snow, who unceasingly’ nods ‘with his head after a strange fashion’.
283  A parallel 
between Kuhleborn and the Fisherman is made as well in a scene emblematic of salvation: the 
Fisherman reaches out over a flooding stream to Undine, who is caught on an island, and, as he 
                                                           
278 Undine, p. 9, p. 58. 
279 Undine, pp. 73-75. 
280 Undine, pp. 82-85. 
281 Undine, p. 47, p. 133. 
282 Undine, pp. 139-140. 
283 Undine, p. 3. 82 
 
does so, his ‘white hairs fall strangely over his face’, reminding Huldbrand of ‘the white man in 
the forest’.
284  Like the ‘fishers of men’ ordained by Christ to redeem souls by spreading the 
Gospels, the Fisherman reaches across the water, offering the charity that could lift Undine from 
her mortal state to a ‘purer life’.
 285  The series of juxtapositions continues in relation to Father 
Heilman, who is described as having a ‘white beard’ and ‘whiter locks on the crown of his head’, 
but who also embodies the union between flesh and spirit, as indicated when he says, ‘I am no 
earthly spirit, though, indeed, a spirit that yet dwells in the earthly body’.
286  In contrast, 
Kuhleborn wears garments that are ‘almost the same as the monk’s’ ‘white habit of his order’, 
but has no immortal soul, as indicated in his statement, ‘I know nothing of penance, and indeed 
fancy I have no particular occasion for it’.
287   
Like Kuhleborn, Bertalda also stands in contrast to Undine as a soulless entity: Undine 
doubts Bertalda’s possession of a soul when she asks her, ‘Have you then a soul? – Have you 
really then a soul?’; inversely, Bertalda wonders how Huldbrand can love one who is ‘rather a 
spirit than a human being’, implying her own love lacks a spiritual aspect; and most tellingly, 
Bertalda’s beauty is maintained with water from the well haunted by Kuhleborn, which makes 
‘fair the skin and’ lends ‘a charm to her beauty’.
288  Basically, Bertalda embodies a Pandemian 
love, and, in accordance with H.N. Coleridge’s terminology, instantiates Beauty within a purely 
‘sensual theory’, unaffiliated with the elevating powers of Holy Spirit. In this regard, her love for 
Huldbrand is not ‘soul-elevating’, as implied when Huldbrand rescues Bertalda from the ‘Black 
Valley’.  While searching for Bertalda in the ‘thick gloom’, Huldbrand spots ‘something white, 
shining through the branches’; but, as he draws closer to the ‘white figure’, he sees ‘lying close 
before him a horrid, disgusting face’, and hears a ‘hoarse voice’ say, ‘Give me a kiss beloved 
one’ before realizing the white figure is Kuhleborn.
289  A similar situation occurs when Bertalda 
and Huldbrand are sitting in a wagon.  Just as Bertalda makes known her love for Huldbrand, the 
couple find themselves in ‘the middle of a foaming river’, see that the wagon and horses have 
‘melted and foamed away into the water that boiled up around them’, and discover that the carter 
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is actually Kuhleborn, who rises ‘up like a tower’ of water to ‘bury them in destruction’.
290  The 
appearance of Kuhleborn at important moments of Bertalda’s relationship with Huldbrand 
dramatically illustrates that her love for Huldbrand will leave his soul mortal, in a state similar to 
that of Kuhleborn. 
Undine, in contrast to Bertalda, is drawn as Huldbrand’s proper spiritual counterpart 
when she rescues Huldbrand from the Black Valley; and this rescue from death metaphorically 
implies that she also elevates his soul above mortality, due to the fact that her love is the same 
that is associated with the Holy Spirit and union with God.  The spiritual connection between 
Undine and Huldbrand is emphasized as well in a dream in which Huldbrand sees Undine 
explaining to Kuhleborn, ‘the soul that was given to me on earth has not yet departed from me’, 
and then hears ‘a voice of music’, suggesting his harmony with his Platonic soul and that he is in 
contact with his own ‘sphere’.
291  Undine’s spiritual associations are drawn further when she 
emerges, spirit-like, from the haunted well as ‘a female figure clad in white, with a veil of the 
same colour depending from her hand’.
292  That Huldbrand’s marriage to Undine represents a 
conflation of the flesh and Spirit is suggested when, just before his wedding night with Bertalda 
he says, ‘I must into the wedding-bed’, to which the spirit of Undine replies, ‘You must indeed, 
but into a dark, cold bed’.
293  In this instance, the union of the wedding bed is correlated with a 
union with the Spirit; and this spiritual aspect is emphasized when Undine smiles ‘in all her 
beauty’ and kisses Huldbrand with a ‘heavenly kiss’ before she kills him.
294  Finally, Undine’s 
instantiation of Huldbrand’s soul is suggested when her spirit appears as ‘a snow-white figure, 
closely veiled’, raising her ‘hands to Heaven in deep and murmured lamentation’, and walking 
behind Huldbrand’s funeral procession.
295   
In his review of Undine Poe states that ‘the mere death of a beloved wife does not imply 
a final separation so complete as to justify an union with another’.
296  For Poe, Undine was more 
than just a ‘frail peg’ upon which to hang his literary theories; it expressed a Neoplatonic 
tradition that Poe saw himself as part of.  Undine , like the criticism of Schlegel and H.N. 
Coleridge, fleshes out many of the Neoplatonic essentialities and assurances that Poe subscribes 
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to, particularly that love is appurtenant of the Holy Spirit, that it brings one in union with God, 
and that men search for their ‘other halves’ who can provide this love and immortalize their 
souls.  This idealization of women is partially built on an identificatory collapse as they come to 
serve as reflections for the male soul, or as Mirrors of Ideality.  We can see how these ideas are 
enacted in Poe’s tales, particularly in relation to what Poe sees as ‘faulty’ epistemologies.  
Specifically, Poe criticizes knowledge systems that attempt to subordinate Ideality and the Spirit 
to mensuration.  For Poe, such epistemologies create false knowledge systems that attempt to 
encompass Spirituality and subsume it to representation.  By doing so, these same 
epistemologies preclude any actual Absolutes, thereby preventing a union with God.  Two ways 
in which Poe illustrates the detrimental effect of false knowledge systems on the soul are through 
the logic of monomania, and through depictions of women as reflections of male essentiality, 
with their bodily conditions reflecting the effects of false knowledge on Poe’s male narrators.  
The following subsection will discuss how Poe’s tale, ‘Berenice’, enacts this correlation between 
the female body and epistemology. 
   
The Devil in the Discourse: Monomania and Egaeus’s Library 
A misrecognition is established at the outset of ‘Berenice’ when Poe’s narrator, Egaeus, 
sees a rainbow – symbolic of God’s covenant with Noah to never again destroy the world with 
flood – as a trope for the ‘wretchedness of earth’, thereby transforming a ‘covenant of peace’ and 
salvation into a ‘simile for sorrow’.
297   The act of tropically tying an emblem of the Spirit to the 
‘wretchedness of earth’ is appurtenant of a knowledge system that collapses the spiritual and 
abstract into the material and representable, effectively nullifying the spiritual ‘realm’.  In 
essence, Poe draws Egaeus – and several of his first-person narrators – as writing and 
experiencing from within an epistemology that allows for an inkling of ‘something beyond’, but 
only realizing this ‘shadow’ of rationality through material and empirical means.  This conflation 
of the spiritual and material, and its Providential implications, underpin not only Poe’s ‘married 
women’ stories, such as ‘Berenice’, but his tales of colonial contact as well.  In ‘Berenice’ the 
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subservience of spirituality to representation and materiality is limned in the tale’s two central 
tropes: Egaeus’s disease of the mind, and the library with its ‘very peculiar’ contents.  While the 
works in the library allude to Neoplatonic, soteriological concerns, ‘monomania’ references a 
series of discourses and tropes that explain Egaeus’s emotional apathy and obsession while 
pointing to a disjuncture between epistemology and a Neoplatonic teleology that underpins the 
tale’s domestic violence.  In order to understand this disjuncture and how it pertains to identity in 
‘Berenice’, it will be useful to provide a brief discussion of monomania before analysing the 
works of Egaeus’s library.   
‘Monomania’, Egaeus’s mental disorder, was a psychiatric disorder ‘discovered’, or more 
properly, conceptualized, in the early nineteenth century.   F.J.V. Broussais’s On Irritation and 
Insanity (1831), and the Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine (1833), edited by John Forbes, 
Alexander Tweedie and John Conolly both explain symptoms and causes of monomania and 
share contemporaneity with ‘Berenice’s’ original publication.
298  For Broussais, monomania, or 
‘chronic partial mania’, signifies a period of madness in which ‘the greater part of insane persons 
are governed by one predominant idea, or by a series of ideas’, yet still ‘understand reasoning 
upon most other subjects, when they are not under the influence of morbid agitation’.
299  
Amongst the various types of monomania Broussais classifies as ‘perversions’ is the ‘perversion 
of the instinctive want of associating with other men’, its central symptom being the inability to 
form emotional attachments with significant others, such as spouses or close relatives.  In 
comparison, Broussais explains that in its ‘lighter degree’ the perverted instinct for human 
association ‘produces moroseness, impatience, and hatred towards certain persons’, while its 
‘middle’ stages produce insane men and women ‘who are in despair, that they cannot love their 
husbands or wives – their children – their relations’ yet still have the presence of mind to 
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condemn and grieve at ‘these sentiments of aversion for their fellow-creatures’.  Its latter stages 
transform emotional aversion into violence, as those who abandon themselves to the destructive 
inclination ‘invent pretexts to justify their atrocities; sometimes it is a voice that directs 
assassination – sometimes it is God himself: some have believed they had a commission to save 
mankind by the baptism of blood; others pretend to secure the salvation of their children, and to 
make angels of them, by cutting their throats’.  Apathy turns into cruelty ‘and the inclination to 
destroy’, and compels ‘an impulse not founded on reflection, and condemned by the persons 
subjected to it – an impulse that tempts’ the insane persons ‘to inflict pain, or even death, on 
those whom they love the most’.  After the murder has been committed, the maniac will ‘coldly 
contemplate’ the victim, or occupy himself ‘about something else, according to the kind of 
delirium which coincides with’ his ‘murderous monomania’.
300      
  The connection between emotional disjuncture and insanity is also made by the 
Cyclopaedia, which distinguishes ‘moral insanity’ from monomania, defining the former as ‘a 
morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits and moral 
dispositions, without any notable lesion of the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties’, and 
the latter as moral insanity attended by hallucination, with the recognition that moral insanity 
tends to ‘degenerate into, or ultimately assume, the character of monomania’.
301  The 
Cyclopaedia’s definition of moral insanity is corroborated by way of reference to Esquirol, who 
explains how insane persons avoid those ‘who are most dear to them’ and ‘revile them, ill-treat 
them, anxiously shun them’. In fact, ‘moral alienation is so constant’ amongst the insane that it 
appears ‘to be the proper characteristic of mental derangement’, and while not all madmen 
experience hallucinations, ‘there are none in whom the passions and moral affections are not 
disordered, perverted, or destroyed’.  The return ‘to the proper and natural state of the moral 
affections’, signified by the ‘tears of sensibility’, the desire to see ‘once more children or 
friends’, or the wish to open one’s heart ‘and return into the bosom of’ one’s family, indicates 
insanity’s approaching cure.
302 
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  A theological strand is tied into monomania’s symptoms through the rejection of love, 
and the way this rejection gradients into violence accompanied by religious visions.  The voices 
from God, baptisms of blood, assurances of salvation by way of murder all gesture toward their 
underpinning theology – a theology further brought to light when considering other 
monomaniacal behaviors: the morally insane act ‘as if actually possessed by the demon of evil’; 
the monomaniacs ‘of gaiety’ ‘believe themselves already in possession of a spiritual world’; and 
those who suffer from the ‘monomania founded on self-dissatisfaction’ believe ‘they are ‘objects 
of divine wrath, pursued by Satan, or having him dwelling in them, or that they are plunged into 
the burning lake’.
303    
Partial cause for the permeation of psychoanalytic discourse with theology is 
monomania’s link with the older concept of melancholia.  On Irritation and Insanity and the 
Cyclopaedia both note this connection, calling partial mania ‘the melancholy of the ancients’ and 
stating that ‘cases of partial insanity have been by former writers distinguished by the term 
melancholia’.
304  One definition of melancholia that enables us to tap into the theological 
undercurrents of On Irritation and Insanity, the Cyclopaedia, and, most importantly, ‘Berenice’, 
is found in Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy.  While Poe’s familiarity with Burton’s 
work is speculative, an argument for acquaintance can be made through his ‘Berenice’ reference 
to Caelius Secundus Curio’s de Amplitudine Beati Regni Dei.
305  Curio’s treatise itself is rare 
enough that the chances of Poe’s having had access to it are slight; however its explication is 
found under the ‘Religious Melancholy’ section of Burton’s work, and the wider publication of 
The Anatomy of Melancholy makes Poe’s knowledge of this explication more probable.  We can 
trace the strong concatenations between religious melancholy and monomania by considering the 
specifics of the former’s symptoms and causes. 
For Burton, those who suffer under religious melancholy, ‘are spiritually sicke, void of 
reason’, almost ‘overborne by their miseries’, and with ‘too deepe an apprehension of their 
sinnes’ to ‘apply themselves to good counsel’ or to ‘pray, believe, repent’.
306  Their spiritual 
sickness follows from a belief in their enormity of offence, the ‘intolerable burden of their sins’, 
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and God’s ‘heavy wrath’ and ‘displeasure so deeply apprehended, that they account themselves 
reprobates, quite forsaken of God, already damned, past all hope of grace, uncapable of mercy’, 
and that their transgressions are so great ‘they cannot be forgiven’.
307  These feelings of 
inevitable perdition are instantiated by corresponding delusions: the victims suffer ‘the paines of 
hell’ more than ‘possibly can be expressed’; ‘they smell brimstone, talke familiarly with divells, 
heare and see Chimeraes, prodigious uncouth shapes, beares, Owles, Anticks, blacke dogges, 
feinds, hideous outcries, fearefull noyses, shreekes, lamentable complaints’ as well as ‘Divells, 
bugbears and Mormeluches’.
308  As Burton explains, a brain troubled by want of sleep or 
nutriment, or by an ‘agitation of spirits’, may reflect ‘prodigious shapes, as our vaine feare and 
crased phantasie shall suggest and faigne’; and such visions are projected outward ‘from inward 
causes, as a concave glass reflects solid bodies’.
309   
The melancholic subjects cannot be cured by ‘Physicke’ alone, but by exposure to 
‘Scriptures, good Divines, good advice and conference’ and by ‘applying Gods Word to their 
distressed Soules’.
310  However, those under religious melancholia may remain obdurate in 
remaining in their condition: ‘they have cauterized consciences, they are in a reprobate sense, 
they cannot think a good thought, they cannot hope for grace, pray, beleeve, repent, or be sorry 
for their sins, they find no griefe for sinne in themselves, but rather a delight, no groning of 
spirit, but are carried headlong to their owne destruction’.  Partly, this obduracy derives from the 
influence of no less than the devil, who ‘insults and domineeres in melancholy distempered 
phantasies and persons especially’, and compels ‘crazed soules’ to think blasphemous thoughts 
against their wills.
311  The devil suggests ‘things opposite to nature, opposite to God & his word’, 
things ‘impious’ and ‘absurd, such as man would never think himselfe, or could not conceave’, 
and he ‘aggravates, extenuates, affirmes, denies, damnes, confounds the spirits, troubles hearte, 
braine, humours, organs, senses, and wholly domineeres in their Imaginations’.
312  Burton calls 
melancholia, balneum diaboli, ‘the divells bath’, stating, it ‘invites him to come to it’, to mingle 
himself ‘with our spirits’ and suggest ‘divelish thoughts into our hearts’.
313  In brief, religious 
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melancholy is the symptom, and condition, that derives from and perpetuates the foregone 
chance for salvation through a God Who ‘loves to the end’.
314 
The correlation between religious melancholy and the preclusion of God’s love is evinced 
in monomania as well.  The Cyclopaedia describes cases ‘in which a disposition to melancholy 
and dejection of mind exists’, and describes their symptoms in relation to love and religious 
education.  The person who suffers from melancholia will become ‘sorrowful and desponding’ 
even though he may be ‘surrounded with all the comforts of existence, and, exclusively of the 
disease, suffers ‘under no internal source of disquiet’, is ‘at peace with himself, with his own 
conscience, with his God’.
315  The ‘tendency to morbid sorrow and melancholy’ can be subject to 
control when it first arises, ‘and probably receives a peculiar character from the previous mental 
state of the individual, from his education, and his religious or irreligious character’.
316  Those 
with ‘well-regulated minds’ will be able to recover from melancholia, while those ‘of an 
opposite character give themselves up to the taedium vitae’.
317  An important difference between 
religious melancholy and monomania, though, is that whereas it is the devil that dissuades one 
from the love of God in the former, in the latter it is faulty epistemology.    
  In Broussais’s definition of  ‘Intellectual’ monomanias grounded in hubris and faulty 
epistemology, he explains how a ‘pleasure’ derived from ‘the desire of observation (curiosity)’ 
of ‘external objects by means of our external senses’ causes one to ‘become passionately 
addicted to intellectual labor’.  For Broussais, this conflation between empirical principles and 
addiction points out the impossibility of insulating empirical perceptions from ‘instinctive 
wants’, or preventing the infiltration of empirical study by perverted instinct.
318  One manner by 
which the instincts can disturb observation is by corrupting methods with a fantasy.  In his 
explanation of ‘Monomania founded on self-satisfaction’ Broussais outlines a type of 
monomania prevalent among ‘those who become insane from excess of mental labor and study, 
whether they have been inflated by success, or discouraged by insurmountable difficulties’.
319  
While one may not achieve intellectual triumph, he can compensate for it through ‘the enjoyment 
he can derive from the castles he builds in the air.  The monomanias are, in fact, nothing but the 
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realizing of castle-building’; and this ‘castle-building’ can cause monomaniacs to believe ‘that 
they are God, whether of the christians [sic] or the pagans’ and consider ‘themselves as a spirit, 
an angel, a demon, a genius, a king, an emperor, a pope, a prince of the blood, a hero, a great 
nobleman, rich, opulent, learned; in believing they have made real discoveries’.
320 
  We can see how the monomaniacal rejection of love and eventual gradient into violence 
affects Egaeus’s relationship with Berenice: Egaeus recollects, ‘I shuddered’ in Berenice’s 
‘presence, and grew pale at her approach’, and ‘during the brightest days of her unparalleled 
beauty, most surely I had never loved her’; and just as monomania drives its victims to inflict 
pain on those they should love, Egaeus mutilates the body of his wife; and just as the 
monomaniac becomes preoccupied by objects coincident with his delirium following his 
destructive act, Egaeus sits in a state of amnesia near the signifiers of his obsession, Berenice’s 
teeth after his gruesome deed is executed.
321  Monomaniacal symptoms are also seen in Egaeus’s 
subscription to an observational methodology that fixates on encompassing the spiritual world 
within empirical knowledge.  Egaeus’s ‘intensity of interest’ in ‘the steady flame of a lamp’ – 
with the flame connoting Platonic divinity – and ‘the perfume of a flower’ reveals this 
fascination for the intangible – a curiosity that carries over into his meditative absorptions in a 
‘shadow falling aslant on the tapestry’.
322  Standing in for the extra-empirical existence that 
Egaeus is cognizant of but which is too mutable and indefinable to be quantified rationally, the 
shadow on the tapestry recalls his ‘pre-existence’ as a disembodied soul that he claims resides in 
his memory ‘like a shadow – vague, variable, indefinite, unsteady; and like a shadow, too, in the 
impossibility of my getting rid of it while the sunlight of my reason shall exist’.  This obsession 
with capturing whatever ethereality lies beyond the parameters of life and transforming it into 
something that can be empirically scrutinized, is seen again when Egaeus simulates death by 
foregoing ‘all sense of motion or physical existence, by means of absolute bodily quiescence 
long and obstinately persevered in’ – a reification of the ‘long night of what seemed, but was not, 
nonentity’ that precedes his birth.
323  His monomaniacal ‘symptoms’ occur in relation to 
discursive knowledge as well: Egaeus is ‘riveted to some frivolous device on the margin or in the 
typography of a book’, cognizant of the ‘margins’ of knowledge but unable to move beyond 
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them; and he reiterates ‘monotonously, some common word, until the sound, by dint of frequent 
repetition, cease[s] to convey any idea whatever to the mind’, unmooring the Platonic Ideal from 
its terrene representation.
324  Returning his ‘intensity of interest’ back ‘in upon the original object 
as a centre’ and negating ‘any idea whatever to the mind’, monomania rivets Egaeus’s attentive 
properties to the ‘bottom rung’ of intellectual activity, precluding attainment of the Ideal.
325  
Through ‘dint of repetition’ monomania dissolves concatenations between words and Ideals, 
incessantly linking representation with its terrene simulacra.  The word thereby becomes one 
with itself, self-contained from its Ideal counterpart.  This collapse of Ideal into word extends to 
physical forms as well when Egaeus says of Berenice’s teeth, ‘que toutes ses dents étaient des 
ideés’ – ‘all her teeth were ideas’.
326   
  Serving to ‘irritate’ Egaeus’s monomania are his ‘very peculiar’ books: Caelius Secundus 
Curione’s de Amplitudine Beati Regni Dei, or On the Great Extent of God’s Blessed Kingdom, 
St. Augustine’s City of God, and Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus’s de Carni Christi, or 
On the Flesh of Christ.  Having ‘characteristic qualities of the disorder itself’, these theological 
works indicate two things: that Egaeus’s monomania is characterized by the disjuncture between 
strict empiricism and the existence of the soul; and that his monomaniacal ‘castle-building’ 
pertains to the attempt to find soteriological completion within such an empirical paradigm.  The 
‘method’ by which Egaeus attempts this material salvation is through the burial and 
‘resurrection’ of Berenice, his wife and soul’s embodiment.  In a way, Egaeus reverses the 
soteriological process: instead of the Spirit elevating the soul and the body into immortality, he 
attempts to debase the Spirit, so that it is ‘self-contained’ in a material object, with its 
immortality embodied by the longevity of the teeth.  The indicators that suggest Berenice’s 
disinterment and mutilation enact Egaeus’s resurrection can be gleaned through consideration of 
the theological works from his library. 
  Two of the books Egaeus mentions have a strong Pauline influence, while the remaining 
book pertains more to a broadened eligibility for salvation.  We will start discussion with the 
Pauline-inflected works, Augustine’s The City of God, and Tertullian’s On the Flesh of Christ, 
before discussing Curione’s treatise.  Of specific relevance is how these two works build on 
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Paul’s assertion that belief in the resurrection of the risen body is beyond ratiocination.  Paul 
asserts the ‘fact’ of the resurrection, somewhat tautologically, when he states: ‘For if the dead 
rise not, then is not Christ raised; And if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your 
sins, Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ, are perished’.
327  In other words, faith in 
the resurrection of Christ depends on a general faith that the self can be resurrected; conversely, 
faith in Christ’s resurrection as God’s act enables the resurrection of the self.
328  This call for 
faith in the risen body is coincident with an invalidation of traditional knowledge that posits 
belief in Christ’s resurrection as ‘foolish’.  Paul says, ‘For the preaching of the cross is to them 
that perish, foolishness’, but ‘it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to 
nothing the understanding of the prudent’.
329  He explicitly reiterates this point in Corinthians 1. 
25 and 1. 27: ‘the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God stronger than 
men’, and ‘God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise; and God hath 
chosen the weak things of the world, to confound the things that are mighty’.
330  In effect, Paul 
establishes Christ’s resurrection as a matter of faith beyond ratiocination.   
This repudiation of ratiocination against belief in the risen body is expressed by 
Augustine and Tertullian as well.  The City of God recalls the Pauline division between flesh and 
spirit by positing society as consisting of ‘no more than just two kinds of human society, which 
we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scripture’.  The first ‘consists of 
those who choose to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit’, and 
where they ‘severally achieve what they wish, they live in peace, each after their kind’.
331  This 
division between flesh and spirit defines those who live according to man and those according to 
God, with the ways of men perceiving those of God as foolish; and just as St. Paul corroborates 
belief in the resurrected body by relegating learned wisdom and positioning the resurrection as 
beyond ratiocination, Augustine also attempts to make credible the ‘incredibility’ of the 
resurrection, and posits three incredible facts: first, ‘it is incredible that Jesus Christ should have 
risen from in the flesh and ascended with flesh into heaven’; second, ‘it is incredible that the 
world should have believed so incredible a thing’; and third, ‘it is incredible that a very few men’ 
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of low birth, education and rank should ‘so effectually’ ‘persuade the world, and even its learned 
men, of so incredible a thing’.  Of these three incredibles Augustine qualifies the last two by 
noting ‘it is indubitable that the resurrection of Christ, and His ascension into heaven with the 
flesh in which He rose, is already preached and believed in the whole world.  If it is not credible, 
how is it that it has already received credence in the whole world’?
332  By utilizing the miracle of 
widespread belief in the resurrection to validate the miracle of the resurrection Augustine writes 
the event as both unbelievable and believable, paradoxically situating the resurrection as 
incredible yet still a postulate. 
  The central Pauline tropes from Scripture and The City of God are in Of the Flesh of 
Christ as well. Tertullian wrote his treatise in confutation of heresies that denied the reality of 
Christ’s human flesh.  An alternate title for his work is Flesh of Christ against Four Heresies, 
specifically those of Marcion, Apelles, Basilides and Valentinus, and his counter-arguments are 
framed by the Pauline concern of describing Christ’s resurrection in order to understand 
humanity’s.  ‘Did it ever exist?’ Tertullian asks of the risen body, ‘whence was it derived? and of 
what kind was it?  If we succeed in demonstrating it we shall lay down a law for our own 
resurrection’.
333   
  Of relevance to discussion of ‘Berenice’ are Tertullian’s assertions against Marcion, who 
argued Christ existed as a phantasm, and Apelles, who believed Christ’s flesh was made of the 
same material as stars.  The crux of Marcion’s argument is that a fleshly body would be 
‘beneath’ an exalted God, and that it would not matter if God practiced deception in affecting the 
assumption of humanity which He knew to be unreal.  That humankind took the illusory body to 
be real would answer every purpose.
334  Tertullian addresses this claim of the ‘unclean’ flesh 
with the implication that even if the human body is ‘unworthy’, then Christ, as the ‘life-giving 
spirit’ elevates it to ‘glorious’ form: ‘Our birth He reforms from death by a second birth from 
heaven’, says Tertullian, and if Christ restores the body, ‘cleanses it from stain’, ‘rekindles its 
light’, exorcises its devils, and reanimates it from death, ‘then shall we blush to own it’?
335  His 
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corroborating illustration immediately recalls the Pauline notion of traditional knowledge 
confounded by God’s ‘foolishness’.  Posing the hypothetical scenario of God preaching ‘the 
kingdom of heaven invested with the body of’ a wolf or cow, Tertullian claims that Marcion 
would censure this instantiation as ‘disgraceful for God’, ‘unworthy of the Son of God, and 
simply foolish’, and that he would make this judgment ‘for no other reason than because one 
thus judges’.
336  He then compounds his condemnation with reference to Corinthians: ‘God hath 
chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise’.
337   
  The Pauline notion of God’s ‘foolish’ things runs through Tertullian’s entire argument: 
he also asserts, ‘there are, to be sure, other things also quite as “foolish”’ as the birth of Christ 
‘which have reference to the humiliations and sufferings of God’, and ‘you will not be “wise” 
unless you become a “fool” to the world, by believing the “foolish things of God”’.
338  
Tertullian’s primary motivation in employing this trope about God’s ‘foolishness’ is to 
undermine Marcion’s reasoning against Christ’s duality – a duality that Tertullian states 
explicitly:  
 
Christ could not be described as being a man without flesh, nor the Son of man without 
any human parent; just as He is not God without the Spirit of God, nor the Son of God 
without having God for His father.  Thus the nature of the two substances displayed Him 
as man and God, – in one respect born, in the other unborn; in one respect fleshly, in the 
other spiritual.
339 
 
In a more implied sense, Tertullian counters Marcion’s arguments for an illusory Christ by 
picturing Christ’s dual nature in a series of binaries:  ‘For which is more unworthy of God, which 
is more likely to raise a blush of shame?  That God should be born, or that He should die? That 
He should bear the flesh, or the cross? Be circumcised, or be crucified’?
340  The soteriological 
tropes in these questions – Christ’s death, the cross, the crucifixion – are paired with fleshly 
images to suggest their lost meaning without human referents.  Yet Marcion would ‘cut away all 
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sufferings from Christ, on the ground that, as a mere phantom, He was incapable of experiencing 
them’; for this reason he remains foolish until he believes the “foolish things of God”’.
341 
  Tertullian’s argument with Marcion provides the context for the ‘paradoxical sentence’ 
that occupies Egaeus’s ‘undivided time, for many weeks of laborious and fruitless investigation’,  
included here with Tertullian’s preceding and succeeding statements:  
 
The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed because men must needs be ashamed 
[of it].  And the Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd.  
And He was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible.  But how 
will all this be true in Him, if He was not Himself true – if he really had not in Himself 
that  which might be crucified, might die, might be buried, and might rise again?
342   
 
Considered within its full rhetorical basis, the ‘paradoxical sentence’ refers to the fleshly and 
spiritual nature of Christ, recalling that while it is ‘shameful’ or ‘unworthy’ of God to appear in 
human form, the humanity of Christ gives the crucifixion meaning.  Descriptions of the 
resurrection as ‘absurd’ and ‘impossible’ foreground the event as a ‘foolish’ thing of God placed 
beyond learned reasoning.  The fact of Egaeus’s inability to understanding the meaning of 
Tertullian’s sentence aligns him with those whose knowledge is confounded by the ‘foolishness’ 
of the resurrection and who cannot grasp the duality of flesh and spirit.  Egaeus’s inability to 
comprehend the dual nature of Christ and the new eschatological humanity is further affirmed by 
reference to Curione’s On the Great Extent of God’s Blessed Kingdom.   
  The crux of Curione’s argument is that if more souls are damned than saved then ‘the 
divell hath the greater sovereignty, for what is power but to protect’?
343  Based on these grounds 
Curione’s treatise seeks to expand the parameters of who can achieve salvation, as he states, 
‘God is good, and will not then bee contracted in his goodnesse, for how is hee the Father of 
mercy and comfort, if his goode concern but a few?’.
344  God’s compassion thereby encompasses 
everyone, even non-Christians: ‘upright livers, no matter of what Religion’ or ‘out of any 
Nation’ ‘shall be saved’, so long as they ‘live honestly, call on God, trust in him, feare him’; and 
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not only non-believers, but ‘wicked livers, Blaspheamers, Reprobates, and such as reject Gods 
grace’ including ‘the divells themselves shall be saved at last’.
345  That Egaeus’s own attitude to 
salvation is in alignment with Curione’s is suggested through his extolment of the ‘noble Italian’, 
while reference to the work itself draws attention to the manner in which Egaeus will attempt to 
achieve salvation without the ‘life-giving spirit’.
346    
  Yet how does Egaeus’s disjuncture from the ‘life-giving spirit’ relate to the bloody 
extraction of Berenice’s teeth?  An answer may be approached by remembering that Berenice 
embodies Egaeus’s soul.  As Egaeus states about his wife:  
 
she had flitted by my eyes, and I had seen her – not as the living and breathing Berenice, 
but as the Berenice of a dream; not as a being of the earth, earthy, but as the abstraction 
of such a being; not as a thing to admire, but to analyze; not as an object of love, but as 
the theme of the most abstruse although desultory speculation.
347  
 
Direct reference to Corinthians recalls the Pauline distinction between flesh and spirit as well as 
Poe’s own philosophy on Beauty.  The fact that Egaeus sees Berenice as a being not ‘of the 
earth, earthy’, but rather the ‘abstraction’ of ‘such a being’ indicates a substitution of the earthy 
for the otherworldly and spiritual – an exchange indicated as well when he claims to see 
Berenice not as ‘living and breathing’ but as a ‘dream’.
348  Egaeus’s distorted perception of 
Berenice reflects the ‘inversion of commonest thought’ characteristic of monomania: ‘the 
realities of the world affected me as visions, and as visions only, while the wild ideas of the land 
of dreams became, in turn, not the material of my every-day existence, but in very deed that 
existence utterly and solely in itself’.
349  That the limitations of monomania define Egaeus’s 
relationship with Berenice is brought into relief when he sees Berenice as a ‘thing’ to ‘analyze’, 
a ‘theme’ of ‘desultory speculation’, as opposed to an ‘object of love’.  This preclusion of love 
references the Christian association of love with the Holy Spirit.  ‘The fruit of the Spirit is love’, 
Paul says in his letter to the Galatians, and in his letter to the Romans, ‘the love of God is shed 
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abroad in our hearts, by the holy Ghost which is given unto us’.
350  However, since love involves 
a Spiritual aspect, Egaeus is incapable of its realization due to the limitations of his disease; and 
just as monomania ‘rivets’ Egaeus to the margins of knowledge, he can only desultorily 
speculate and analyze what should be the proper object of love.   
  Tellingly, Berenice ‘dies’ as the period of nuptials approaches, thereby replacing a union 
of love with a union in which the flesh is tied to death.  The 1835 edition of the Southern 
Literary Messenger and the 1840 edition of Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque include a 
scene usually omitted from standard editions of ‘Berenice’ in which Egaeus attends Berenice’s 
wake.  Taking place in the ‘bed-chamber of the departed’, where Egaeus approaches ‘the side of 
the bed’, uplifts ‘the draperies of the curtains’, and lets them descend on his shoulders, enclosing 
him ‘in the strictest communion with the deceased’, the scene is a morbid inversion of the 
marital bed; but where the ‘union of person’, or the union of flesh and spirit, should be 
consummated, is instead Egaeus’s encounter with the items that materialize his soul, specifically,  
‘the white and glistening, and ghastly teeth of Berenice’.
351  
  The connection between Berenice’s teeth and Egaeus’s soul is made by the allusions 
carried in her name itself.  Berenice, the daughter of King Agrippa is present at Paul’s trial when 
Festus shouts at him for believing in the resurrection, ‘Paul, thou art beside thyself: much 
learning doth make thee mad’.
352  Her name thereby reiterates the theme of God’s ‘foolishness’ 
being beyond traditional learning.  On another level Berenice’s name alludes to Catullus’s poem 
about Berenice, wife to her first cousin Ptolemy Euergetes, who sacrifices a lock of her hair in 
prayer for her husband’s safe home-coming after he departs for war.  The lock of hair is then 
born into the sky by gods, where it becomes a constellation.
353   
The catasterism of Berenice’s lock gains theological resonance when figured within 
Tertullian’s argument against the heresy of Apelles.  Like Marcion, Apelles also stresses the 
shameful condition of the flesh and its unworthiness for Christ; however, where Marcion limns 
Christ as phantasmagorical, Apelles agues that the constituting material of Christ’s physical self 
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comes ‘from the stars, and from the substances of a higher world’.
 354  Tertullian addresses 
Apelles’s literalization of the ‘celestial’ imagery of Corinthians by asserting that the statement, 
‘the first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the lord from heaven’ has ‘nothing to do 
with any difference of substance; it only contrasts with the once “earthy” substance of the flesh 
of the first man, Adam, the “heavenly” substance of the spirit of the second man, Christ’.  For 
Tertullian, the ‘celestial’ man refers to the man of the Spirit and that ‘those whom it compares to 
Him evidently become celestial – by the Spirit, of course – even in this “earthy” flesh’.  As 
Christ rises in the ‘earthy’ flesh to return to heaven, so will those believers who are ‘put on a 
level with Him’.
355  When read against Of the Flesh of Christ, Catullus’s poem thereby points to 
Berenice’s disfigurement as Egaeus’s attempt to establish a purely material soteriology.  Unable 
to understand a Spirit existent beyond empirical and physical bounds, he literalizes Paul’s 
‘celestial’ metaphor and enacts ‘salvation’ through the burial and resurrection of his ‘soul’.  The 
final images of Egaeus’s narrative confirm the risen spirit: the impress of ‘nails’ in his hand, the 
‘tenant of the tomb’, the ‘body enshrouded, yet still breathing – still palpitating – still alive’, and 
the teeth ‘scattered to and fro about the floor’ like stars.
356 
  Ironically, in accordance with Poe’s philosophy, Berenice already is representative of 
Egaeus’s capacity to achieve Beauty and the Spirit, even if his monomania disables him from 
comprehending this.  ‘She had loved me long’, Egaeus says of Berenice, a statement that recalls 
‘The Poetic Principle’ and Beauty’s reification in a woman’s ‘divine love’; and this connection 
between Berenice and Beauty is drawn explicitly when Egaeus remembers her as a ‘gorgeous yet 
fantastic beauty’.
357  Her namesake as well hints at a love story in that Catullus’s Berenice 
marries her first cousin, the same blood relation Poe’s Berenice shares with Egaeus; and 
Egaeus’s name – a reference to the Egaeus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream who fails to 
understand love – affirms undercurrents of unrequited love in Poe’s tale.  In this regard, the ‘fatal 
disease’ that befalls Berenice is the love for her cousin that transforms her into a representation 
of Egaeus’s ability to achieve salvation through the Spirit.
358  This love story is further implied in 
Egaeus’s description of the ‘mystery and terror’ that befalls Berenice: suggestions of romantic 
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feelings – her ‘light-heartedness and joy’ – immediately lead to disease, or the ‘spirit of change’, 
that transforms ‘her mind, her habits, and her character’, and ‘even the identity of her person’ in 
‘a manner the most subtle and terrible’ until she is no longer known ‘as Berenice’.  This 
‘spiritual’ connection between Egaeus and Berenice is also made by the similarity in 
‘symptoms’.  Just as Egaeus falls into ‘bodily quiescence’, Berenice succumbs to ‘a species of 
epilepsy’, and as the disease further inflicts Berenice, Egaeus’s disorder grows ‘rapidly upon’ 
him.
359 
  As an instantiation of Egaeus’s ability to achieve salvation, Berenice’s physical form 
literally makes specular the ‘fleshly’ condition of his soul, and the final ‘living’ image of 
Berenice paints a soul that is ‘corruptible’, death-like and detached from the ‘life-giving spirit’: 
the skull-like forehead is ‘high’ and ‘very pale’, her temples are ‘hollow’, ‘melancholy’ reigns 
over her ‘countenance’, and the eyes are ‘lifeless, and lusterless, and seemingly pupilless’.  After 
noticing Berenice’s teeth Egaeus states, ‘would to God that I had never beheld them, or that, 
having done so, I had died’ – an ironic statement, because spiritually he is already one of the 
‘perished’.
360 
Significantly, Egaeus recalls that during their ‘final’ meeting Berenice ‘spoke no word; 
and I – not for worlds could I have uttered a syllable’.
361  This congruency not only reaffirms the 
spiritual link between Egaeus and Berenice, but calls forth ‘The Poetic Principle’, in which the 
achievement of Beauty is contingent on the capacity for expression.  In conjuncture with 
Berenice’s ghastly appearance, the mutual silence underscores how Egaeus will never achieve an 
authentic ‘elevation of the soul’.  Rather, his monomaniacal fixations rivet him to the material 
mechanics of expression.  This conflation of Spirit and Beauty with Berenice’s mouth is 
suggested when Egaeus assigns the teeth a ‘capability of moral expression’ even when 
‘unassisted by the lips’; and this suggestion is repeated in the omitted ‘wedding bed’ when, just 
before Egaeus sees Berenice’s teeth, a ‘band around’ her ‘jaws’ becomes ‘broken asunder’.
362  
With Egaeus’s final possession of the teeth, the authentic capacity to ‘elevate the soul’ through 
the association with Spirit is finally and irrevocably denied to him – it exists only as ‘the spirit of 
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a departed sound’ – and his damnation is spelled out as ‘ever and anon’ a ‘shrill and piercing 
shriek’ rings in his ears.
363 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to construct a methodology for analysing identity in Poe’s 
fiction.  The primary ideas that organize identity construction for Poe are: a Neoplatonic 
teleology; the conflation of the Platonic conceptualization of Beauty with Christian notions of 
love, the Holy Spirit, and a union with God; the Pauline dichotomy between Adam and Christ; 
the putrescent or disarticulate body as unredeemed, or Adamic; and the female Other as a 
spiritual aspect of the male self.  Significant as well to Poe’s identities is the self divided between 
epistemology and the Absolute aspects of the Spirit and Ideal, with discussion of ‘Berenice’ 
serving to illustrate how this division between epistemology and Ideality forms identity.  This 
chapter also illustrated how women serve as organizing tropes in Poe’s literature due to their 
connections with Neoplatonic ideals of love and Beauty, and as will be seen in succeeding 
chapters, even when women characters are more secondary to the narrative they still maintain an 
organizing absence.  Having provided the under-riding philosophy of many of Poe’s tales, this 
thesis will now show how this philosophy is embedded in, and reacts with, early America’s 
ideological figurations of property and Native Americans.  The next chapter will focus 
specifically on property in Poe’s fiction, especially as it relates to finding a ‘root’ to land 
ownership.      
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Chapter Three: National Ideality: ‘The Oblong Box’, 
‘The Domain of Arnheim’, and Schlegel’s Theory of 
the National ‘Root’ 
 
 
The following chapter will mobilize the methodologies put forward in Chapter Two to 
examine how Neoplatonism structures Poe’s ideas about property and land.  Referring once 
again to Schlegel’s Lectures, this chapter will illustrate how Poe subscribes to Schlegel’s theory 
that nationhood has a ‘root’, or Neoplatonic Ideal.  For Poe, the nation’s ‘root’ is analogous to 
the human soul, an essentiality that must be elevated through the Spirit.  The method for 
elevating the national ‘root’ is by investing the poetic sentiment into the land through labour.  In 
order to outline how Poe conceptualizes this national ‘root’ this chapter will discuss ‘The Oblong 
Box’, as well as Schlegel’s concept of the national ‘root’ vis-à-vis the formation of a national 
literature and criticism.  The chapter will then examine Poe’s ‘The Domain of Arnheim’ as an 
artistic project to locate and express national Ideality. 
 
‘The Oblong Box’ 
   
We can see how Poe conceptualizes the idea of national ‘root’ within his own 
Neoplatonic theories outlined in the previous chapter in his tale, ‘The Oblong Box’.  Told by an 
unreliable narrator, the tale’s mystery revolves around the unknown connection between the 
narrator’s friend, Cornelius Wyatt, Wyatt’s supposed wife, and the eponymous oblong box.  
Typifying the poet as described in ‘The Poetic Principle’, Wyatt displays both Christian charity, 
and a preoccupation with the Beautiful: he has the ‘ordinary temperament of genius’, the 
personal traits of ‘misanthropy, sensibility, and enthusiasm’, and ‘the warmest and truest heart 
which ever beat in a human bosom’; he enthusiastically ‘comments upon the loveliness of 
women’; he soars ‘into the regions of the purely ideal’ when beauty is the ‘theme’ of 
conversation; and he has ‘so refined, so intellectual, so fastidious’, ‘so exquisite a perception of 102 
 
the faulty, and so keen an appreciation of the beautiful’.
364  In contrast, Wyatt’s false wife – a 
servant in disguise – is a ‘decidedly plain-looking woman’, almost ‘positively ugly’ and ‘rather 
indifferent looking, totally uneducated, and decidedly vulgar’.
365  In short, she is not Beautiful, 
and her ‘uneducated’ disposition means she cannot guide her lover through the fields of Sciences 
and Philosophy that lead to Ideality.  Basically, Wyatt’s false bride embodies the Pandemian 
lover characterized by a homeliness and passion detrimental to the soul’s struggle for Beauty, 
since its tendency is to degrade rather than elevate the soul.  When compared to Wyatt’s supernal 
disposition, these Pandemian aspects cause the narrator to suppose that ‘some fit of enthusiastic 
and fanciful passion’ prompted Wyatt to ‘unite himself with a person altogether beneath him’.
366  
In a sense, ‘Mrs Wyatt’s’ significatory relation to the oblong box metaphorizes the condition of 
the ‘false bride’ in Poe’s philosophy, as an outward appearance of femininity that conceals a 
‘dead’ capacity to elevate the soul through love and facilitate a union with God; and this lost 
spiritual capacity is emphasized when the narrator supposes the oblong box to hold ‘a copy of 
Leonardo’s “Last Supper”’.
367  This inability to achieve a union with God through Eros and love 
affects Wyatt, leaving him spiritually dead and incapable of expressing Beauty, as indicated 
when the narrator’s unwitting allusion to the deceased wife renders Wyatt ‘to all appearance’ 
‘dead’, and unable to express himself ‘for some time’.
368   
Sharing a similar condition with the false wife is the narrator, who is also incapable of 
understanding Ideality.  Twice the narrator refers to the oblong box’s contents as a 
‘mystification’.
369  Poe’s use of the term ‘mystification’ can be understood through brief 
discussion of his short story of the same name, in which the protagonist, Von Jung, backs out of 
a duel against his rival, Johan Hermann, by referring him to a passage from a coded treatise 
called Duelli Lex Scrippa, et non; aliterque.  After reading the passage in question, Hermann 
then accepts Von Jung’s withdrawal and acknowledges his ‘chivalrous behaviour’. The ‘twist’ is 
that the passage from the Duelli, as it appears ‘prima facie’, is ‘ingeniously framed so as to 
present to the ear all the outward signs of intelligibility, and even profundity, while in fact not a 
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shadow of meaning’ exists.
370  By calling the oblong box a ‘mystification’ the narrator ironically 
points out his own methodological short-comings of being able to read ‘outward signs’, but not 
cohere them into a meaning, as indicated when he describes the oblong box as ‘pine’, ‘six feet in 
length by two and a half in breadth’, and ‘peculiar in shape’, but does not consolidate this data 
into the obvious idea of a coffin.
371  
  While the majority of Poe’s married women stories take place in a European setting, ‘The 
Oblong Box’ is specifically set in America.  Not only is the packet-ship named ‘Independence’, 
but its lifeboats land at Ocracoke Inlet and near Roanoke Island, sites of first English settlements 
in the New World.  Furthermore, the surviving passengers imply a microcosm of early 
nineteenth-century North American society, with ‘the captain and his wife, Mr Wyatt and party, 
a Mexican officer, wife, four children’, the narrator, and ‘a negro valet’.
372  Basically, Poe 
metaphorically presents the foundation of America.  Significantly excluded from this national 
founding are Wyatt, who returns to the Independence, lashes himself to his wife’s coffin, and 
sinks into the sea, and the dead wife, who represents the lost potential to elevate the soul through 
love, Beauty and Spirituality.   The Captain’s refusal to return to the Independence for the oblong 
box is a symbolic rejection of the spiritual elements which the dead wife represents.  What Poe 
says about America with this metaphor is that at its ‘root’ the nation is not only missing the poet, 
with his ‘poetic sensibilities’, but the elements of love and Beauty themselves, and, in relation to 
this, an essential national Ideality.  What remains instead of ‘poets’ are types like the narrator 
and false wife, subjects who lack the proper souls to perceive Beauty, or elevate the soul, and so 
instantiate empty signification in the sense that they exist without any essential interiority.  
Wyatt’s imploration to the Captain to return for the coffin thereby becomes a condemnation of 
early nineteenth-century American society because it is a list of the things that it forsakes: ‘By 
the mother who bore you – for the love of Heaven – by your hope of salvation, I implore you to 
put back for the box’.
373  
  Just exactly what is exchanged for the nation’s Spiritual ‘root’ is implied in the tale’s 
final substitution when Captain Hardy tells the narrator that the oblong box was ‘conveyed on 
board as merchandise’.  In other words, the Spiritual ‘root’ is replaced by property, a 
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replacement which leaves its national subjects ‘more dead than alive’, meaning they are without 
an essential interiority.
374  This detriment of property to the soul’s elevation is noted at different 
times by Poe.  In Marginalia, Poe states, ‘The Romans worshipped their standards; and the 
Roman standard happened to be an eagle.  Our standard is only one-tenth of an Eagle – a Dollar 
– but we make all even by adoring it with tenfold devotion’.
375  And in ‘Pinakidia’ Poe quotes a 
passage from the Psalms rewritten by William Slayter in 1642, which condemns the extolment of 
riches over morality: ‘The righteous shall his sorrows scan, | And laugh at him, and say, 
“Behold! | What hath become of this here man, | That on his riches was so bold”’.
376  This 
replacement of the essential ‘root’ for merchandise results in an artificiality in both the nation, 
and its national subjects.  The Lectures’ agenda is to expunge national artificiality by locating a 
national essence and providing the paradigm that would enable its artistic expression.  Poe takes 
up this project in ‘The Domain of Arnheim’ by drawing the national ‘root’ as inherent in the land 
itself.      
 
Schlegel’s Lectures and the National ‘Root’ 
As Schlegel states in his Introduction, the purpose of the Lectures is to give a ‘general’ 
historical view and develop ‘those ideas which ought to guide us in our estimate of the value of 
the dramatic productions of various ages and nations’.
377  Such guiding ideas are found in a 
supposed Platonic idea of the nation.  In part, Schlegel’s project is a quest to find the ‘zero 
degree’ of nationhood, the place where it is rooted in the universal and ideal, immutable to 
cultural and historical vicissitudes, and where anxieties of its constructedness are put to rest.
378  
The more national art expresses its extra-phenomenal and universal ‘root’ the more natural those 
national expressions become.  Inversely, artistic divagations from the nation’s immutable ideal 
plunge the nation into artifice.  By critiquing Germany’s preoccupation with artifice, and by not 
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only extolling national statements of its universal ideal, but by providing a model as to how such 
expressions can be achieved, Schlegel’s literary criticism is a palliative as well as a patriotic act.  
  Thematically, this nationalism ‘sets the stage’ in the Preface of the Lectures in an 
anecdote about their presentation to their audience.  In the lectures’ final moments Schlegel 
invokes ‘recollections of the old German renown sacred to every one possessed of true patriotic 
sentiment’, and whilst his audience is ‘thus more solemnly attuned’, he becomes ‘powerfully 
agitated’ by the knowledge that his relationship with them, ‘founded on a common love for 
nobler mental cultivation’, will ‘soon be dissolved’.  Schlegel recounts, ‘A general emotion was 
perceptible, excited by so much that I could not say, but respecting which our hearts understood 
each other.  In the mental dominion of thought and poetry, inaccessible to worldly power, the 
Germans, who are separated in so many ways from each other, still feel their unity’.  The 
inspiration for this moment of affect is explained in terms that recall both the elevated Platonic 
soul and a Kantian relationship with national space: ‘amidst our clouded prospects we may still 
cherish the elevating presage of the great and immortal calling of our people, who from time 
immemorial have remained unmixed in their present habitations’.
379  Schlegel’s tropes of 
sentiment establish a paradox about an ‘elevating’ affection, an ideal ‘German-ness’ that is 
immutable, ineffable, and beyond ‘worldly power’, yet still attainable through ‘thought and 
poetry’ and ‘nobler mental cultivation’, even while that same ‘worldly power’ of Germany itself 
is ‘clouded’ and ‘separated in so many ways’.     
  Schlegel implements a methodology of aesthetics, or a ‘philosophical theory of beauty 
and art’, to facilitate expression of the national ideal.  In order for this aestheticism to be 
considered ‘of sufficient practical instruction’ it must be united ‘with the history of arts’, in other 
words with what is overarching, and, in a more implied sense, with what is universal.  Schlegel 
defends his aestheticism by pointing out what he sees as the necessity of a universal perspective: 
‘we see numbers of men, and even whole nations, so much fettered by the habits of their 
education and modes of living, that they cannot shake themselves free from them, even in the 
enjoyment of fine arts’.  For such people nothing ‘appears natural, proper, or beautiful, which is 
foreign to their language, their manners, or their social relations’.  While a focused study on 
domestic art can provide some forms of cultivated artistic discrimination in a ‘narrow’, 
‘circumscribed’ sense, no one ‘can be a true critic or connoisseur who does not possess a 
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universality of mind’, who cannot throw ‘aside all personal predilections and blind habits’ and 
transport himself ‘into the peculiarities of other ages and nations’.  A true critic recognizes 
‘whatever is beautiful’ despite the ‘external modifications which are necessary’ to its existence, 
‘and which sometimes even seem to disguise them’.
380   
  This properly universal aestheticism enables the critic to recognize true poetry, which is 
defined in terms that indicate a Neoplatonic influence: ‘Poetry, taken in its widest acceptation, as 
the power of creating what is beautiful, and representing it to the eye or the ear, is a universal gift 
of Heaven, which is even shared to a certain extent by those we call barbarians and savages’.  
Where poetry does exist the critic must not allow himself to be ‘repelled by external 
appearances’.
381  Rather, to discern true poetry is to recognize the essential, be it the ideal or the 
soul, or more specifically, the nation’s ideal or the souls of its subjects.  In both instances the 
recognition of poetry is a recognition of the spiritual ‘root’ of identity, the true essence, without 
which one remains an artificial shell.  Schlegel explains the vital distinction between true and 
artificial poetry by expanding on his ‘organic’ trope in a way that limns poetry’s immutable 
‘root’: ‘Every thing must be traced up to the root of our existence: if it has sprung from thence, it 
must possess an undoubted worth; but if, without possessing a living germ, it is merely an 
external appendage, it can never thrive nor acquire a proper growth’.  While artificial poetry may 
‘appear at first sight dazzling phenomena’ or the ‘works of a golden age’, it is analogous to the 
‘mimic gardens’ of impatient children who ‘break off here and there branches and flowers, and 
plant them in the earth’.  While the garden first assumes a noble appearance, the ‘rootless plants 
begin to droop, and hang down their withered leaves and flowers, and nothing soon remains but 
bear twigs’.  In contrast, the ‘rooted’ and natural symbolized by the ‘dark forest’, is that ‘on 
which no art or care was ever bestowed, and which towered up toward heaven long before 
human remembrance’; it ‘bears every blast unshaken, and fills the solitary beholder with 
religious awe’.
382  The connection of the ‘root’ with ‘religious awe’ and ‘heaven’ – in other 
words with mysticism and its associations with ideality and divinity – is stated by Schlegel 
explicitly: ‘Religion is the root of human existence.  Were it possible for man to renounce all 
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religion, including that of which he is unconscious, and over which he has no control, he would 
become a mere surface without any internal substance’.
383   
By making religion the ‘root’ of ‘human existence’ Schlegel privileges Western 
Christianity even though the same root gestures to a Platonic influence.  Schlegel’s aesthetic 
methodology thereby signals a syncretism that emphasizes Christianity as vital and Platonism as 
static, with the ‘spirit’ of ancient art depicted as ‘plastic’, and that of the moderns 
‘picturesque’.
384  Also calling the ‘modern’ spirit ‘romantic’, Schlegel explains that the 
difference between plastic and romantic art is that ‘antique art and poetry separate, in a strict 
manner, things which are dissimilar’, while romantic art ‘delights in indissoluble mixtures’, and 
blends together all contrarieties – ‘nature and art, poetry and prose, seriousness and mirth, 
recollection and anticipation, spirituality and sensuality, terrestrial and celestial, life and death’ – 
in ‘the most intimate manner’.
385  Ancient art is ‘an harmonious promulgation of the permanently 
established legislation of a world submitted to a beautiful order, and reflecting in itself the 
eternal images of things’, while romantic poetry strives after ‘new and wonderful births’ and is 
the expression of ‘a secret attraction to chaos which is concealed beneath the regulated creation 
even in its very bosom’.  The ‘animating spirit of original love hovers’ ‘anew above the waters’ 
in romantic poetry, and despite its ‘fragment-like’ appearance, ‘approaches more to the secret of 
the universe’ in its acknowledgment that ‘nothing can ever in truth exist separately’.
386 
  In juxtaposition, classical art, whether poetry or drama, is plastic because it is analogous 
to a group of sculptures: ‘the figures correspond to the characters, their grouping to the action’, 
and the only subject explored is the one that is exhibited.
387  Plastic art represents ideality, the 
originary idea, in a manner that suggests nothing ‘mystic’ exists beyond what can be experienced 
by the faculties of the mind: ‘Sculpture directs our attention exclusively to the groupe [sic] 
exhibited to us, it disentangles it as far as possible from all external accompaniments, and where 
they cannot be altogether dispensed with, they are indicated as light as possible’.
388  In contrast, 
romantic art is like a large picture that allows its audience to meditate on the figures and motions 
displayed as well as ‘what surrounds’ them.  The picturesque represents ‘not merely the nearest 
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objects’, but ‘the prospect of a considerable distance, and all this under a magical light’.
389  
Although the romantic scene is ‘bounded’ less perfectly than the antique because it is like a 
‘fragment cut out of the optic scene of the world’, it is capable of opening ‘to us in the back 
ground a prospect into a boundless distance’, and enabling ‘us to see in bodily objects what is 
least corporeal, namely, light and air’.
 390   
This difference between the ‘bounded’ and ‘boundless’ is the same difference between 
the material and mystical.  As Schlegel states, ‘the principle of the antique poetry is ideal, that of 
the romantic mystical: the former subjects space and time to the internal free-activity of the 
mind; the latter adores these inconceivable essences as supernatural powers, in whom something 
of divinity has its abode’.
391  By hinting at the ‘considerable distance’ beyond objectivity which 
holds the ‘least corporeal’ ‘light and air’, implying, with an elemental idiom, Christ and divinity, 
the picturesque signifies the ineffable spiritual realm beyond the empirical world, as well as the 
promise of the soteriological unification of the spiritual and sensible, terrestrial and celestial, and 
life and death.  In part, such an aestheticism responds to eighteenth-century empiricism, which 
Schlegel criticizes for defining ‘what is possessed of life as a mere accumulation of dead parts’ 
instead of ‘penetrating to the central point and viewing all the parts as so many irradiations from 
it’.  Empirically characterized, the literature of the eighteenth century never looked ‘for more 
than the logical connexion of causes and effects’, and forced ‘some partial and trivial moral by 
way of application’.
 392  Schlegel disputes such literature by constructing an aestheticism that 
considers the ‘central point’ beyond empiricism, or as he states, ‘I require a unity which lies 
much deeper, is more fervent, and more mysterious than that with which most critics are 
satisfied’.
393   
Schlegel’s use of the word ‘unity’ is significant in the context of constructing an aesthetic 
theory because it not only refers to a literary work’s structure as a whole, but the Platonic ideal 
with which the rational mind communicates in order to form a judgment.  Schlegel disagrees 
with literature structured by the ‘logical connexion of causes and effects’ prescribed in 
Aristotle’s unity of action, arguing that such literature can never arrive at completion: ‘where are 
the limits of this plurality?  Is not the concatenation of causes and effects, backwards and 
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forwards, without end; and consequently should we not begin and break off every where in the 
same manner?’
394  According to Schlegel, ‘we may go on to an almost endless accumulation of 
events’ without ever violating Aristotelian unity, ‘as in the Thousand and One Nights [sic], 
where the thread of the story is never once broken’.
395  Instead of judging art on the merits of 
unity of action, the critic should consider how the separate components of an artwork are 
internalized by human understanding to establish a ‘joint impression on the mind’.  This overall 
impression is the unity of interest, a phrase coined by Baron Friedrich Heinrich Karl de la Motte 
Fouqué, which is conceptualized around the correspondence between sensory impressions and 
Platonic idealness.  While the initial impressions of art are garnered by external senses which 
perceive objects in an ‘indefinite plurality of distinguishable parts’, the ability to comprehend the 
parts in ‘one entire and perfect unity’ and form a judgement is ‘always founded on the reference 
to a higher sphere of ideas’.
396   
The agency to unify the empirical and mystical in the unity of interest is exactly that 
aspect which Schlegel denies to the Platonic figures and structures in his aestheticism.  By 
‘reflecting in itself the eternal images’ of a beautifully harmonious order, plastic representation 
does not gesture to anything mystical beyond itself.  This inability to represent a mystical and 
‘boundless’ distance is directly related to religion and the manner in which Schlegel positions 
Classical theology and art within a soteriological logic as earthly.  Specifically, Schlegel defines 
Classical religion as ‘the deification of the powers of nature and of the earthly things’; and for 
this reason, ‘however far the Greeks may have carried beauty, and even morality, we cannot 
allow any higher character to their formation than that of a refined and ennobled sensuality’.
397  
For the ancient Greeks, human nature ‘was in itself all-sufficient’ and ‘aspired to no higher 
perfection than that which they could actually retain by the exercise of their own faculties’; their 
religion was a ‘religion of the senses’ which had ‘only in view the possession of outward and 
perishable blessings’; and their concept of immortality, ‘in so far as it was believed, appeared in 
the obscure distance like a shadow, a faint dream’.
398  In contrast, the modern Christian nation is 
‘taught by superior wisdom that man, through a high offence, forfeited the place for which he 
was originally destined; and that the whole of the object of his earthly existence is to strive to 
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regain that situation, which, if left to his own strength, he could never accomplish’; the Christian 
religion holds that ‘every thing finite and mortal is lost in the contemplation of the infinite; life 
has become shadow and darkness, and the first dawning of our real existence opens beyond the 
grave’; and the Christian consciousness, or subject, knows ‘that the happiness after which we 
strive we can never here attain; that no external object can ever fill our souls’.
399  Only through 
the conflation with Christian doctrine is Classical aestheticism redeemed, or as Schlegel states, 
‘This sublime and beneficent religion has regenerated the ancient world from its state of 
exhaustion and debasement’.
400   
 
‘The Domain of Arnheim’ 
Schlegel’s project to express the nation’s religious ‘root’ and reclaim humankind’s 
‘originally destined’ place is taken up by Poe in his essay-story, ‘The Domain of Arnheim’.  Poe 
originally wrote a much shorter version called ‘The Landscape Garden’ in 1842 and developed it 
into ‘The Domain of Arnheim’ for publication five years later.
401  This five year gap between the 
tale’s original publication and later expansion implies that the ideas it expresses were important 
enough to Poe that he wished to refine and develop them in full.  Indeed, in an 1848 letter to 
Helen Whitman Poe said that the latter version had much of his soul in it, and this speaks to the 
importance he attributes to landscape gardening in his own theories and principles.
402  It is useful 
to remember that while music and poetry are Poe’s privileged media for expressing the poetic 
sentiment, he oddly extols the landscape garden, stating that ‘very peculiarly, and with a wide 
field’, the poetic sentiment can be developed through its ‘composition’.
403  Poe gives landscape 
gardening its ‘wide field’ in ‘The Domain of Arnheim’.  Significantly, of all other artistic media, 
Poe singles out landscape gardening as the only one requiring a condition for its expression of 
Beauty, namely, a ‘wide field’.  What this ‘wide field’ refers to is property, particularly land and 
financial wealth.  In this regard, ‘The Domain of Arnheim’ is aligned more with its historical 
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context than most of Poe’s tales for the way it acknowledges property as necessary to the 
establishment of the self, as evidenced when it sets up the extreme wealth of the protagonist, 
Ellison, as the condition that enables him to transform the land into an expression of Beauty.  
Relating back to Poe’s philosophies of the Beautiful, Ellison’s transformation of property into 
Beauty means that property has the potential to not only facilitate the soul’s elevation when the 
poet utilizes it to express the poetic sentiment, but, when considering the Neoplatonic links 
between the Beautiful and salvation, property also enables the poet to be the ‘true man’ who 
becomes conscious of his own immortal soul through the implicit communion with Christ and 
divinity, and who is therefore distinct from the ‘earthy’ men of Adam.  Inversely again, the 
conditionality of property itself carries a condition: property on its own cannot enable the soul’s 
elevation, but, rather, fulfils its vital conditionality only when it is utilized towards the end of 
achieving the Beautiful.  
  When Poe links property – particularly land – with the Beautiful he articulates what is for 
him the site where the constructed subject is naturalized by an essential and universal element.  
This conjoining of property and spirit is first implied in the narrator’s initial description of 
Ellison: ‘From his cradle to his grave a gale of prosperity bore my friend Ellison along.  Nor do I 
use the word prosperity in its mere worldly sense.  I mean it as synonymous with happiness’.
404  
For Poe, this possession of prosperity in both ‘earthy’ and unworldly forms creates an ‘instance’ 
of ‘what has been deemed the chimera of the perfectionists’; that is, the embodiment of the ‘true 
man’, the national subject who possesses both Spirit and property to establish a whole, coherent 
self.
405  Ellison’s perfectibility is emphasized with an implied parallel with Christ, in that just as 
Christ is the Spirit made flesh, Ellison is the reification of a ‘chimera’ of ‘perfection’.  Poe 
denotes the ‘true man’, or ‘true’ national subject, as one possessing both property and Spirit first 
by describing the self without these vital conditions, and then limning the conditions that lead to 
perfectibility.  First, Poe outlines this subjective lack through a negative comparison with 
Ellison:  
 
In the brief existence of Ellison I fancy I have seen refuted the dogma, that in man’s very 
nature lies some hidden principle, the antagonist of bliss.  An anxious examination of his 
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career has given me to understand that, in general, from the violation of a few simple 
laws of humanity arises the wretchedness of mankind – that as a species we have in our 
possession the as yet unwrought elements of content – and that, even now in the present 
darkness and madness of all thought on the great question of the social condition, it is not 
impossible that man, the individual, under certain unusual and highly fortuitous 
circumstances may be happy.
406    
 
Implied in this description of the ‘social condition’ is a subjective lack – termed the ‘hidden 
principle’ and ‘antagonist of bliss’– that points to identity as partially artificial, constituted as a 
discursive pattern consisting of ‘dogma’ and the ‘violation of a few simple laws’.  This 
discursiveness emphasizes identity as an epistemological – as well as theological and ideological 
– formation that immures the soul, or ‘yet unwrought elements of content’, against realizing its 
divinity, since it is the ‘social condition’ that violates the few ‘simple laws of humanity’.  
Keeping in line with his theories and philosophies described in the previous chapter, Poe’s 
presupposition with this formation is that there potentially is an essential element of humanity, a 
soul, but that it requires the right conditions in order for it to achieve this essentiality, or 
immortality. 
  Ellison outlines the conditions for the soul to achieve immortality in his ‘four elementary 
principles’, or ‘conditions, of bliss’.
407  The first principle is the ‘purely physical one of free 
exercise in the open air’, which Ellison corroborates by pointing to the ‘tillers of the earth’ as the 
only people who, ‘as a class, can be fairly considered happier than others’.
408  The second 
condition is ‘the love of woman’, the third is the ‘contempt of ambition’, and the fourth is an 
‘object of unceasing pursuit’, with the ‘extent of attainable happiness’ being ‘in proportion to the 
spirituality of this object’.
409  The soteriological idea of the Spirit’s unification with the earth is 
an organizing element in Ellison’s set of conditions: the second and fourth conditions recall 
Poe’s ideas about the soul’s elevation through Beauty and the Ideal, while the third relates to the 
transcendence of worldly gain in pursuit of the Ideal, as Poe explains when he notes that ‘while a 
high order of genius is necessarily ambitious, the highest is above that which is termed 
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ambition’.
410  The first condition pertaining to health by way of proximity to the land echoes the 
Fichtean influence on Jefferson’s Notes about the national husbandman who gains his virility by 
working the soil.  This group of ‘conditions’ establishes the ‘zero degree’ of subjectivity for Poe, 
the point where identity is naturalized not only through ownership of property, but through 
property as a vehicle to an Ideal that gives the self essentiality.  As Poe explains, landscape 
gardening is ‘the richest, the truest, and most natural, if not altogether the most extensive 
province’ for expressing the Poetic sentiment.
411  Like Locke’s ideas of labour, this process of 
‘naturalization’ works in two directions: the poetic sentiment invested into nature naturalizes the 
poet’s essentiality against the artificial and totalizing aspects of the ‘social condition’; and this 
investment of poetic labour also naturalizes the poet’s criticism and aesthetic theories.  
The artistic medium of landscape gardening has a naturalizing characteristic because it 
reverses the relationship between object and representation.  As Poe explains, when the natural 
world is compared with painting or sculpture, we ‘justly’ ‘regard nature as supreme’; and due to 
the fact no ‘pictorial or sculptural combinations’ can ‘do more than approach the living and 
breathing beauty’, any ‘criticism which says, of sculpture or portraiture, that here nature is to be 
exalted or idealized rather than imitated, is in error’.
412  Poe continues, ‘no such combination of 
scenery exists in nature as the painter of genius may produce.  No such paradises are to be found 
in reality as have glowed on the canvas of Claude.  In the most enchanting of natural landscapes, 
there will always be found a defect or an excess’.
413  Unlike the painting ‘of genius’, the ‘wide 
surface of the natural earth’ has no position from which a critic will not find some offence with 
regards to its composition.  Yet in landscape gardening ‘the principle of the critic is true’, 
because the poet imbues nature itself with the labour inspired by the ‘poetic sentiment’, 
transforming nature into supernal Beauty and sublimating the land closer to its lost divinity.
414  
Again, these processes of self-creation, and of imbuing the land with a divinely-placed principle, 
recall Locke’s ideas about property and the self; and this Lockean influence is evinced in 
Ellison’s reasons for pursuing Beauty through landscape gardening:  
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In the multiform and multicolour of the flower and trees, he recognized the most direct 
and energetic efforts of Nature at physical loveliness.  And in the direction or 
concentration of this effort – or, more properly, in its adaptation to the eyes which were 
to behold the earth – he perceived that he should be employing the best means – 
labouring to the greatest advantage – in the fulfilment, not only of his own destiny as 
poet, but of the august purposes for which the Deity had implanted the poetic sentiment 
in man.
415 
 
Ellison’s idea of labouring to the ‘greatest advantage’ in order to fulfil the ‘Deity’s purpose’ for 
placing the poetic sentiment within humankind conflates Locke’s ideology with Poe’s 
Neoplatonism.  On one hand, Ellison’s inspiration for landscape gardening is influenced by 
Locke’s idea that ‘God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also given them 
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience’.
416  On the other, the 
way Ellison perceives the ‘Deity’s plan’ as being fulfilled is structured by the theological duality 
between Adam and Christ, so that the ‘poetic’ labour invested into the land transubstantiates it 
into the forfeited earthly paradise promised to Adam by God.  This transubstantiation is 
explained in Ellison’s response to the narrator’s inquiry of why ‘geological disturbances’ disrupt 
natural ‘form and colour-grouping’ and create flaws in the land that are ‘abnormal and unadapted 
to any purpose’.  Ellison’s answer recalls the Adamic loss of Eden and subsequent fall into 
mortality: ‘Admit the earthly immortality of man to be the first intention.  We have then the 
primitive arrangement of the earth’s surface adapted to his blissful estate, not as existent but 
designed.  The disturbances were the preparations for his subsequently conceived deathful 
condition’.
417  Implicitly, Poe intermeshes labour inspired by the poetic sentiment with Locke’s 
ideas about the establishing agency of labour to create both persons and property.  The 
concatenation between the two ideologies is tied into their respective divine inherencies: the 
Lockean labour substantiates a divinely-placed ‘property’ in one’s person to establish the self; 
and, in comparison, the poet’s artistic labour as described in ‘The Poetic Principle’ also touches 
on divinity when it expresses Beauty, with this expression being contingent on an elevated soul 
that enables one to become a ‘true man’.  By correlating his own ideas about the poetic sentiment 
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with Locke’s ideas about labour and property, Poe equalizes the artist’s struggle for supernal 
Beauty with Locke’s definition of labour as a facilitator of personhood and citizenship.     
  In keeping with his ideological background of ‘genteel patriarchy’, Poe ascribes an 
importance to land, particularly once it is invested with labour inspired by the poetic sentiment; 
and this importance for Poe is given in the final outcome of Ellison’s project.  That the 
inspiration of Ellison’s labour derives from the poetic sentiment is stated in his description as a 
poet in ‘the widest and noblest sense’ who comprehends ‘the true character, the august aims, the 
supreme majesty and dignity of the poetic sentiment’, and who ‘instinctively’ feels that ‘the sole 
proper satisfaction of this sentiment’ lies in ‘the creation of noble forms of beauty’.
418  That the 
poetic sentiment compels his desire to transform the landscape is stated in his assertion of an 
‘incontrovertible’ principle that signals the possibility of ‘something beyond’, and that ‘an 
object’ may exist ‘in keeping with the principle’.  Although such an object is ‘unattainable by the 
means ordinarily possessed by individuals’, if attained, it would ‘lend a charm to the landscape-
garden far surpassing that which a sense of merely human interest could bestow’.  What these 
extraordinary ‘means’ Ellison refers to are ‘very unusual pecuniary resources’; and the 
‘principle’ he mentions is the conveyance of ‘the sentiment of spiritual interference’.
419  In a 
passage that ties together several thematic strands, Ellison describes at length the investment of 
nature with the poetic sentiment through labour:  
 
In the most rugged of wildernesses – in the most savage of the scenes of pure nature – 
there is apparent the art of a creator; yet this art is apparent to reflection only; in no 
respect has it the obvious force of a feeling.  Now let us suppose this sense of the 
Almighty design to be one step depressed – to be brought into something like harmony or 
consistency with the sense of human art – to form an intermedium between the two: – let 
us imagine, for example, a landscape whose combined vastness and definitiveness – 
whose united beauty, magnificence, and strangeness, shall convey the idea of care, or 
culture, or superintendence, on the part of beings superior, yet akin to humanity – then 
the sentiment of interest is preserved, while the art intervolved is made to assume the air 
of an intermediate or secondary nature – a nature which is not God, nor an emanation 
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from God, but which still is nature in the sense of the handiwork of the angels that hover 
between man and God.
420 
 
Again, the artistic labour produces a sublimation, and this elevating process is described within a 
Neoplatonic framework, with the idea that the world is a Platonic Creator’s ‘art’, or handiwork, 
converging with tropes of humankind’s fall from immortality.  With the abasement of the 
Creator’s world, its ‘art’ becomes apparent to ‘reflection only’, and not ‘feeling’, suggesting that 
the land’s essentiality is still ‘mortal’ and ‘unelevated’, and for this reason it cannot elevate one’s 
soul through ‘feeling’ towards Beauty.  This correlation of essence with ‘feeling’ refers back to   
the narrator’s earlier statement, ‘in landscape alone is the principle of the critic true’ – a principle 
qualified by the way the critic feels ‘its truth’.  As the narrator explains, ‘the feeling is no 
affectation or chimera’; not even ‘mathematics’ can ‘afford’ a ‘more absolute’ demonstration 
‘than the sentiment’ that ‘art yields the artist’.  The critic ‘not only believes, but positively 
knows, that such and such apparently arbitrary arrangements of matter constitute and alone 
constitute the true beauty’.
421  Reflecting Locke’s paradigm of property creation, the poetic 
labour invested into the land transforms both the land and the labourer, raising the land to an 
‘intermediate or secondary nature’ between earth and God, and affecting the critic’s ‘feeling’, 
validating and sublimating an essential component self that is ‘absolute’ and ‘positively’ known.  
It is the artistic labour that sublimates the land and puts it back in Platonic ‘harmony’ with the 
‘Almighty design’, so that it is ‘one step depressed’, and, like the intermediary elements of air 
and water, the art becomes an intermediary between the earth and the spirit.  ‘Magnificence’, a 
term Poe uses in relation to property, particularly property with a false spiritual aspect, is 
combined with Beauty, and its suggestions of spirituality beyond the material world, so that the 
world – in an anti-pantheistic vein – is not God, nor an emanation from God, but can gesture 
toward a spiritual realm and affirm humanity’s divine essentiality through artistic labour.
422 
  The artist’s ability to imbue the land with his property of the transubstantiating ‘poetic 
sentiment’, or the ‘diversity’ of his ‘faculties’ from which his ‘rights of property originate’, 
derives from an elevated soul that makes him so little ‘of the earth, earthy’; and this elevated soul 
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is emphasized in Ellison in the way that he meets the second of his conditions for happiness, 
namely, ‘the sympathy of a woman, not unwomanly, whose loveliness and love’ envelop ‘his 
existence in the purple atmosphere of Paradise’.
423  Used to describe a condition that elevates the 
soul through Beauty, Paradise also refers to the Edenic state before Adam’s fall, so that Poe 
connects the transubstantiation of the land to love and the Spirit.  This intermeshing of earth and 
Spirit is evinced in the theme of Ellison’s art and in the final vision of reified Beauty.  
Arnheim, the extensive realm of Ellison’s landscape garden, is a large allegory of the 
immortal soul’s journey through life, death, and into a union with God, with all its imagery 
figuring the soteriological progress.  A structuring trope for this journey is Schlegel’s idea about 
bounded and unbounded representations: the river transporting the narrator through Arnheim 
initially takes ‘a thousand turns, so that at no moment’ can its ‘gleaming surface be seen for a 
greater distance than a furlong’, and at ‘every instant’ the boat is ‘imprisoned within an 
enchanted circle’ made up of ‘insuperable and impenetrable’ walls of foliage and a roof of ‘ultra-
marine satin’.
424  Bounded temporally by the clock-like ‘enchanted circle’ of the ‘instant’, and 
sensibly by knowledge gained in increments, the initial leg of the narrator’s journey characterizes 
the empirical delimitations associated with the physical, ‘earthy’ life.  Connected to these tropes 
are spiritual ones: the boat’s reflection lies on the water like a ‘phantom bark’ floating ‘in 
constant company with the substantial one, for the purpose of sustaining it’ over the void-like 
river, whose ‘transparency’ creates the illusion of  ‘no floor’, thereby suggesting how the 
immortal spirit preserves the self from the oblivion of death.
 425   
The immortal soul’s preservation through death is represented again when the boat enters 
a grave-like chasm with high walls inclined together to obscure the daylight, and ‘long plume-
like moss’ descending from the ‘shrubberies overhead’ to create ‘an air of funereal gloom’, 
before it turns suddenly, ‘as if dropped from heaven’, into a basin, where the narrator is 
confronted with ‘the full orb of the declining sun’ forming ‘the sole termination of an otherwise 
limitless vista’.
426  The basin’s ‘limitless vista’ recalls Schlegel’s ideas of the boundless scene 
that connotes ‘what is least corporeal, namely, light and air’, and this allusion to the Holy Spirit 
is suggested again by the fact that vista’s ‘sole termination’ is the sun, a symbol for Christ, 
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thereby suggesting a union of the earth with the Spirit.  Indeed, the epigram to ‘The Domain of 
Arnheim’ is a quote from Giles Fletcher’s ‘Christ’s Victorie on Earth’, with its comparison 
between the ‘garden’ and a ‘lady’ further suggesting the idea of the earth’s union with the Spirit 
through love.
427  Soteriological tropes emerge again when the narrator’s boat is exchanged for ‘a 
light canoe of ivory’, symbolizing the transubstantiation of the earthly into a spiritual self, as 
well as when the canoe proceeds by its own volition towards the sun, implying the immortal 
soul’s innate desire for union with God through love and the Spirit.  As the canoe moves towards 
the sun, the narrator hears the ‘divinest melody’ of ‘soothing yet melancholy music’ coming 
from an ‘unseen origin’, suggesting in Platonic language the world placed in gained harmony 
with its ‘sphere’, while the attainment of heaven is represented by the ‘gigantic gate or rather 
door of burnished gold, elaborately carved and fretted, and reflecting the direct rays of the now 
fast-sinking sun with an effulgence that seems to wreathe the whole surrounding forest in 
flames’.
428  Finally, the voyage culminates in an amphitheatre replete with signifiers of beauty 
similar to those listed in ‘The Poetic Principle’: ‘there is a dream-like intermingling to the eye of 
tall slender Eastern trees – bosky shrubberies – flocks of golden and crimson birds – lily-fringed 
lakes – meadows of violets, tulips, poppies, hyacinths, and tube-roses’, and the perfume of a 
‘strange sweet odour’, thereby suggesting how the land is infused with the poetic sentiment.
429          
Inter-articulated with these tropes of Paradise are those of property and magnificence: not only 
are the gates of heaven made from ‘burnished gold’, but the ‘surrounding forest’ is described as 
‘rudely and luxuriantly wooded’, and basin’s shores are covered in ‘gorgeous flower-blossoms’ 
that resemble ‘rubies, sapphires, opals, and golden onyxes, rolling silently out of the sky’.
430  The 
final result of the conflation between beauty and property is the ‘mass’ of ‘architecture’ 
‘sustaining itself by a miracle in mid-air; glittering in the red sunlight with a hundred oriels, 
minarets, and pinnacles; and seeming the phantom handiwork, conjointly, of the Sylphs, of the 
Fairies, of the Genii, and of the Gnomes’.
431  In other words, the union of property and Beauty 
establishes a visible representation of the Spirit, suggesting how the poetic sentiment invested 
into the land through labour leads to the religious ‘root’, or Ideality, of the land.  While the 
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majority of Poe’s tales have a religious theme, the actual illustration of the reified Spirit is 
uncommon, and its depiction in ‘The Domain’ signals the importance Poe assigns to the union of 
land with the poetic sentiment.  Furthermore, its appearance reflects back on the idealness of 
Ellison, and points out how Poe lends perfectibility to the subject with both property and the 
poetic sentiment.  
The image of the floating ‘architecture’ also reflects Ellison’s idealness and elevated 
soul, and this idealness gains resonance when referring back to Schlegel’s Lectures.  Schlegel 
located the essence of Greek tragedy in the idealness of its characters.  In using the term ‘ideal’ 
Schlegel denotes how the manners of the Greek tragic characters are ‘always elevated above 
reality’, with their ‘ideality of the representation’ consisting ‘in the elevation to a higher sphere’.  
As Schlegel explains, the aim of Greek tragedy is to ‘separate the image of humanity’ from ‘the 
ground of nature to which man is in reality chained down, like a feudal slave’, and he puts 
forward two rhetorical questions to explain his argument: ‘How was this to be accomplished?  
By exhibiting to us an image hovering in the air’?  While such an exhibition of Ideality is 
‘incompatible with the law of gravitation and with the earthly materials of which our bodies are 
framed’, the Greeks succeed in combining ‘ideality with reality’ to display ‘an elevation more 
than human with all the truth of life, and all the energy of bodily qualities’.
432  In relating the 
‘architecture’ floating in the air to Ellison’s landscape garden, Poe not only implies that the 
imbuement of property with the poetic sentiment elevates the land ‘above reality’, making it ‘one 
step depressed’ from God’s design, but that the property Ellison invests in the land through 
labour is that of his own soul elevated through love and the Spirit; and this unity between earth 
and a ‘higher sphere’ is underscored by the mythical Sylphs, Fairies, Genii, and Gnomes 
associated respectively with the Platonic elements of water, air, fire, and earth, thereby implying 
the union between earth and heaven.  
 
Conclusion 
  The purpose of this chapter was to show how Poe figures national Ideality in the 
Jacksonian context.  ‘The Oblong Box’, expresses Poe’s perception of Jacksonian subjects as 
‘more dead than alive’ in the sense that they are ‘artificial’, or ‘mere surface without any internal 
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substance’ in that they lack an essence elevated by the Neoplatonic ideas of love, Beauty, and the 
Spirit; and this lack of personal essence reflects the national root’s replacement by property, or 
merchandise.  Schlegel’s Lectures flesh out and provide much of the contextualizing philosophy 
that structures how Poe determines national Ideality and its relation to national expressions of 
art, while analysis of Poe’s ‘The Domain of Arnheim’ shows how Poe attempts to locate national 
ideality through an investment of the poetic sentiment into the landscape through labour.  Having 
now examined how Poe draws an Ideal relationship between national subjectivity and national 
territory, the following chapter will focus on Poe’s conceptualizations of Native Americans, 
looking at ‘Morning on the Wissahiccon’ and ‘The Masque of the Red Death’, as well as some 
selections of Poe’s criticism.   
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Chapter Four: ‘Of the Earth, Earthy’: Sympathy, 
Displacement and Poe’s Depictions of Native 
Americans 
 
Leon Jackson observes that while a great deal of criticism is engaged in ‘determining the 
precise nature’ of Poe’s attitudes towards African-Americans and slavery, ‘no such debate is 
necessary’ to determine that his attitudes towards Native Americans ‘was fairly consistently 
negative, based, as it was, on a rejection of the noble savage ideal.  Indeed, he typically painted 
them as bloodthirsty and violent’.
433  Jackson corroborates this argument by alluding to the ‘half-
breed’ Dirk Peters from The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, who is described by the narrator 
as ‘one of the most purely ferocious-looking men I ever beheld’, and the Sioux of The Journal of 
Julius Rodman, who are ‘our enemies at heart’ and ‘an ugly ill-made race . . . according to our 
ideas of the human form’.
434  However, while Poe rejects the noble savage ideal, his attitude 
towards Native Americans is still complicated, straddling as it does the ideas of Indians as 
objects of sympathy and as inherently irrational and inferior.  Poe’s ambivalent attitude towards 
Native Americans makes even Jackson’s corroborating examples problematic: the editor in 
‘Rodman’ calls the Sioux Rodman’s ‘bugbears par excellence’, implying an irrational fear, and 
after escaping live burial on Tsalal Pym calls Peters one of the ‘only living white men’ on the 
island, gesturing to inclusivity and assimilation – a gesture similar to Prospero’s claim on 
Caliban, ‘this thing of darkness, I | Acknowledge mine’.
435  Pym’s claim on Peters is underscored 
when considering how seven years before Pym’s publication Supreme Court Justice John 
Marshall described tribal governments in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia as ‘domestic dependent 
nations’ – a paradoxical term, because the definition of tribal governments as ‘nations’ by the 
Supreme Court acknowledges their sovereign, independent status.  Yet the referents, ‘domestic’ 
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and ‘dependent’, also mean that they are incorporated within, and the responsibility of, the 
United States.
436   
  A starting point for understanding Poe’s attitudes towards Native Americans is one of his 
lesser-known tales, ‘Morning on the Wissahiccon’ or ‘The Elk’, because it illustrates an 
American claim on Native American territories as a claim on Native Americans themselves.  
Originally published in The Opal for 1844 as a companion piece for J.G. Chapman’s picture of 
an elk in romantic scenery entitled ‘Morning’, the tale itself has an ironic tone: while boating 
along the Wissahiccon River, a nameless narrator revels in visions ‘of the “good old days” when 
the Demon of the Engine was not, when pic-nics were undreamed of, when “water privileges” 
were neither bought nor sold, and when the red man trod alone, with the elk, upon the ridges that 
now towered above’.
 437  While revelling, the narrator immediately sees his vision reified as ‘one 
of the oldest and boldest of those identical elks which had been coupled with the red men’ of his 
imagination, and his ‘whole soul’ becomes ‘bound up in intense sympathy’ for the elk, which he 
imagines to be ‘repining, not less than wondering, at the manifest alterations for the worse, 
wrought upon the brook and its vicinage, even within the last few years, by the stern hand of the 
utilitarian’.  The ‘romance’ of the vision comes crashing down though when an African-
American servant emerges from the thickets to catch the elk: ‘the noble animal, although a little 
fluttered, made no attempt at escape.  The negro advanced; offered the salt; and spoke a few 
words of encouragement or conciliation.  Presently, the elk bowed and stamped, and then lay 
quietly down and was secured with a halter’.  The tale concludes with the explanation that the elk 
is ‘a pet of great age and very domestic habits’ belonging to an ‘English family occupying a villa 
in the vicinity’.
438 
The metaphoric significance of the elk and its domesticity can be understood by 
comparing the descriptive similarities between ‘Morning’ and ‘The Poetic Principle’.  In 
‘Morning’, the narrator’s description of the Louisiana Valley’s ‘gentle undulations of soil, 
interwreathed with fantastic crystallic streams, gigantic, glossy, multicoloured, sparkling with 
gay birds and burthened with perfume’ parallels the ‘simple elements’ that induce the ‘true 
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poetic effect’ in ‘The Poetic Principle’, such as ‘clustering of low shrubberies’, ‘the twinkling of 
half-hidden brooks’, ‘the songs of the birds’, ‘the gleaming of silver rivers’, etc., thereby 
describing the valley in terms of Beauty.
 439   The narrator of ‘Morning’ even states, ‘The most 
gorgeous imagination might derive suggestions from its exuberant beauty.  And beauty is, 
indeed, its sole character.  It has little, or rather nothing, of the sublime’.
440  This distinction 
between Beauty and the sublime points to Burkean ideas, as well as those laid out by Poe in ‘The 
Domain of Arnheim’.  Part of Burke’s definition of the sublime is the heightened feelings of 
awe, solemnity, and terror that accompany being in the presence of God; and, as Poe describes in 
‘The Domain of Arnheim’, this nearness to God through the land requires an investment of 
labour inspired by the poetic sentiment.
441  However, this poetic investment into the landscape 
can never occur.  As the narrator observes: ‘Now the Wissahiccon is of so remarkable a 
loveliness that, were it flowing in England, it would be the theme of every bard, and the common 
topic of every tongue, if, indeed, its banks were not parcelled off in lots, at an exorbitant price, as 
building sites for villas of the opulent’.
442  The Wissahiccon’s potential to elevate the soul 
through Beauty, as the ‘theme of every bard’, is curtailed by its transformation into property, or 
‘parcelled lots’.  In other words, the transformation of nature into property prohibits its potential 
for sublimity through poetic labour as well as the soul’s elevation through Beauty.   
The image of the elk ‘secured with an halter’ is metaphoric for the philosophical ideas 
that inform ‘Morning’.  Just as the Wissahiccon’s ability to elevate the soul is curtailed by its 
transformation into parcelled lots, the narrator’s ‘whole soul’ is ‘bound up’ with what turns out 
to be property.  Furthermore, the ownership of the elk by an ‘English family’ implies that the 
Wissahiccon’s transformation into merchandise causes the obfuscation of the national ‘root’.  At 
the same time, though, the elk, ‘coupled with the red men’, is also metaphoric for Native 
Americans, and this tropic connection is underscored by analogous terminology used to 
described the ‘pet’ of ‘very domestic habits’ and the ‘domestic dependent nations’.  Further, the 
elk’s status, as owned property, points to American ownership over Native American lands.  
Poe’s positioning of the elk as a metaphor for both the land’s potential to create Beauty and as 
‘the Indian’ gestures toward an important conflation and incorporation.  Specifically, the ability 
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to locate and express the nation’s Spiritual ‘root’ is contingent on the displacement of Native 
Americans in order to inherit their rightful and certain ownership of the land.  For Poe, this 
displacement is marked by an element of ‘intense sympathy’ towards Native Americans, but it is 
also grounded in the belief of the tribal populations’ inherent irrationality and inferiority.     
Poe’s ambivalent sympathy toward Native Americans can be evinced in his criticism as well, 
particularly his argument to change the name of America to Appalachia.  On one hand, he argues 
that the name does honour to the ‘Aborigines, whom, hitherto, we have at all points unmercifully 
despoiled, assassinated, and dishonoured’; on the other, he notes that Appalachia is not only 
‘indigenous, springing from one of the most magnificent and distinctive features of the country 
itself’, but – and ‘by far the most truly important consideration of all’ – it has an inherent 
‘music’: ‘nothing could be more sonorous, more liquid, or of fuller volume, while its length is 
just sufficient for dignity’.
443  In arguing for a name that is ‘musical’, Poe seeks an expression of 
the nation’s Spiritual root, or Ideality, that puts it in touch with its ‘sphere’; and one of the 
prerequisites for finding this ‘root’ is that it is ‘indigenous’, ‘springing from’ the ‘country itself’.  
That is, the ‘soul’ of the nation is found in its indigeneity; and this process of claiming 
indigeneity involves honoring the ‘Aborigines’, because the act of ‘honouring’, or 
memorializing, the tribal populations can also imply that they are no longer a threat and safely 
out of the way of territorial expansion. 
As Dana Nelson notes, rationality as a trait was strategically denied to Native American 
populations in order to justify Anglo-American appropriation of the continent; and part of Poe’s 
justification for negating tribal claims to the national territory can be found in the Neoplatonic 
conceptualizations of identity he subscribes to.
 444  As Plato explains in the Timaeus, the human 
immortal soul is a small component of the World Soul, and this close connection between the 
human and World souls enables the immortal human soul to have reason and identify Ideality. 
As Plato explains, to ensure that no irrational creatures should be more fair than the rational, and 
that reason cannot ‘belong to any apart from Soul’, the Architect constructs ‘reason within soul 
and soul within body ’.
445  As the World Soul moves through the universe in its human body it 
touches upon things of substance, and ‘announces’, without speech or sound, ‘what the object is 
identical with and from what it is different, and in what relation, where and how and when, it 
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comes about that each thing exists and is acted upon both in the sphere of the Becoming and in 
that of the ever-uniform’.  When its announcements are concerned with the sensible and mutable, 
then ‘opinions and beliefs arise which are firm and true’; and when the Soul touches on the Ideal, 
then reason and knowledge of necessity result.
446 
Echoing Platonic discourse, Augustine’s Pauline-inflected spirit-body binary emerges 
against the philosophical background of a World Soul that endows the human soul with 
rationality while remaining itself ideal.  For Augustine, this Platonic World Soul, which exists 
both materially and ideally and imbues the human mind with reason, is associated with God, who 
is also of a material and ideal nature, and is the Architect ‘not only of this visible world’, but ‘of 
every soul whatsoever’, existing ‘above all that is of the nature of the soul’, and bestowing 
‘blessedness to the rational soul’ through ‘participation in His own unchangeable and incorporeal 
light’.
447  The Pauline binary of the body and soul, and the human soul’s connection with the 
World Soul, or God, are rephrased by Augustine into the terms ‘body’ and ‘life’.  Augustine says 
the Platonists consider that ‘whatever is is either body or life’, with the nature of the body being 
‘sensible’, or perceived by the sight and touch of the body, and that of life being ‘intelligible’, 
meaning understood by the ‘sight of the mind’.  The Platonists prefer the ‘intelligible nature to 
the sensible’ because they understand that ‘there is no corporeal beauty’, whether in its form or 
action, of ‘which it is not the mind that judges’; and this ability to form judgement ‘could never 
have been, had there not existed in the mind itself a superior form of these things, without bulk, 
without noise of voice, without space and time’.
448  While the mind’s mutability enables it to 
grow and become more discerning, this same mutability leads to the belief ‘that the first form is 
not to be found in those things whose form is changeable’; rather it is a ‘first form’ not 
‘admitting of degrees of comparison’, a ‘first principle of things’, which is ‘not made’, but by 
which ‘all things’ are made.
449   
The spiritual connection between the immortal human soul and God, which enables 
rationality and the ability to recognize the Ideal, does not generally apply to Native Americans in 
Poe’s fiction and criticism, as is evinced by the way he presents them as incapable of the poetic 
expression that could elevate the soul towards Ideality.  In his review of Legends of a Log Cabin 
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Poe asserts that while ‘The Wyandot’s Story’ is good ‘we have fault to find, likewise, with the 
phraseology in this instance.  No Indian, let Chateaubriand and others say what they please, ever 
indulged, for half an hour at a time, in the disjointed and hyperbolic humbug here attributed to 
the Wyandot’.
450  Poe’s reasons for discrediting the idea of an Indian speaking longer than ‘half 
an hour’ are elaborated somewhat in his review of C.F. Hoffman’s poem about ‘two Indian 
chiefs [who] are rivals in love’: 
 
The descriptive portions are particularly good, but the author erred, first, in narrating the 
story in the first person, and secondly, in putting into the mouth of the narrator language 
and sentiments above the nature of an Indian.  I say that the narration should not have 
been in the first person, because, although an Indian may and does fully experience a 
thousand delicate shades of sentiment (the whole idea of the story is essentially 
sentimental), still he has, clearly, no capacity for their various expression.  Mr. 
Hoffman’s hero is made to discourse very much after the manner of Rousseau.
451   
 
For Rousseau, man in his natural, ‘savage’ state is not necessarily good, but is not bad precisely 
because he does not ‘know what it is to be good; because it is neither the development of the 
understanding nor the restraint of the law that hinders [him] from doing ill’, but rather a 
‘peacefulness’ of ‘passions’ and an ‘ignorance of vice’.
452  The primary element that defines the 
border between civilized and natural man is property.  As Rousseau states, ‘the first man who, 
having enclosed a piece of ground, took it into his head to say “This is mine”, and found people 
simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society’.  This development towards 
civilization engenders negative outcomes because the accumulation of property means an 
increase of competition on one hand, ‘and conflicting interest on the other, together with a secret 
desire on both of profiting at the expense of others.  All these evils were the first effects of 
property and the inseparable attendants of growing inequality’.  Usurpations and robberies 
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accompany the struggle to claim property, resulting in a suppression of compassion and increase 
in vice.
453   
  Poe refutes the Rousseauian ideal of originary man in his natural, savage state in 
Marginalia:  
 
The theorizers on Government, who pretend always to ‘begin at the beginning’, 
commence with man in what they call his natural state – the savage.  What right have 
they to suppose this his natural state?  Man’s chief idiosyncrasy being reason, it follows 
that his savage condition, his condition of action without reason – is his unnatural state.  
The more he reasons the nearer he approaches the position to which his chief 
idiosyncrasy irresistibly impels him; and not until he attains this position with exactitude 
– not until his reason has exhausted itself for his improvement – not until he has stepped 
upon the highest pinnacle of civilisation – will his natural state be ultimately reached, or 
thoroughly determined.
454  
 
For Poe, civilized man marked by reason is mankind’s ‘natural’ state, and this pertains back to 
Adam’s fall, which was a relinquishment of humankind’s original, ‘natural’ immortality that 
Christ’s  resurrection  rectified.    The  closer  union  with  God,  or  the  World  Soul,  intrinsically 
involves a move to greater reason.  Poe rejects Rousseau’s notion that the primary distinction 
between  civilized  man  and  savagery  is  merely  one  of  physical  property,  and  he  opts  for  a 
philosophy  that  naturalizes  man’s  civilized  state  and  locates  racial  difference  in  inherent 
‘spiritual’ deficiencies connected with an inability for ‘expression’.  Looking back to ‘The Poetic 
Principle’, Poe notes that ‘the struggle to apprehend the supernal Loveliness’ is a struggle ‘on the 
part of souls fittingly constituted’; and such ‘fittingly constituted’ souls are not found amongst 
Poe’s depictions of Native Americans: again, while ‘an Indian may and does fully experience a 
thousand delicate shades of sentiment’ he has ‘no capacity for their various expression’.  In other 
words, ‘savages’ are unable to attain divinity, or the ‘Beauty above’ because they do not have the 
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inherent capability for expression, and in being unable to express themselves they remain, in a 
sense, ‘of the earth, earthy’.
 455   
  Poe’s  conception  of  Native  Americans  being  ‘of  the  earth’  finds  its  corroboration  in 
Shakespeare’s character, Caliban.  Poe makes allusion to The Tempest in both ‘The Man That 
Was Used Up’, through the namesake of Miranda Cognoscenti, and in ‘The Masque of the Red 
Death’, with the Red Death being a reference to Caliban’s curse on Prospero and Miranda in The 
Tempest, ‘The red plague rid you | For learning me your language’.
456  While Caliban is not 
specifically Native American, much incidental evidence ties him to the aboriginal tribes of the 
Americas.  Setebos, the god of Caliban’s mother, is described in the  account of Magellan’s 
expedition as ‘a great devil of the Patagonians’, and by worshipping him, ‘Sycorax is identified 
with the most remote, God-forsaken and degenerate of sixteenth-century Amerindian types’.
457  
Trinculo  associates  Caliban  with  ‘Indians’  when  stating  that  in  England  ‘There  would  this 
monster make a man; any strange beast there makes a man.  When they will not give a doit to 
relieve  a  lame  beggar,  they  will  lay  out  ten  to  see  a  dead  Indian’.
458    As  well,  Caliban’s 
complaint of usurpation finds an analogy in Anglo-America’s relationship with its aboriginal 
tribes:  
 
    The island’s mine by Sycorax my mother, 
    Which thou tak’st from me [. . . .] 
    All the charms 
    Of Sycorax – toads, beetles, bats – light on you! 
    For I am all the subjects that you have, 
    Which first was mine own king; and here you sty me 
    In this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me       
    The rest o’th’island.
459  
 
Caliban also is congruent with Poe’s philosophy because he is a savage who is inherently 
incapable of elevating himself above baseness: Miranda calls him an ‘Abhorred slave, / Which 
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any print of goodness wilt not take’, and Prospero even refers to him as ‘Thou earth, thou!’.
460  
The correlation of Caliban with the earth occurs not only in the play itself, but in its surrounding 
criticism.  In Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays William Hazlitt says of Caliban:  
 
Shakespeare has described the brutal mind of Caliban in contact with the pure and 
original forms of nature; the character grows out of the soil where it is rooted 
uncontrolled, uncouth and wild, uncramped by any of the meannesses of custom.  It is ‘of 
the earth, earthy’.  It seems almost to have been dug out of the ground, with a soul 
instinctively superadded to it answering to its wants and origin.
461 
 
Although Poe reviewed Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays in 1845, two years after ‘The Masque 
of the Red Death’s’ original publication, the first edition of Hazlitt’s work was published in 
1817, and as Kevin J. Hayes notes, Poe likely read essayists such as William Hazlitt, Leigh Hunt, 
and Charles Lamb to supplement his early education.
462  In his 1845 review of Characters of 
Shakespeare’s Plays Poe praises the author, asserting that ‘If anything could induce us to read 
anything more in the way of commentary on Shakespeare, it would be the name of Hazlitt 
prefixed.  With his hackneyed theme he has done wonders, and those wonders well’.  Yet 
however referring to Hazlitt as a ‘genius’ Poe also invalidates him with slight praise, stating, ‘for 
purposes of mere amusement, he is the best commentator who ever wrote in English’, and ‘take 
away the innumerable foibles of Hunt and Hazlitt, and we should have the anomaly of finding 
them more diminutive than we fancy them while the foibles remain’.
463  One of these ‘foibles’ 
for Poe would be the Rousseauean slant inflecting Hazlitt’s interpretation of Caliban’s vulgarity: 
‘Vulgarity is not natural courseness, but conventional courseness, learnt from others, contrary to, 
or without an entire conformity of natural power and disposition’.
464  Yet despite such ‘foibles’, 
Hazlitt’s interpretation of Caliban holds a ‘keystone’ position in the overall discourse Poe 
constructs around the figure of the Indian.  Specifically, it corroborates his theory that the soul of 
the ‘savage’ is incapable of elevation, being ‘superadded’ in answering to the wants and needs of 
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a creature ‘of the earth’.  When we consider the more spiritual aspects of being ‘of the earth’ 
against the incorporative displacement indicated in ‘Morning on the Wissahiccon’, in which an 
undisputed Anglo-American inheritance of the land is necessary to invest it with the labour of 
the poetic sentiment, then we see that being ‘of the earth’ has two meanings in relation to Native 
Americans: it refers to a spiritual condition, but also a more literal one, a condition of being a 
principle of the national ‘earth’ that must be incorporated. 
 
‘The Masque of the Red Death’ 
  Utilizing methodologies put forward in previous chapters alongside discussion of Poe’s 
mixed attitudes of sympathy and condescension towards Native Americans enables interpretive 
access to ‘The Masque of the Red Death’.  While ‘The Masque’ is obviously a tale about 
morality and sympathy, as indicated when Prospero shuts out the Red Death and the ‘impulses of 
despair’ from his castellated abbey, the allusion in its title to Caliban’s curse also lends the tale a 
colonial context that is not considered in its surrounding criticism by suggesting that the 
sympathy disregarded in ‘The Masque’ is at least partially metaphoric for America’s lack of 
sympathy toward its Native American populations.
465  The specific focus of this subsection is to 
analyse how this lack of sympathy is justified by an epistemology, particularly a pantheistic, 
Transcendental epistemology, that puts forth a knowable, absolute morality and spirituality that 
blocks an authentic union of God through the Holy Spirit.  Finally, this subsection will consider 
how this Spiritual lack is tied to the putrescent and disarticulate body.   
  Hubert Zapf observes that several story elements in ‘The Masque’ draw heavily ‘on 
modes of story-telling which seem to belong to a distant past rather than to the contemporary 
context of Poe’s own literary and cultural world’, and he poses the questions: ‘What is the reason 
for this historical distancing, this aesthetic anachronism in the literary method of the story?  
What is its function in the overall composition of the text?’.
466  These questions may be 
approached by considering the ideologies of immutability and certainty that underpin the masque 
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structure.  Consideration of this structure provides a framework for which to analyse ‘The 
Masque’.   
As David Lindley explains, the Renaissance masque is usually a celebration in honour of 
an event or monarch, central to which is the arrival of a group of intricately disguised nobles, 
known as the antimasque, who proceed to involve members from the main court audience in a 
specially designed and highly rehearsed communal dance.  The narrative of the masque is 
provided by a writer whose function is to create a fictional context for the arrival of the 
antimasque.  Often the formal narrative idealizes the court, emphasizing it as an instantiation of 
order and social harmony, with the antimasquers, in contrast, representing disorder and discord.  
The inevitable departure of the antimasque affirms the order embodied by the court.
467     
  The significance of the masque structure, with its arrival and departure of threatening 
disorder, gains resonance from its historical and economic contexts.  Jennifer Chibnall points out 
that by the end of the Elizabethan era the rapidly developing mercantilist and capitalistic 
economy was quickly eroding the rurally based feudal structure, which had become more of a 
lingering remnant than an economic reality.  This social development turned the aristocracy and 
landed gentry to alternate means for economic survival, and, uncertain of its function, the court 
withdrew into itself.  Within the enclosed world of the court, and in proportion to its growing 
sense of uncertainty, the entertainment became more involved in expressing an aristocratic sense 
of control, represented by displaying the threatening elements in such a way as could be 
managed or obliterated by the masque vision.  In the Elizabethan and Jacobean masque the 
management of difference was expressed through tropes of reconciliation and political unity; but 
by Charles’s reign the court had been diminished and threatened enough that management was 
represented as securing an enclosed space for the aristocracy.
468     
  When considering the structure of the masque we see that it carries with it tropes of self-
evidential truth and order, and juxtaposed disruptive otherness that requires management or 
expulsion.  Returning back to Zapf’s original questions, Poe’s masque setting is not so much 
concerned with ‘historical distancing’ and ‘aesthetic anachronism’ as it is with bringing its tropes 
to bear on the American scene. Specifically, Poe aligns the self-evidential truths of the masque 
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with Emerson’s absolute knowledge, and presents the setting itself as an allegory for 
Transcendental discourse.  The ‘mummer’ who intrudes into this discourse is at once the 
antimasque and an instantiation of mortality.  Its presence disrupts the Transcendental structure 
by undermining its assurances of an absolute knowledge beyond the realm of empiricism.  As to 
how Poe conflates the masque setting with Transcendental discourse will be illustrated through 
discussion of key tropes in Emerson’s ‘Idealism’ and ‘The Over-soul’ and their instantiations in 
‘The Masque’. 
In his discussion of Poe and Emerson, Brian Harding notes that Emerson alludes to The 
Tempest in the ‘Idealism’ chapter of Nature in order to exemplify the poet’s ability to 
subordinate material objects to his imagination.  As Emerson says, ‘the perception of real 
affinities between events (that is to say, of ideal affinities, for those only are real), enables the 
poet thus to make free with the most imposing forms and phenomena of the world, and to assert 
the predominance of the soul’; and Prospero, Emerson’s archetypal poet, asserts ‘the 
predominance of the soul’ by controlling the physical world to transfigure it in accordance with 
his imaginative vision.
469  In juxtaposition, the Prospero of ‘The Masque of the Red Death’ 
asserts his imaginative power over the physical world by creating a ‘micro-kingdom’ entirely 
dominated by his fancy: ‘Everything in the confined world of the abbey is a product of 
Prospero’s imagination, from the colours of the seven rooms, to the colour of the great clock’.
470  
Yet, for all Prospero’s power, the Red Death invades the realm of his imaginative vision and 
destroys his ‘kingdom’.  ‘The Masque’ thereby allegorizes the intrusion of reality into the 
‘circumscribed world of the poet’s imaginative control’; and as Harding asserts, this ‘contrast 
between Poe’s Prospero and Emerson’s reveals more about their conceptions of art than any 
disagreement concerning the status of metre in poetry’.
471  
  By discussing ‘Idealism’ in greater detail, we see how Poe’s Lockean based empiricism 
stands inimically to Emerson’s conceptualization and collapse of creation and knowing. The 
dominant trope in ‘Idealism’ is the conflation of the outside world’s material reality with the 
poet’s / philosopher’s inner world of imagination and Reason.  At the outset of the chapter 
Emerson says, ‘a noble doubt presents itself’ as to ‘whether nature outwardly exists’, and he 
                                                           
469 Brian Harding, American Literature in Context: II, 1830-1865, American Literature in Context: 1620-
1930 (London: Methuen, 1982), p. 67. 
470 Harding, p. 68. 
471 Harding, p. 68. 133 
 
ponders ‘in my utter impotence to test the authenticity of the report of my sense’ ‘what 
difference does it make whether Orion is up there in heaven, or some god paints the image in the 
firmament of my soul?’.
472  For Emerson, culture and our empirically based Understanding 
compel us to believe in an absolute nature; however, ‘when the eye of Reason opens’ then 
sensory experience becomes subordinate to the ‘causes and spirits’ which are seen to govern 
them.  In part, the ability to experience reality through ‘the eye of Reason’ involves a dislocation 
of perspective.  In the realm of the Understanding this dislocation may occur by mechanical 
means when a buggy or train provides a vantage point from outside of the usual.  When this 
occurs the viewer becomes wholly detached from his usual relation with the world and perceives 
other beings as ‘apparent, not substantial’.
473   
  Relative to poetry, the poet creates a dislocation of perspective in a ‘higher manner’ by 
making objects of the physical world become symbols for his Reason: ‘to [the poet], the 
refractory world is ductile and flexible; he invests dust and stones with humanity, and makes 
them the words of Reason’; he ‘unfixes the land from the sea, [and] makes them revolve around 
the axis of his primary thought’.
474   Above all poets, ‘Shakespeare possesses the power of 
subordinating nature for the purposes of expression’, and Emerson lists examples from The 
Tempest, as noted above, to illustrate how he correlates the ‘farthest sundered things’ ‘by a 
subtile spiritual connexion’.
475   
  Just as the Emersonian poet transfigures material objects through his passion, the 
philosopher ‘postpones the apparent order and relations of things to the empire of thought’.  
Emerson insists that philosophy ‘proceeds on the faith that a law determines all phenomena, 
which being known, the phenomena can be predicted’.  This law, ‘when in the mind, is an idea’; 
and an idea in turn manifests a ‘spiritual life’ ‘imparted to nature’.  When reason is able to seize 
philosophical laws the material world becomes subordinate to the idea – the ‘solid seeming block 
of matter’ becomes ‘pervaded and dissolved by a thought’ – and the ‘masses of nature’ are 
penetrated by an ‘informing soul’.  With this conflation of soul and matter, nature becomes 
‘transferred into the mind’ and leaves matter ‘like an outcast corpse’.  Emerson calls Ideas 
‘immortal necessary uncreated natures’, and when we are within their presence ‘we wait in an 
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Olympus of the gods’, ‘we ascend into their region, and know that these are the thoughts of the 
Supreme Being’; and by attaining Ideas we attain an absolute knowledge: ‘we learn the 
difference between the absolute and the conditional or relative.  We apprehend the absolute.  As 
it were, for the first time, we exist.  We become immortal, for we learn that time and space are 
relations of matter’.
476 
  In order to undermine Emerson’s ideal of absolute knowledge, Poe allegorizes it in the 
setting of ‘The Masque of the Red Death’, writing the Renaissance masque, with its self-
evidential truths, as an analogy for an Emersonian discourse that writes its own truth and grounds 
its epistemology in a supernal Reason.  Just as the Renaissance masque communicates an 
established order, the court of Prince Prospero embodies an aristocratic sense of control, with 
threatening elements either contained or displayed in such a way as can be managed and 
controlled.  Specifically, mortality, reified as the Red Death, is controlled in both a physical and 
intellectual sense as something incomprehensible and disruptive to the knowable order, as 
implied not only by the court’s seclusion but the act of welding shut the abbey gates because the 
courtiers ‘resolved to leave means neither of ingress or egress to the sudden impulses of despair 
or of frenzy from within’.
477  In essence, Prospero establishes an ‘empire of thought’ in which 
everything that is not subordinate to his own expression is precluded; and the justification for 
establishing this ‘empire’ is suggested in the structure of the abbey itself, particularly through the 
seven lighted rooms.    
Much criticism pertaining to ‘The Masque’ has focused on the meaning of the seven 
rooms: H.H. Bell notes that the masque’s seven rooms are ‘the allegorical representation of 
Prince Prospero’s life span’, but may also reflect the seven decades of life, which ‘according to 
the Bible is the normal life span of man – three score and ten’, while Vanderbilt expands on 
Bell’s interpretation by suggesting that the different colours correspond to different stages of life: 
blue represents dawning life, green connotes youth and growth, orange is the ‘high noon of 
existence’, etc.
478  Another interpretation can be gained by considering Coleridge’s Table Talk, 
which Poe references in Marginalia.  In his April 24, 1832 commentary on ‘Colours’ Coleridge 
states, ‘colours may be expressed by a heptad, the largest possible formula for things infinite, as 
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the pentad is the smallest possible form.  Indeed, the heptad of things infinite is in all cases 
reducible to the pentad’.
479  He then lists a heptad of colours, including blue, violet, orange, red, 
yellow, ‘green indecomponible’, and ‘green decomponible’ which approximately correspond 
with ‘The Masque’s’ coloured rooms of blue, violet, orange, green, purple, white, and black with 
window panes ‘a deep red colour’.
480  Similar to Emerson’s ‘Idealism’, Coleridge’s ‘Colours’ 
pantheistically limns a structure inclusive of absolute knowledge beyond empirical methodology 
– an inclusiveness enforced by his suggestion that the ‘tetrad’ of his structure ‘is the formula of 
God’ ‘and is, in reality, the same with, the Trinity’.
481 
In ‘The Over-soul’ Emerson draws a distinction between philosophers such as Spinoza, 
Kant and Coleridge, and others such as Locke, Paley, and Stewart, naming the former, teachers 
who ‘speak from within, or from experience, as parties and possessors of the fact; and the other 
class, from without, as spectators merely, or perhaps as acquainted of the fact on the evidence of 
third persons’.
482  This dichotomy between speaking from within or without is appurtenant to 
Emerson’s larger discussion about revelatory visions and their relation to the soul.  Emerson 
describes his concept of the Over-soul as the Unity ‘within which every man’s particular being is 
contained and made one with all other’.  Although physically we live in ‘division, in parts’, 
‘within man is the soul of the whole’, or the Over-soul.
483  Revelations are the ‘disclosure’ of the 
soul to ourselves, and Emerson defends their authenticity when he states, ‘the soul is the 
perceiver and revealer of truth.  We know truth when we see it, let sceptic and scoffer say what 
they choose [. . . .]  We know truth when we see it, from opinion, as we know when we are 
awake that we are awake’.
484  Evan Carton points out, though, the Emersonian revelation that 
one claims to witness must be a reality generated from without; yet when this revelation is to be 
communicated to others its authority and authenticity require it be spoken from within, from 
experience.  This necessary fluctuation of the revelatory vision between exterior and interior 
raises disturbing questions: ‘if the sacred teacher – the prophet, the poet – speaks from within as 
a possessor of the fact, does not this suggest that his “attitude of reception” during his visions 
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may be an attitude, a posture, assumed to disguise from himself his own manufacture of these 
visions’?
485    
Emerson projects this doubt onto the teachers who speak from without, calling them 
‘half-insane’ for their ‘fervent’ mysticism, ‘prophesying’, and ‘infinitude’ of thought.
486  Poe, 
however, turns this insanity back onto Transcendentalism when he says of Prospero, ‘there are 
some who would have thought him mad.  His followers felt that he was not.  It was necessary to 
see and hear and touch him to be sure that he was not’.
487  Prospero attempts to implement a 
structure inclusive of an ‘infinitude of thought’; and in attempting to attain this self-created 
absolute knowledge he also attempts to ascend over time and matter and ‘become immortal’, as 
emphasized in his effort to literally shut out mortality.  His attempts at immortality are 
undermined, though, by the limitations of empiricism, suggested by the necessity ‘to see and 
hear and touch him to be sure’ he is not ‘half-insane’.   
Referring back to the structure of the mask, we see how the seven rooms allegorize a 
discourse that grounds itself in absolute knowledge: first, the structure of the apartments suggests 
an empirical, sequential progression of measured knowledge: ‘the apartments were so irregularly 
disposed that the vision embraced but little more than one at a time.  There was a sharp turn at 
every twenty or thirty yards, and at each turn a novel effect’.
488  This empirical realm is in turn 
surrounded by another space, ‘a closed corridor which pursue[s] the windings of the suite’, that 
is not readily accessible but can be known via ‘stained glass windows’ and ‘projected’ rays.
489  
In other words, the apartments are structured conterminously with Emerson’s philosophy, with 
an empirical realm of Understanding, and a realm ‘beyond’ suggestive of Reason and the Over-
soul.  This correlation of the ‘closed corridor’ with spirituality is further implied by its braziers 
of fire resting on ‘tripods’ that recall the tetrad, or Trinity, as well as the projected light that 
‘produce[s]’ ‘gaudy and fantastic appearances’.
490  Throughout ‘The Masque’ the courtiers are 
depicted in chimerical terms, as ‘fantastic appearances’, ‘dreams’, ‘a multitude of dreams’, 
‘phantasms’, ‘delirious fancies’, and twice they are drawn as ‘taking hue from’ ‘the rooms’ and 
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‘many-tainted windows’.
491  As mere ‘productions’ of the light, the courtiers’ interiorities are, in 
effect, subsumed by a Transcendental vision reified by the apartments, their souls replaced by a 
material, artistic representation of the soul.  In this regard, the light from the ‘closed corridor’ 
ironically recalls Emerson’s definition of the Over-soul as a light ‘from within or from behind’ 
that ‘shines through us upon things, and makes us aware that we are nothing, but the light is 
all’.
492  Reduced to mere ephemera, the courtiers ironically literalize this description:  they are 
nothing, their essentiality subsumed by the light. 
Connected to Poe’s criticism of Emerson’s pantheistic discourse is the theme of 
sympathy.  Specifically, Poe presents Emerson’s ideas as preclusive of a true union with God 
through the Holy Spirit, with the dissolution of the maskers being a sign of their biblical 
punishment.  The most prominent signifier of this Providential punishment is the image of the 
clock.  In his description of sublime sounds that can ‘overpower the soul’, suspend its action’, 
and ‘fill it with terror’, Burke lists excessive ‘loudness’, and ‘the noise of vast cataracts, raging 
storms, thunder, or artillery’.  He also notes that few ‘things are more aweful [sic] than the 
striking of a great clock, when the silence of the night prevents the attention from being too 
much dissipated’.
493  Again, the Burkean sublime is associated with terror, but this terror can also 
be due to a confrontation with God.  As Burke explains this confrontation, ‘whilst we 
contemplate so vast an object, under the arm, as it were, of almighty power, and invested upon 
every side with omnipresence, we shrink into the minuteness of our own nature, and are, in a 
manner, annihilated before him’.
494  As a representation of sublimity, the ebony clock remains 
somewhat ‘beyond the bounds’ of the Prince’s artistic control; and this same characteristic can 
be attributed to the mummer who brings the Red Death, who emerges out of the ruminations that 
the clock induces, as stated: ‘And thus too, it happened, perhaps, that before the last echoes of 
the last chime had utterly sunk into silence, there were many individuals in the crowd who had 
found leisure to become aware of the presence of a masked figure which had arrested the 
attention of no single individual before’.
495   
This theme of Biblical punishment is suggested in the symptoms of the disease itself: 
‘Blood was its Avatar and its seal – the redness and the horror of blood.  There were sharp pains, 
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and sudden dizziness, and the profuse bleeding at the pores, with dissolution.  The scarlet stains 
upon the body and especially upon the face of the victim, were the pest ban which shut him out 
from the aid and from the sympathy of his fellow man’.
496  The symptom of blood easily recalls 
Christ-related themes, which are emphasized again in the description of the Red Death arriving 
like ‘a thief in the night’, which is a phrase used by St. Paul to describe Christ in Thessalonians:   
 
But of the times and the seasons, brethren, ye have no need that I write unto you.   
For your selves know perfectly that the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the 
night 
For when they shall say, Peace and safety; [sic] then sudden destruction cometh 
upon them, as travail upon a woman with child; and they shal [sic] not escape.   
But ye, brethren, are not in darkness, that that day shall overtake you as a thief.   
Ye are all the children of light, and the children of day: we are not of the night, 
nor of darkness.   
Therefore let us not sleep as do others; but let us watch, and be sober.   
For they that sleep, sleep in the night; and they that be drunken, are drunken in the 
night.   
But let us who are of the day, be sober, putting on the breast-plate of faith and 
love, and for an helmet, the hope of salvation.   
For God hath not appointed us to wrath; but to obtain salvation by Our Lord Jesus 
Christ,  
Who died for us, that whether we wake or sleep, we should live together with 
him.
497  
 
St. Paul’s passage warns against moral certainty and draws a distinction between the Christian 
‘brethren’ and the people of ‘darkness’ or ‘night’ – metaphorically those who do not find 
salvation in Christ – who believe themselves to live in ‘Peace and safety’ but will be punished on 
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the day of reckoning.  A similar warning, and description of Christ, is given by St. Paul in II 
Peter 3. 10-12: ‘But the day of the lord will come as a thief in the night; in which the heavens 
shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also 
and the works that are therein shall be burnt up’.
 498 
Direct analogies may be drawn between the Thessalonians and II Peter passages and ‘The 
Masque of the Red Death’.  Just as the people of the ‘night’ believe themselves to live in ‘Peace 
and safety’, the court of Prince Prospero finds ‘security’ within the castellated abbey; and just as 
the ‘day of the Lord’ comes to the people of ‘darkness’ as a ‘thief in the night’, so too does the 
Red Death come to the revellers.  Bringing Poe’s Biblical references to light not only calls into 
relief the Neoplatonism under-riding many of Poe’s tale, but associates the bodily dissolution 
and decay of the revellers with the precluded Holy Spirit, especially when considering the 
unredeemed body as described by Byles in Chapter Two.  The Scriptural passages also bring to 
‘The Masque’ a trope of undermined moral certainty which, when contextualized ideologically 
with Poe’s debate against Transcendentalism, lends itself to the debate against epistemological 
certainty as well.   
These Biblical references also foreground a more conservative theological view against 
Emersonian spirituality, particularly one that emphasizes a Christian salvation and charitable 
sympathy.  The theme of sympathy is also present in ‘The Masque’ through its allusion to The 
Tempest, a play in which sympathy is the foundation of its meaning.
499  Michael Neill notes that 
central to The Tempest is the figure upon which the notion of sympathy and redemption is 
founded, the Communion service – a service which in its Anglican form has a triple function: it 
is a memorial ceremony of Christ’s sacrifice; it is a ritual of repentance in which remembrance of 
sins leads to forgiveness; and finally, it celebrates, re-affirms, and re-integrates the Christian 
community.  Such Eucharistic tropes are clear in Prospero’s final request to the community of 
the audience to be ‘relieved by prayer’ ‘which frees all faults’, and his reminder, ‘as you from 
crimes would pardoned be, | Let your indulgence set me free’.
500  They are also evinced in 
Ariel’s feast, which is abruptly taken away from the three ‘men of sin’, Alonso, Sebastian and 
Antonio, before they are reminded of their misdeeds, thereby recalling the Book of Common 
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Prayer’s prohibition of evil-doers from the Eucharist prior to their repentance: ‘If among those 
who come to be partakers of the Holy Communion, the Minister shall know any to be an open 
and notorious evil liver, or to have done any wrong to his neighbours’ then the Minister warns 
him to ‘presume not to come to the Lord’s Table’, until he has ‘repented and amended his former 
evil life’.
501     
The theme of exemption from the Christian community through sin is evinced in ‘The 
Masque’ when Prince Prospero and his court forego sympathy towards their fellow men.  In 
doing so, they also forego salvation and suffer the fate of dissolution.  In the ‘Annihilation’ 
excerpt of Marginalia Poe links morality to dissolution when he puts forth ‘a very poetical and 
very suggestive, although, perhaps no very tenable philosophy, by supposing that the virtuous 
live while the wicked suffer annihilation hereafter’.  The possibility of annihilation ‘would be in 
the ratio of the sin’, and determined by the ‘proportion of dreamlessness’ in a sleep or swoon.  
Dreamless sleeps or utter unconsciousness ‘demonstrate the soul to have been then in such a 
condition that, had death occurred, annihilation would have followed’.  On the other hand, when 
revival is accompanied by a recollection of visions then ‘the bliss or wretchedness of the 
existence’ in the hereafter is ‘indicated by the character of the visions’.
502  The moral causation 
outlined in ‘Annihilation’ brings into relief a similar causation in ‘The Masque’; specifically, that 
the courtiers – the ‘multitude of dreams’ – are annihilated because they lack the Spiritual 
element, and thereby commit the sin of denying sympathy.  This morality underpinning the 
courtiers’ punishment is further emphasized when considering the American Book of Common 
Prayer’s definition of those who receive Communion as ‘partakers of the kingdom of Heaven’ – 
a definition coincident with I Corinthians 15: 48-50, as listed above, that those who do not find 
salvation in Christ ‘cannot share in God’s Kingdom’.
503  Within Poe’s philosophy of identity, the 
courtiers are ‘earthbound’ in both senses: they renege on their agency for expression and they 
lack the soul’s elevation through the Holy Spirit. 
While the morality implied in ‘The Masque’ may be read towards a general didactic 
purpose, textual evidence ties it to questions about sympathy in relation to Native Americans, 
                                                           
501 Neill, p. 47, and ‘The Order For The Administration of the Lord’s Supper, or Holy Communion’, in The 
Book of Common Prayer, and Administration of the Sacraments and Other Rites and Ceremonies of the 
Church, According to the Pentecostal Episcopal Church in the United States of America: Together With 
the Psalter, or Psalms of David, (New York: T. Allen, 1797) p. 1 of 16. 
502 Poe, Marginalia, p. 354-355. 
503 Book of Common Prayer, ‘Holy Communion’, p. 6 of 16. 141 
 
and, more implicitly, to a sense of colonial guilt: the allusions to The Tempest, with its New 
World setting; the use of the name Prospero; the Red Death as Caliban’s manifested curse; and 
Caliban’s centrality to Poe’s concept of Native Americans all point to a colonial context.  More 
obliquely, this context is further brought into relief when considering the Emersonian 
implications in the ‘Beauty’ that marks Prospero’s court.  While the narrator’s description of the 
court as containing Beauty connects ‘The Masque’ with Poe’s Neoplatonic theories, it also 
gestures toward tropes in the ‘Beauty’ chapter of Nature in which Emerson – despite rejecting 
Unitarianism – promotes a Lockean ideology.  Specifically, he outlines how the combination of 
human will with nature engenders an entitlement to property: ‘we are taught by great actions that 
the universe is the property of every individual in it.  Every rational creature has all nature for his 
dowry and estate.  It is his if he will’.  This romantic sense of entitlement is directly applied to 
America when Emerson limns Columbus as a man who ‘takes up the world into himself’ in 
accordance with his ‘constitution’: ‘When the bark of Columbus nears the shores of America; – 
before it, the beach lined with savages, fleeing out of all their huts of cane; the sea behind; and 
the purple mountains of the Indian Archipelago around, can we separate the man from the living 
picture?’.
504  Paul Giles notes that ‘romantic racialists’ such as Emerson ascribe characteristics to 
particular races, and in ‘Beauty’ this ascription is implied in the condition that allows one to 
claim nature as a dowry; in particular, like Poe, Emerson denies rationality to Native American 
populations in order to justify Anglo-American appropriation of the continent.
505  Despite its 
romantic presumptions, ‘Beauty’ is thereby ideologically slanted to promote America’s justified 
appropriation of tribal lands for the purpose of establishing property.  The fact that Poe is 
engaged with social phenomena of his particular historical moment, and that he mobilizes his 
tales and their allusions towards particular ideological ends immediately invalidates any 
argument that Poe is an ‘irresponsible referencer’, utilizing allusion for mere ornamentation.  
Instead, as ‘The Masque’ indicates, through his references Poe constructs an opacity that 
traduces an absolute certainty and in doing so draws attention to itself as a text figured by and 
embedded in debates about morality, sympathy, and epistemology.  This is not to assume that 
Poe’s conceptualization of Native Americans is not racially biased – it obviously is, and in its 
own way justifies American appropriation of the continent; but to dismiss his tales as lacking 
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‘moral depth’ is also to do them a disservice.  Analyzing his tales in relation to their ideological 
and epistemological contexts allows for a nuanced reading that sheds light on Poe’s idiosyncratic 
meanings.     
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Chapter Five: Essentiality and Prosthetic Masculinity 
in Poe’s ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ 
 
Introduction 
Like Colonel Johnson and Ransom Clarke, Brevet Brigadier General John A.B.C. Smith 
is an Indian fighter whose ‘shattered frame’ reveals a subjective instability related to the 
American struggle for land.  As the nameless narrator of ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ 
progresses in his knowledge quest to uncover the mystery of John A.B.C. Smith, his encounters 
with the gossipers of American high society are marked by allusions to European Renaissance 
and Romantic texts that bring into relief the colonial and identificatory concerns of early national 
America.  By connecting American subjectivities with European discourse, and underscoring the 
concatenations between a national ideology and the over-arching epistemologies that sustain it, 
Poe locates the genesis of American tropes within a more transatlantic context, and in this sense 
practices the ‘universality of mind’ recommended by Schlegel for the ‘true critic or connoisseur’, 
eschewing the early America’s project of literary nation building.  As J. Gerald Kennedy points 
out, early America was involved in an ‘invention of tradition’ between 1820 and 1850, 
constructing a distinct national identity through the production of books and magazines that 
extolled American history and themes: ‘early settlement, the border wars with native tribes, the 
Revolution, and the exploration of the West, as well as the official, public enshrinement of the 
Pilgrims and Plymouth Rock’ were often commemorated in order to establish a strong sense of 
national self.  Although faced with the ‘cultural pressure to construct a national narrative’, Poe 
disregarded such topics and ‘mocked the fetishizing of American subjects’.
506 One such 
fetishized subject Poe ‘de-mythologizes’ in ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ is that of the 
‘shattered’ Indian-fighter.  This is not to argue that bodies dismembered by colonial warfare are 
exceptionally American; but rather, that this trope becomes caught up in certain American 
context where it was displayed and extolled for political purposes, especially in relation to Indian 
Removal.  At the same time, though, by using a universal approach Poe is not necessarily 
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undermining the American context of male dismemberment caused by Indian warfare; as David 
S. Reynolds points out, early American writers ‘now recognized as “major” had, of course, a 
profound debt to classical literature; but the key factor to understand is that, unlike some of their 
contemporaries, they transformed classic themes and devices into truly American texts by fusing 
them with native literary materials’.
507  Like Herman Melville’s novel, Moby-Dick, which 
‘democratically encompasses a uniquely large number of antebellum textual strategies’ as well as 
classical and Shakespearian tropes, ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ grafts classical European with 
American depictions of identity and corporeal dismemberment.  Specifically, Poe limns the 
injured body as a paradoxical condition of being both a man and not a man, as opposed to a 
celebratory symbol for America’s predestined ownership of its territory, by tying a trope related 
to Indian warfare with European and English fictions – such as Shakespeare’s Othello, Byron’s 
Manfred, Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe – that depict the dismembered body as a frontier of 
epistemological limitation.  In doing so, he positions the disarticulate corpus of the Indian-fighter 
as a site where ideological narratives, and methods of knowing, lose coherence.  Combined with 
themes of epistemological limitation are the Neoplatonic tropes outlined in previous chapters that 
draw Smith’s disarticulate body as one that is lacking a Spiritual essence or elevated soul, as 
suggested by the dearth of sympathy shown to the ‘Kickapoos’ and by the disconnection between 
the female and male characters of ‘The Man That Was Used Up’; and this lack of an elevated 
soul also means an inability to claim the national territory by investing the land with the ‘poetic 
sentiment’ through labour.   
 
‘The Man That Was Used Up’ 
  An illuminating point of entry for discussing identity construction in ‘The Man That Was 
Used Up’ can be gained by studying Poe’s allusion to Othello in his inclusion of Iago’s 
statement, ‘—mandragora | Nor all the drowsy syrups of the world / Shall ever medicine thee to 
that sweet sleep | Which thou ow’dst yesterday!’.
508  Poe’s reasons for referencing Othello can be 
understood by again turning to Schlegel’s Lectures, particularly his discussion of Othello.  For 
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Schlegel, Othello is divided between ‘savagery’ and morality, and thereby ‘suffers as a double 
man; at once in the higher and lower sphere into which his being was divided’.
509  This division 
implies an imperial ideology that argues for the ‘inherent’ inability of the ‘savage’ races to attain 
morality or proper rationality.  As Schlegel notes, ‘We recognize in Othello the wild nature of 
that glowing zone which generates the most raging beasts of prey and the most deadly poisons, 
tamed only in appearance by the desire of fame, by foreign laws of honour, and by nobler and 
milder manners’.
510  In other words, Othello only has the ‘appearance’ of morality and rationality 
due to the influence of European Imperialism; and this mere appearance of civilized identity 
relates back to his inability to raise up his soul through Beauty and the Holy Spirit, as implied 
when Schlegel states that Othello’s jealousy ‘is not the jealousy of the heart, which is compatible 
with the tenderest feeling and adoration of the beloved object; it is of that sensual kind which, in 
burning climes, has given birth to the disgraceful confinement of women and many other 
unnatural usages’.
511  Not only is Othello unable to reach a closer union with God through the 
Spirit, as implied by his origins in a ‘savage’ society that confines women, but his identity is 
‘unnatural’, artificial, because it lacks the Spiritual ‘root’; as Schlegel states, ‘The Moor seems 
noble, frank, confiding, grateful for the love shown him; and he is all this’; however, ‘the mere 
physical force of passion puts in flight in one moment all his acquired and accustomed virtues, 
and gives the upper hand to the savage in him over the moral man’.
512  
  Poe relates Othello’s artificial, and ‘unnatural’, identity back to the construction of 
American manhood, which he sees as a constituted without an essential Spiritual grounding.  As 
outlined in previous chapters, Poe endorses America’s claim to the land so far as it is invested 
with labour as defined by Locke, especially privileging labour inspired by the ‘poetic sentiment’, 
because it facilitates the nation’s Spiritual ‘root’ and returns the land back to its Edenic 
condition.  Attainment of the national territory without the invested element of divinity creates a 
nation, and national subjects, that are themselves artificial, and the narrator of ‘The Man That 
Was Used Up’ finds this site of ‘unnaturalness’ at the end of his knowledge quest in the figure of 
General Smith.  In drawing the Indian-fighter as an artificial construct Poe implies that the 
process of attaining rights to the land through military force is negligible, because it does not 
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facilitate national Ideality.  This is not to argue that Poe endorses Native American rights to the 
land.  As stated, Poe perceives Native American ‘inherent’ irrationality as a disqualification from 
making a justified claim to the land, at least so far as that claim is based on essentiality.  
However, the fact that Poe perceives the military confiscation of Native American lands as 
‘unnatural’ ties into his own theologically-grounded philosophies that correlate Ideality, 
including national Ideality, to the Christian idea of the Holy Spirit.  In keeping with his idea that 
America has foregone its Spiritual ‘root’, Poe also feels that the nation has foregone the virtues 
associated with the Spirit, such as love, charity and a union with God, and the earthly, ‘deathly’ 
bodies are a sign of this essential lack.  In this regard, the body of General Smith is disarticulate, 
and foregoes divine essence, for two reasons: it has an unjustified claim to the national 
territories, and it is missing the essential and cohering Spiritual interiority that Poe associates 
with the Holy Spirit and an elevated soul.  
  Recalling Poe’s figuration of women as agents of soteriological completion for their male 
counterparts, Poe implies a Spiritual lack in American society by depicting a disconnection 
between the male and female characters: the narrator cannot communicate with Miss Tabitha T.; 
Kathleen O’Trump berates Mr. Tattles; Mrs. Pirouette criticizes the narrator while dancing; and 
the narrator thinks he is dialoguing with Miranda Cognoscenti about Smith when in fact she 
refers to Climax.
 513   This soteriological theme gains resonance when reading Misses Arabella 
Cognoscenti’s name as an allusion to John Winthrop’s sermon, ‘A Model of Christian Charity’, 
which was delivered on board the Arbella while on route to America.
514  In ‘A Model for 
Christian Charity’, Winthrop outlines a model for community bound by economic as well as 
sympathetic agency which is also organized around ideas related to the Holy Spirit and corporeal 
imagery.  Positing Scripture-based rules for lending and collecting debts, Winthrop also justifies 
charity and mercy, noting that ‘every seventh year the creditor was to quit that which he lent to 
his brother if he were poor as appears’.  Grounding ‘the practice of mercy according to the rule 
of God’s law’ is an ‘affection from which this exercise of mercy must arise’, or the fulfillment of 
the law through love.
515  Quoting the Bible to define Christian love as the ‘bond of perfection’, 
Winthrop uses corporeal tropes to illustrate love as the binding ‘ligament’ of community, 
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referring first to the Body of Christ and His church: ‘when Christ comes and by His spirit and 
love knits all these parts to Himself and each to other, it is become the most perfect and best 
proportioned body in the world’.  The transforming and binding properties of Christ’s love also 
apply to the formation of individuals: every man is born with the principle of Adam, to ‘love and 
seek himself only’ until Christ takes possession of the soul and infuses the principle of ‘love to 
God and our brother’.   When this occurs, the quality of love ‘works like the spirit on the dry 
bones.  Ezekiel 37: ‘“bone came to bone.”  It gathers together the scattered bones [. . .] and knits 
them again into one body again in Christ, whereby a man is become again a living soul’.  Finally, 
noting that the ‘ground of love is an apprehension of some resemblance in things loved to that 
which affects it’, Winthrop describes the binding qualities of love in personal inter-relationships 
with imagery connotative of marital undertones: when the soul ‘finds anything like to itself, it is 
like Adam when Eve was brought to him.  She must have it one with herself.  This is flesh of my 
flesh (saith the soul) and bone of my bone [. . . .  She] desires nearness and familiarity with it’.
516   
  In Captivity and Sentiment: Cultural Exchange in American Literature, 1682-1861, 
Michelle Burnham employs Winthrop’s tropes of debt and corporeality in her interpretation of 
Catharine Maria Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie, claiming that Magawisca’s unveiling of her missing 
limb confronts American readers with an ‘unobscured vision of cultural debt, of an unrepayable 
Indian dispossession’ as opposed to an ‘obscured scene of cultural loss’, and ‘the inevitability of 
Indian disappearance’.  Elaborating on debt and dispossession in the Jacksonian context, 
Burnham describes Andrew Jackson’s legal career as built on a ‘complete dismissal of John 
Winthrop’s rule of mercy, on the refusal to convert debt to loss’.  As a lawyer, Jackson 
represented creditors in their suits against debtors, and his own experience of paying off debts 
over several years left him with a life-long hatred for debt evaders.  In fact, ‘only Jackson’s 
obsession with debt equalled his obsession with Indian removal’.  Of course, debt and Indian 
removal were correlated because ‘Indian lands were repeatedly possessed in exchange for tribal 
debt’; and the market laws that justified Indian possession were characterized by a ‘passive 
inevitability’ that eliminated Anglo-American agency and ‘erased the guilt of accountability’.
517 
  While the question of colonial guilt and accountability are not immediately perceptible in 
‘The Man That Was Used Up’ these concerns are raised indirectly by way of reference.  The 
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narrator’s conversation with Miss Bas-Bleu alludes to both Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and 
Byron’s Manfred when they debate whether the ‘title of a certain poetical drama of Lord 
Byron’s’ is ‘Man-Fred or ‘Man-Friday’.
518  In Robinson Crusoe, the protagonist wavers about 
dispatching the cannibals, stating, ‘I had greatly scrupled the lawfulness of it to me, and my heart 
trembled at the thought of shedding so much blood, though it was my deliverance’.
519  Vis-à-vis 
Byron’s drama, Ernest Hartley Coleridge explains, ‘the motif of Manfred is remorse – eternal 
suffering for an inexpiable crime’.
520  When contextualized by New World colonialism, such 
depictions of guilt readily find an association in America’s troublesome relationship with its own 
land.  Bergland notes that while the history of Anglo and Native American contact is marred by 
‘murders, looted graves, illegal land transfers, and disruptions of sovereignty’, ‘land ownership 
may be the source of the nation’s deepest guilt’; and this sense of guilt related to America’s 
access to property is evinced in the construction of The Declaration of Independence.  Here, 
Jefferson alters Locke’s fundamental rights to ‘life, liberty, and property’ by replacing the 
concept of property with ‘the pursuit of happiness’.  This act of elision, an effective denial and 
repression of the importance of property to the republic, as well as an ironic indicator of its 
centrality, evinces directly the ‘vexed relationship the United States has to its own territory’.
521  
Specifically, America’s ownership of its own territory is ‘vexed’ because it is predicated on an 
‘inexpiable crime’: the theft of Indian lands.     
  Although Poe employs Winthrop’s ‘A Model of Christian Charity’ to indirectly allude to 
colonial guilt he also makes reference to it as an ironic foil to Jacksonian society.  While 
Winthrop conceives of a ‘city upon a hill’ bound by Christian love, Poe draws an America 
characterized by lack of affection and maliciousness: the narrator assaults Climax, swears at 
Sinivate, kicks Smith, and thinks Captain Mann ‘should have been both shot and hung’; and 
Smith barks racial epithets at Pompey.
522  This pettiness is compounded by inter-personal 
disconnection: Smith mistakenly calls the narrator Thompson, Mrs. Pirouette criticizes the 
narrator while dancing, and the narrator thinks he is dialoguing with Miranda Cognoscenti about 
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Smith when in fact she refers to Climax.
523  In short, Poe’s high society lacks the cohesion 
grounded in affection endorsed by Winthrop, and is composed metaphorically of ‘scattered 
bones’, or people who are not ‘living souls’.  In effect, it is what Winthrop warns against when 
he discusses the ‘city upon a hill’.  In ‘The Fashionable Thirties: Poe’s Satire in “The Man That 
Was Used Up”’, Ronald T. Curran corroborates the idea of a fractious community, noting that 
O’Trump and Pirouette are moves and steps rather than people, and that the society ‘tends to 
split into numerous parts.  Whether at the theater, the card party, or the dancing rout, the people 
play mechanical parts in the social mechanism’.  Curran also claims that in Poe’s ‘unmanly 
society’ ‘women are the custodians of the social graces [and] men are their willing pupils’ as 
they attempt social mobility.
524  However, considering ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ alongside 
Winthrop’s essay foregrounds a more profound lack of relationship between Poe’s men and 
women.  Specifically, the disjuncture between the sexes prohibits the soul from finding ‘anything 
like’, or ‘flesh of [her] flesh’ to be ‘one with herself’, thereby precluding the possibility of 
finding Spiritual completion.  By alluding to themes of Christian charity and the conversion of 
debt into loss, Poe alludes to colonial guilt and thereby points up America’s uncertain 
justification to land ownership and its corollary effect of destabilized identity. 
  Referring back to Schlegel’s interpretation of Othello as a man divided into the ‘higher’ 
and ‘lower’ spheres brings into relief another identity-related concern regarding Anglo-
America’s displacement of its Native American tribes, as well as its relationship with its African-
American populations.  Specifically, Schlegel implies an identificatory collapse between Othello 
and Iago, stating that Iago ‘pursues Othello like his evil spirit’, so that ‘it is if by means of an 
unfortunate affinity, founded however in nature, [his] influence was by necessity more powerful 
over him than the voice of his good angel Desdemona’.  The implication in this statement is that 
Iago takes the place of Othello’s spiritual mirror, and thus as an aspect of Othello himself.
525  
The collapse of identities between Iago and Othello has been noted by much contemporary 
scholarship: E.A.J. Honigmann asserts that despite their oppositionality, Elizabethan audiences 
would have found Othello and Iago alike in accordance with the psychology of humours, in 
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which jealousy and envy are closely associated.
526  In addition, they ‘both are professional 
soldiers who take their wives abroad on active service, feel betrayed by them, kill them, and thus 
in effect destroy themselves’.
527  Alice Walker and John Dover Wilson note Othello’s and Iago’s 
inter-changeability of language, stating, ‘it is now a commonplace criticism that in his spiritual 
downfall Othello speaks like Iago’: Othello’s allusions to foul toads and summer flies ‘belong to 
the period of his overthrow’, reflecting Iago’s ‘ascendancy over Othello’s soul, so that he begins 
to think in Iago’s images, to see the world with Iago’s eyes’.
528 Inversely, ‘Iago is so fired with 
his success that he borrows for a moment the highly metaphorical language of Othello’.
529  
Aligned with these tropes is Iago’s blurred delineation between self and other: ‘Were I the Moor, 
I would not be Iago; | In following him, I follow myself’, the repetitive, echoing dialogue 
between himself and Othello, and the undercurrents of sexual displacement manifested in Iago’s 
suspicions that Othello leapt into his ‘seat’ and did his ‘office’ ‘’twixt [his] sheets’.
530  While 
Othello’s and Iago’s antagonism is part of the ‘black/ white opposition’ ‘built into the play at 
every level’, when read in the context of ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ it corroborates a lack of 
delimitation between colonizer and colonized.
531  
This duality of the self in connection to themes regarding race is further alluded to in 
‘The Man That Was Used Up’ by Poe’s reference to Pierre Corneille’s Le Cid.
532 While the 
connection between Le Cid and Jacksonian American is faint, parallels of racial antagonism 
between the Castilians and Moors and Anglo and Native Americans may be drawn because both 
pairings are struggling over usurped territory.  In Le Cid, King Fernando says about the Moors: 
‘They cannot but with Jealouzy look on, | Seeing me rule in Andalouzia, | And this fair country, 
which I took from them, | Keepes their designs awake’.
533  Waged over this disputed land is a 
battle of identities between the self and self.  The opening epigram of ‘The Man That Was Used 
Up’ is spoken in Corneille’s drama by Cimera when she laments her father’s death at the hands 
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of her fiancé.  Poe’s translation as ‘Weep, weep my eyes!  It is no time to laugh, | For half myself 
has buried the other half’, and Joseph Ruther’s 1637 English translation of ‘Weepe, weepe, mine 
eyes, melt into tears my braine | Halfe of my life, the other halfe has slain’ outline an internal 
strife within the mind, or ‘braine’, between two constituting figures, in which one has ‘slaine’ or 
buried the other.
534   
On one hand, these tropes pertaining to a ‘black / white’ identificatory collapse and to a 
dipartite self can be read within a theological framework.  Recalling that Schlegel defines 
Othello as a ‘double man’ divided between the ‘higher and lower sphere’, Poe’s quotation from 
Le Cid can be read as a reflection of this spiritual division, with the one ‘half’ of the self, the self 
of the ‘lower sphere’, causing the destruction of the other half.  Read in this light, the destruction 
of John A.B.C. Smith is caused not only by the Kickpapoo Indians, but is a consequence of 
actions inspired by the ‘lower sphere of the self, the mortal, ‘unelevated’ soul that lacks 
rationality and charity.  In addition, this dipartite self is Poe’s commentary that the self is built on 
‘feet of clay’ without a spiritual essentiality, and in this sense undermines the pretence of a 
civilized self.  On the other hand, Poe’s references to Le Cid and Othello point up an anxiety 
about a lack of delimitations between the colonizing self and colonized other.  Specifically, if the 
self can be constructed like Othello’s, between a ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ sphere, and if Native and 
African Americans are characterized by this lower sphere, then the implication persists that 
civilized Anglo-America also shares an identificatory component with the ‘savage’ races and that 
this interior ‘savage’ could gain the ‘upper hand’ over the ‘moral man’.  This conflation between 
the ‘savage’ and the civilized grows even closer when considered within the ideological and 
political context in which property constitutes the self, and that during the course of Jackson’s 
democracy private property, including slaves, became the condition for voting privileges and full 
citizenship over land ownership.  These aspects related to private property, and the identificatory 
conflation between colonizer and colonized become significant in the final scene of the 
narrator’s knowledge quest to uncover the ‘mystery’ of John A.B.C. Smith.    
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The Narrator’s Knowledge Quest in ‘The Man That Was Used 
Up’ 
The epistemological theme in ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ is expressed in the 
narrator’s quest to find Smith’s true identity, with nationalistic discourse blocking the way to his 
goal.  This discursive obfuscation is suggested in ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ by the barrage 
of gossip the narrator penetrates in order to discover the truth about Smith.  As Poe says about 
the gossiper in Marginalia, ‘it was not properly said that “he commences his discourse by 
jumping in media res.”  For clearly, your gossiper commences not at all.  He is begun.  He is 
already begun.  He is always begun.  In the matter of end he is indeterminate’.
535  In relation to 
‘The Man That Was Used Up’, the narrator’s knowledge quest is also an attempt to penetrate an 
‘indeterminate’ discourse repelling him from true knowledge; and what this discourse blocks 
access to is a site of subjective anxiety.  Specifically, this site is the point where American 
justifications to its national territory falter, particularly, and in relation to Poe’s philosophy, 
because its claims to the land are based on worldly, material gain, and not an essentializing Ideal, 
Spiritual ‘root’.  As a subject defined by the national context drawn by Poe, the narrator also 
lacks the ability to achieve the soul’s elevation and understand Ideality.  Writing from within this 
perspective, Poe emphasizes his idea that ‘spirituality’ and ‘Ideality’ are things beyond 
epistemological categorization, particularly beyond epistemologies that emphasize specularity.  
What this means, is that for the narrator, concepts such as Spirituality or Ideality are experienced 
as nonexistence, death or mortality, and represent what epistemology always comes up against 
and fails to comprehend.     
  This connection between a knowledge system that emphasizes ocular evidence and an 
internalized site of mortality, or nonexistence, is suggested in the narrator’s initial encounter with 
General Smith.  As the General overwhelms and occupies the narrator’s mental focus, his 
impressive outward appearance is described in terms of negative comparison: his hair is the ‘no 
color’ of ‘jetty black’, his whiskers are ‘unimaginable’, his mouth is ‘unequalled’, and the legs 
are ‘ne plus ultra’ of good legs.
536  Smith has ‘neither too much flesh nor too little – neither 
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rudeness nor fragility’.
537  This paradoxical conflation between presence and anti-presence not 
only foreshadows the narrator’s final discovery that Smith’s exteriority is composed around 
nothing, or an ‘exceedingly odd-looking bundle of something’, but recalls the unthoughtlike 
thoughts and thoughts of thoughts Poe denotes in Eureka in reference to his concept of 
Attraction, or the interconnectedness of all matter in the universe.    
For Poe, the Universe originated from an original, unary particle that God willed into 
being then diffused into Multiplicity: ‘All Things and All Thoughts of Things, with all their 
ineffable Multiplicity of Relation, sprang at once into being from the primordial and irrelative 
One’.
538  The counter reaction of this ‘Big Bang’ theory is that the Multiplicity of particles 
gravitate ‘each to each’, as opposed to a geographical centre,
539 as they attempt to rejoin the ‘lost 
parent’ of the principle Unity.  As Poe explains, ‘every atom of every body attracts every other 
atom, both of its own and of every other body’, thereby resulting in a ‘sympathy’ of each atom 
with ‘every other atom, and with each and with all at the same time, and for ever, and according 
to a determinate law of which the complexity [. . .] is utterly beyond the grasp of the imagination 
of man’.  Since such concepts cannot be imagined in their entirety, Poe refers to them as an 
unthoughtlike thoughts.
540   These unthoughtlike thoughts juxtapose thoughts of thoughts, or 
signifiers standing in for what cannot be understood.  Taking as examples ‘infinite’, ‘God’, and 
‘spirit’, Poe explains that such terms are ‘by no means the expression of an idea, but of an effort 
at one’, standing ‘for the possible attempt at an impossible conception.  Man needed a term by 
which to point out the direction of this effort – the cloud behind which lay, for ever invisible, the 
object of this attempt’.
541   
While these unthoughtlike thoughts and thoughts of thoughts reflect ‘scientific’ 
meditations, they also foreground epistemological limitations by ‘pointing out the direction’ to 
an exteriority of knowledge systems.  Poe posits an inimicality between ‘intuition’ – or the 
‘conviction resulting from deductions or inductions of which ‘the processes [are] so shadowy as 
to’ escape ‘consciousness’, elude ‘reason’, and defy ‘expression’ – and inductive reasoning, 
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which stifles ‘intuitive leaps’ through its emphasis on sensory, empirical means.
 542  Taking 
particular issue with the deductive reasoning of Jeremy Bentham Mill, Poe attempts to 
destabilize the validity of Mill’s deductive axioms by questioning inherent unquestionability: 
citing Mill’s axiom that the ‘ability or inability to conceive [. . .] is in no case to be received as a 
criterion for axiomatic truth’, Poe considers it alongside the ‘unquestionable’ ‘quintessence of 
axiomatic undeniability’, namely that ‘contradictions cannot both be true --  that is, cannot 
coexist in nature’; for example, ‘a tree must be either a tree or not a tree [. . .] it cannot be at the 
same time a tree and not a tree’, the reason being, ‘because we find it impossible to conceive that 
a tree can be anything else than a tree or not a tree’.
543  However, if the ‘ability or inability to 
conceive, is in no case to be taken as a criterion for axiomatic truth’, then, according to Poe, all 
Mill’s argumentation is ‘at sea without a rudder’, because it fails to encompass an impossible 
paradox.
544  For Poe, then, epistemology reaches its limit at the site of such paradoxes that it 
cannot encompass.                         
  Depicted as a man and not a man, Smith stands at an epistemological limit, the unity of a 
man formed from multiple parts around a ‘nondescript’, a hybrid of what can and cannot be 
known.  Indicating Smith’s hybrid status is the gap between his emphatic remarkability and the 
narrator’s inability to determine why he is indeed remarkable.  While the narrator notes that 
Smith is ‘a remarkable man – a very remarkable man – indeed one of the most remarkable men 
of the age’, he cannot specify what that ‘remarkable something’ is or the ‘odd air of je ne sais 
quoi which hung about’ the General.
545  This inability to comprehend the ‘whole’, ‘entire 
individuality’ of Smith hints at an inherency located beyond an ocular rational knowledge 
system.
546  Correlating this inherency with America’s struggle for land are the comments and 
mannerisms of the narrator’s ‘kind friend’ who, after explaining how Smith earned his heroic 
reputation in ‘the late tremendous swamp-fight, away down south, with the Bugaboo and 
Kickapoo Indians’, ‘open[s] his eyes to some extent’.
547  In mentioning the Kickapoos and 
swamp-fight the friend recalls the Second Seminole War, a bitter, drawn-out conflict resultant 
from Jackson’s Removal Policy, while ‘opening his eyes to some extent’ ironically calls into 
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relief the limit of a knowledge system that emphasizes ocular evidence.
548  The fusion of these 
two tropes together implies that the site inaccessible to, and blocked by, epistemology is related 
to the national struggle for land.  More specifically, though, the association of the obfuscating 
discourse with the jingoism of ‘blood and thunder, and all that!’ implies an ideological blocked 
reflexivity that prohibits cognizance of the site of subjective nonentity, or subjective uncertainty, 
for nationalistic ends.
 549  In this regard, the interruptive word ‘Man’, with all its denotations of 
rationality, property ownership, and national belonging, is metonymic for the influx of screening 
‘knowledge’, such as the ‘greater general information’ and ‘points of mechanical invention’ the 
General’s monologue ‘invariably comes back to’ when the narrator attempts to understand ‘the 
mysterious circumstances attending the Bugaboo war’.
550  
  Yet while this internalized site of nonentity is precluded from rational understanding Poe 
still connects it to the subject as written within an ideological and epistemological framework.  
The narrator’s statement, ‘she went on, and I – I went off’ and repetition of the phrase ‘tête-à-
tête’ imply a doubled self, while the phrase ‘will I nill I’ implies a self conjoined with a site of 
nonexistence, recalling the internal conflict suggested by Le Cid.
 551  The narrator’s knowledge 
quest also reiterates the void/ existence conjuncture because it begins with reference to mortality 
and culminates in corporeal reconstruction, thereby allegorizing the construction of the 
‘artificial’ self around the mortal, unredeemed soul.  The scene of mortality that commences the 
knowledge quest is implied when the narrator converses with Miss Tabitha T. and is interrupted 
by the Reverend Doctor Drummummupp’s Biblical citation of Job 14:1-2: ‘man that is born of a 
woman hath but a short time to live; he cometh up and is cut down like a flower!’.
 552  While the 
reference to Job foregrounds mortality, the citation itself holds secondary implications related to 
death when considering the context in which it was commonly used.  Specifically, ‘The Order 
for the Burial of the Dead’ in the American version of The Book of Common Prayer instructs 
recitation of Job 14:1-2 when ‘the Corps is made ready to be laid in the Earth’, thereby 
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emphasizing tropes of the Adamic, mortal soul.
553  The full passage from which Poe borrows 
includes the statement ‘in the midst of life we are in death’, further underscoring a life/ death 
symbiosis; and these funerary undertones are deepened by the narrator’s puns that he ‘shudders 
recalling’ (horesco referens) and does not ‘scruple to seize’.
 554  The knowledge quest builds on 
this site of mortality in its progression to the Rantipole Theatre, ‘setting up’ a parallel between 
identities constructed around nonexistence and performed characters lacking real interiority.  
During the card game with this Mrs. Kathleen O’Trump, subjective lack of interiority is again 
suggested when Mr. Tattle has ‘no hearts’, while the unification between existence and mortality 
is reiterated in O’Trump’s status as a widow, a suggestion that her ‘other half’ is ‘buried’.
 555 
  Bringing into relief and emphasizing the site of the mangled body as an epistemological 
border, as well as themes pertaining to the futility of attempting to locate certainty beyond 
empirical – especially ocular – means, is Poe’s reference to Othello.
 556  Similar to the nameless 
narrator, Othello is also on a knowledge quest to locate absolute evidence that could quell 
anxiety by providing epistemological closure and, more specifically, identificatory grounding: 
just as the narrator is put ‘into a pitiable state of agitation’ when confronted with ‘the slightest 
appearance of mystery – of any point [he] cannot exactly comprehend’, Othello ‘cannot bear to 
let things remain vague and undetermined.  He must know.  This is his anxiety’, especially as it 
relates to Desdemona’s fidelity and by extension, his own identity as a rational man.
557  
However, Othello’s quest for absolute knowledge fails because of a methodology that 
emphasizes ocular evidence.  As Othello states, ‘I’ll see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove’ for 
‘to be once in doubt | Is once to be resolved’.
558  Iago perverts Othello’s system of knowledge, so 
that ‘in the event, he sees nothing definitive’.
559  He forces Othello to rely on ‘imputation and 
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strong circumstances’, claiming it would be ‘impossible he should see’ ocular proof of her 
fidelity: ‘Would you, the supervisor, grossly gape on?  Behold her topped?’.
560  
Representing the limit of Othello’s epistemology is Desdemona’s body, an ‘object’ of 
study from which Othello attempts to derive an absolute meaning.  As Elizabeth Gruber points 
out, the violent deaths of women in Othello are ‘crucial to the “discovery” of knowledge’.
561  
While questions regarding the identity, existence and essence of women are raised in 
‘calumniated-woman plays’, the real emphasis is ‘upon the torment and desire of man: it is his 
knowledge’ ‘that defines the epistemological journey’, and it his proper subjectivity that allows 
him to target a ‘feminized’ object ‘of knowledge’.
562  According to Gruber, Othello is annoyed 
that ‘Desdemona’s body displays no outward signs of infidelity – despite his efforts to read the 
word “whore” on her flesh’, and his knowledge quest, in a sense, is a demand for his wife’s body 
to ‘be turned inside out, so that [her] presumed transgressions can be displayed’.
563  Such 
demands to read interiority of meaning through Desdemona’s dismemberment are suggested in 
Othello’s threats to ‘tear her all to pieces!’ and ‘chop her into messes’.
564  However, Othello’s 
demand to find meaning inside his wife’s disarticulate body is also a desire to find the spiritual 
completion of the self, because Desdemona is also appurtenant to the completion of his own 
identity as a man; as Iago notes, ‘Our general’s wife is now the general’ for he ‘hath devoted and 
given | up himself to the contemplation, mark and denotement of her | parts and graces’.
565       
  When read against Poe’s text, Othello brings into relief important themes also evinced in 
‘The Man That Was Used Up’: like Othello, the narrator’s knowledge quest is limited by a 
knowledge system that emphasizes ocular evidence; he is frustrated that the anxious ‘mystery’ of 
Smith’s appearance is not immediately knowable; and his revelation of knowledge is correlated 
with a body torn ‘all to pieces’.  However, even when the narrator comes to the site of 
disarticulation and ‘stagger[s] into an armchair’ with ‘staring eyes’, the truth of what Smith’s 
overwhelming presence occludes still cannot be fully known; namely, the narrator discovers the 
‘nondescript’, something which literally cannot be remarked upon, and around which Smith’s 
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identity is constructed.
 566  This ‘nondescript’ represents an interior site of nonentity, or death, 
replacing the divine aspect, and also signifying the point where subjectivity becomes ungrounded 
without the vital and cohering link of property.  In this regard, the ‘nondescript’ recalls 
Johnson’s wound – the death wound that will not bring death – because it symbolizes a 
paradoxical point that epistemological systems cannot fully encompass as well as a condition 
that national ideology will not allow to be known: that of being both a subject and not a subject, 
or a man and not a man.  In a sense, although internalized, the ‘nondescript’ represents an 
epistemological frontier where national discursive identity becomes ungrounded, as evinced 
through discussion of the various textual references Poe ties to the American trope of the ‘used 
up’ self.      
When analyzing epistemological frontiers as indicative of the limits of discursive 
identity, and how these frontiers and limitations coincide with an American disjuncture from the 
land in ‘The Man That Was Used Up’, a point of interpretive access to Poe’s tale is his reference 
to Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and the manner in which he conflates it with Byron’s Manfred: 
when Miss Bas-Bleau exclaims ‘It’s Man-Fred, I say, and not at all by any means Man-Friday’ 
the narrator disputes her point, deciding that ‘the true title’ ‘of a certain poetical drama of Lord 
Byron’s’ is actually ‘Man-Friday’.
567  In ‘The Fashionable Thirties: Poe’s Satire in “The Man 
That Was Used Up”’, Ronald T. Curran notes that the confusion between titles reflects a ‘literary 
controversy’ within superficial society that ‘cannot keep [its] titles and characters straight’, and 
flaunts its ‘contemporary tast[es]’ for ‘romances and stories of adventure and travel [that] had 
begun to replace poetry and didactic essays in the 30s and 40s’.
568  While the title ‘mix-up’ does 
indicate a bemused, superficial society, it also has a secondary meaning; namely that the inter-
changeable titles indicate thematic similarities between the texts, and that by suggesting the ‘true 
title’ of Byron’s work is actually ‘Man-Friday’, the ‘true meaning’ of Manfred lies in Crusoe’s 
colonial relationship with the Native American Other.   
  Byron’s Manfred brings into relief Poe’s own concerns regarding identity as determined 
by epistemological limitations, and sites of non-entity, most prominently associated with death, 
located within the self.  As Ernest Hartley Coleridge notes, ‘Byron’s Manfred is “in the 
succession” of scholars who have reached the limits of natural and legitimate science, and who 
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essay the supernatural in order to penetrate and comprehend the “hidden things of darkness”’.
569 
This tension between ‘the limits of natural and legitimate science’ and the ‘things of darkness’ is 
appurtenant to the over-arching theme that the continual accumulation of knowledge obfuscates 
one’s own mortality: as the First Destiny says, ‘knowledge is not happiness, and science | But an 
exchange of ignorance for that | Which is another kind of ignorance’; and Manfred reiterates this 
theme in his statement, ‘I plunged amidst Mankind – Forgetfulness | I sought in all, save where 
‘tis to be found – | and that I have to learn – my Sciences, | My long pursued and superhuman 
art’.
570  In other words, ‘sciences and art’ are only ‘ignorance’ and ‘forgetfulness’ of the more 
profound ignorance and forgetfulness of non-existence.  Manfred’s desire to break his 
epistemological ‘ignorance’ and affront ‘Death’ manifests in a ‘death wish’ in which he craves 
‘self-oblivion’ but is always held back by ‘a single hair’ that does ‘not break’; yet when he does 
broach the frontiers of mortality and knowledge he finds the sites marked by disarticulate bodies: 
in ‘the caves of Death’ Manfred draws ‘Conclusions most forbidden’ from the ‘withered bones, 
and skulls, and heaped up dust’; and when it is his time to expire he tells the Spirit, ‘what ye take 
| shall be ta’en limb by limb’.
571   
  By referencing Manfred Poe establishes a thematic parallel between his own and Byron’s 
texts, namely with regard to how the limit of epistemologically defined identity is represented by 
sites of death and indicated by the disarticulate body.  In ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ this 
identificatory and epistemological limit is marked by Smith.  Described as an ‘exceedingly odd-
looking bundle of something’ and ‘the nondescript’, Smith is literally a ‘point [one] cannot 
exactly comprehend’, and thereby eludes systems of knowledge.
572  What can be remarked upon, 
and what makes Smith ‘one of the most remarkable men of the age’, are the artificial signifiers 
that constitute his body: the ‘cork leg’ ‘screwed on in a trice’, the ‘shoulders and bosom’ slipped 
over his frame, his ‘capital scratch’ from De L’Orme’s, his ‘good set’ of teeth, and an eye that 
needs to be screwed in.
573  This conflation between the remarkable and inexplicable constitutes 
Smith as representative of an impossible site – a ‘je ne sais quoi’ – against which language and 
knowledge constantly come up, but cannot encompass; and, alluding again to Manfred, he is a 
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hybrid of not only what can and cannot be known, but life and death as well.  Recalling  
Hamlet’s meditation on Yorick’s skull, when he states, ‘now get you to my lady’s chamber, and 
tell her, | let her paint an inch thick’, implying that life is painted around the kernel of the 
ultimate unknown, death, Smith is also constructed around an unknown nothingness, or 
‘nondescript’.
 574 Indeed, John A.B.C. Smith’s name itself implies the beginning of language and 
knowledge, suggesting that he represents the point where language is fused with nothingness or 
nonentity; and this life/ death conflation is furthered in Manfred’s description of himself as ‘A 
blighted trunk upon a curséd root, | Which but supplies a feeling to Decay – | And to be thus, 
eternally but thus’.
575  
  Poe transports Manfred’s disarticulate bodies to a colonial context by way of Robinson 
Crusoe, allusively collapsing the two texts in the narrator’s discussion with Miss Bas-Bleau, and 
conflating Manfred’s tropes with the Lockean conceptions of property and self that figure in 
Defoe’s novel.  Of especial significance to Defoe’s text are Locke’s ideas concerning ownership 
of property through the investment of labor.  Crusoe echoes Locke’s idea that the God-given 
right to create property from Nature extends as far as one can enjoy and ‘make use of it to any 
advantage of life before it spoils’ when he says, ‘that all the good things of this world are of no 
further good to us, than as they are for our use: and that whatever we heap indeed to give to 
others, we enjoy as much as we can use and no more’; and he creates items of use through his 
investment of labor, such as the ‘abundance of things’ made from his ‘infinite labour’, or the 
plank boards made by investing ‘time and labour’.
576  Crusoe also extends his ‘right of 
possession’ over the land he utilizes and cultivates, referring to himself as the ‘king and lord of 
all this country indefeasibly’ and noting ‘I might call myself king or emperor over the whole 
country which I had possession of; there was no rival; I had no competitor, none to dispute 
sovereignty or command with me’.
577  By asserting this right of possession over the island 
Crusoe enacts the Lockean tenet that when one subdues the land he ‘annex[es] to it something 
that [is] his Property, which another [has] no Title to, nor could without injury take from him’.
578   
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  Crusoe’s assumptions to possession are unsettled, however, when the discovery of a 
savage’s footprint makes him feel ‘like a man perfectly confused and out of’ himself, ‘not 
feeling’ ‘the ground’ he ‘went on’.
579  Here, Crusoe experiences feelings of subjective 
incoherence, of being ‘confused and outside himself’, when a ‘competitor’ troubles his sense of 
sole possession of the island.  This Other presence is immediately associated with subjective 
annihilation, or being ‘used up’, and property loss, as noted by Crusoe’s reflections on the 
footprint: 
 
Then terrible thoughts racked my imagination about [the savages] having found my boat, 
and that there were people here; and that if so, I should certainly have them come again in 
greater numbers and devour me; that if it should happen so that they should not find me, 
yet they would find my enclosure, destroy all my corn, carry away all my flock of tame 
goats, and I should perish at last for mere want.
580  
 
Crusoe’s fears of corporeal annihilation and loss of sole possession of the island are physically 
symbolized when he comes upon, ‘skulls, hands, feet and other bones of human bodies’ at ‘a 
place where there had been a fire made, and a circle dug in the earth, like a cock-pit, where it is 
supposed the savages had sat down to their inhuman feastings’.
581  This connection between 
physical annihilation and property loss is explicitly linked with national struggles for sovereignty 
when Crusoe asks, ‘Well, Friday, and what does your nation do with the men they take?  Do they 
carry them away and eat them as these do?’ Friday answers, ‘Yes, my nation eat mans too, eat all 
up’.
582  The connection between national dominance and physical dismemberment is repeated 
when Crusoe explains that the savages ‘never eat any men, but such as come to fight with them, 
and are taken in battle’, and mentioned again when a beach ‘covered with human bones, the 
ground dyed with blood’ and ‘great pieces of flesh left here and there, half-eaten, mangled, and 
scorched’ represent a savage nation’s ‘triumphant feast’ and ‘victory over their enemies’.
583  This 
correlation between devoured bodies and national dominance is emphasized further when Crusoe 
and Friday pass over the border zone between Spain and France and are attacked by 
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anthropomorphized wolves who devour a man’s head and ‘upper part of his body’, and charge, 
‘roaring and open-mouthed to devour’ an unsettled Crusoe who worries about being ‘torn to 
pieces’.
584  Corporeal dismemberment and annihilation in Robinson Crusoe thereby represent not 
only property loss, but a national struggle in which the loser is devoured, metaphorically 
consumed, and incorporated into a larger, more powerful country.  Through this process of 
domination ‘the savage’ is economically incorporated as a slave and property, positioned in a 
Europeanized order of signification and knowledge, and subjected in a Master-slave dialectic.
585  
As Crusoe states, Friday ‘made all the signs to me of subjection, servitude, and submission 
imaginable, to let me know how much he would serve me as long as he lived’.
586   
  Crusoe conceals the dismembered bodies because they indicate the point where his right 
to the land and property is contested and denaturalized; specifically, he has Friday hide the 
disarticulate bodies, or ‘bury the barbarous remains of [the cannibals’] barbarous feast’, because 
he ‘could not bear to see them’.
587  As Crusoe states, Friday ‘defaced the very appearance of the 
savages being there; so that when I went by again, I could scarce know where it was’.
588  When 
we foreground how the disarticulate body as a representation of disrupted colonial assumptions 
to the land is repressed by Crusoe, we see where Poe links Defoe’s text with Byron’s Manfred.  
Just as the ‘withered bones’ and ‘skulls’ indicate ‘conclusions most forbidden’ for Manfred, 
Crusoe attempts to hide the ‘great pieces of flesh left here and there, half-eaten, mangled, and 
scorched’ because they indicate the possibility of dispossession from his property and the 
denaturalization of coherent subjectivity.  By conflating Manfred’s knowledge quest for the 
‘dark things’ beyond epistemological limitations with Crusoe’s repression of the disarticulate 
body, Poe indicates that ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ is also structured as a knowledge quest to 
discover the ‘forbidden’ site where American subjectivity falls apart against the impossible 
‘nondescript’ that is inaccessible to knowledge.  That this ‘nondescript’ is internal to the self is 
suggested by reference to Manfred, who also positions ‘decay’ or death, the ultimate unknown to 
epistemology, within the self, while its relation to the colonial struggle for land is indicated by 
the reference to Robinson Crusoe.  For Poe, then, the point of nonentity around which identity is 
constructed is obscured from the self by the very epistemologies that constitute the self, thereby 
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precluding any totalizing self-knowledge; or as Manfred states, men are ‘half dust, half deity’ 
until ‘Mortality predominates, | And men are – what they name not to themselves’.
589   
  While the final scene of the narrator’s knowledge quest correlates Smith’s dismembered 
body with epistemological limitation, it also ties together thematic strands related to: subjectivity 
as contingent on property ownership, the destabilization of national identity due to a disrupted 
relationship with the land, and the lacking theologically-defined essentiality of the self.  In one 
respect, Smith’s reconstitution through designer prosthetics by ‘Pettit’, ‘Ducrow’, ‘Thomas’, etc., 
and by his servant, Pompey, relates to contemporary debates about private property, instead of 
land ownership, becoming the new requisite in Jacksonian democracy for full suffrage and 
citizenship.  Smith’s literal reconstruction by his private property separates him from the spark of 
divinity that Poe sees as appurtenant to the investment of poetic labour into the land.  This 
reconstruction by private property points as well to a racial identificatory collapse between 
Anglo- and African-Americans based on the Lockean ideology that property constitutes the self; 
and this collapse can tie into fears about the ‘savage’, or ‘lower sphere’ gaining the ‘upper hand’ 
over the ‘moral man’.  The idea of the ‘lower sphere’ usurping the ‘moral man’ may be more 
fully brought to light by considering paragraphs edited from modern versions of ‘The Man That 
Was Used Up’, but included in the original publications from 1839 to 1842.  These paragraphs 
follow Smith’s statement, ‘I really believe you don’t know me at all’: 
 
‘No – no – no!’ said I, getting as close to the wall as possible, and holding up both 
hands by way of expostulation; ‘don’t know you – know you – know you – don’t know 
you all!  Where’s your master?’ here I gave an impatient squint towards the negro, still 
keeping a tight eye on the bundle. 
‘He! he! he! he-aw! he-aw! he-aw!’ cachinnated that delectable specimen of the 
human family, with his mouth fairly extended from ear to ear, and with his forefinger 
held up close to his face, and levelled at the object of my apprehension, as if he were 
taking aim at it with a pistol. 
‘He! He! He! He-aw! he-aw! he-aw! – What, you want Mass Smif?  Why, dar’s 
him!’.
590 
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The uncertainty between colonizer and colonized is emphasized in the edited paragraphs when 
the narrator looks at both the servant and the ‘bundle’ and asks, ‘Where’s your master?’, while 
Pompey’s action of levelling his ‘forefinger’ at Smith as though ‘taking aim’ with a ‘pistol’ 
exemplifies the ‘lower sphere’ of the self gaining the ‘upper hand’.  That Pompey represents the 
‘lower’ aspects of the self is given in his exaggeratedly dehumanized condition, with his donkey-
like laugh, and the narrator’s ironic reference to him as a ‘delectable specimen of the human 
family’, while Smith’s invectives against Pompey indicate his desire to deny the ‘savage’, 
‘lower’, and irrational aspect of his self.  The violence implied in Smith’s language to Pompey 
reflects not only America’s campaign against the ‘Bugaboos’, or ‘irrational fears’, but speaks to 
the theological crux of Poe’s tale: that is, the ‘lower sphere’ of the human soul needs to be 
elevated through love and charity in order to reach the cohering and immortalizing Ideality.  
Suppression of the ‘savage’ aspects of the self without the elevating powers of the Holy Spirit, or 
what Schlegel would term ‘religion’, establishes a false, artificial self without a naturalizing 
‘root’.  Again, though, Poe paints this violence and suppression as characteristic of American 
society as a whole, and just as Smith tries to deny the ‘lower’ aspects of his own identity, the 
narrator tries to deny the constructed, artificial nature of himself by denying Smith, telling him, 
‘No – no – no! [. . .] don’t know you – know you – know you – don’t know you all!’, in response 
to Smith’s repeated question, ‘Strange you shouldn’t know me though, isn’t it?’.
591  In spite of 
the narrator’s denial, though, the echoing dialogue between himself and Smith underscores their 
connection: when Smith states that he swallowed his teeth ‘when the big Bugaboo rammed me 
down with the butt end of his rifle’, the narrator repeats, ‘Butt end! ram down!! my eye!!’, to 
which Smith echoes, ‘O yes, by the by, my eye’.
592   
What is also noteworthy in Pompey’s implied act of violence is the way it recollects 
Ransom Clarke’s final wound by the African-American fighter during the Dade Ambush, 
connecting Smith’s condition to a site where the nation’s ownership of its territory is uncertain, 
as well as to the correlated recurrent trope in early American literature of corporeal 
dismemberment.  This connection is furthered when Smith lays the blame for his mangled 
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condition at the feet of the Kickapoos and Bugaboos who broke his teeth, gouged his eye, and 
‘took the trouble to cut off at least seven eighth of [his] tongue’.
593  Yet while Smith’s mangled 
body marks America’s unstable right to its lands, his reconstruction by his slave Pompey means 
that he is also literally realized by his property, signifying that his property must still be 
inalienable.  By existing as both a subject and not a subject, or both a man and a ‘used up’ man, 
Smith is a creation of the same discourse that writes figures such as Colonel Johnson and 
Ransom Clarke, those whose perpetually wounded conditions signify a national anxiety 
surmounted by a natural ‘manliness’ that stems from their proximity to their own land; and this 
dipartite existence is re-emphasized by the hyphenated statement that implies a doubled self, 
‘Brevet Brigadier-General John A.B.C. Smith was the man – was the man that was used up’.
594  
Poe thereby employs the trope of being ‘used up’ to illustrate the paradoxical condition of being 
an American subject, of having a predestined right to the land as well as an anxiety that the 
property is not rightfully owned. 
 
Conclusion   
  In writing about ‘used up’ identity, Poe connects Brevet-Brigadier General John A.B.C. 
Smith with a trope repeated throughout colonial and early national American literature that 
indicates a national struggle for land as well as a battle to naturalize rational subjectivity.  
However, as indicated by Emmons’s Tecumseh, to be ‘used up’ also means to have no rightful 
claim to the New World.  By depicting Smith as ‘used up’, and suggesting that ideological 
discourse obfuscates this site where white, rational identity comes apart, Poe indicates that 
American attempts to naturalize assumptions to its territories always-already fail and the national 
subject can only surmount and ‘bury’ the site where it loses coherence.  Again, though, this is not 
to overly modernize Poe: this national failure to naturalize occurs because it lacks an essential 
element.  In ‘Dissemination’, Homi Bhabha explains how the act of writing the nation involves a 
splitting of its ‘nation-people’ into, at once, the historic and staticized objects of a narrative that 
grounds authority from ‘the pre-given or constituted historical origin in the past’, and the 
subjects that must turn the ‘scraps, patches and rags of daily life’ into a contemporary ‘coherent 
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national culture’ that obfuscates ‘any prior or originary presence of the nation-people’ in order to 
write itself as modern.
595  In ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ a splitting of the national subject also 
occurs, between the cohesive, contemporary narrator and his disarticulate reflection who cannot 
properly claim the land, whose identity is ultimately grounded on nothing but an ‘odd-looking 
bundle of something’, and who, in short, cannot articulate the cultural ‘scraps, patches and rags’ 
into a coherent national self.  By depicting this site that Jacksonian America attempts to bury, 
Poe disrupts the project of nation-building and marks where ideology and subjectivity are ‘used 
up’. 
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Chapter Six: Disarticulate Masculinity and Poe’s 
Polemic Against Pantheism in The Narrative of Arthur 
Gordon Pym of Nantucket 
 
Introduction 
 
After the death of the Jane Guy’s crew on Tsalal, Pym walks through a ravine and 
observes that the ‘place was one of singular wildness, and its aspect brought to my mind the 
description given by travellers of those dreary regions marking the site of some degraded 
Babylon’.
596  Pym’s comparison of Tsalal with ‘degraded Babylon’ alludes to the Whore of 
Babylon in Revelations, or the judgement of the ‘great whore that sitteth upon many waters’, 
who is also called ‘the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth’.
597  The Whore of 
Babylon has several metaphoric meanings: as a harlot, she represents ‘false religion and all the 
social practices involved in it’; simultaneously, she embodies a city in which merchants and sea-
travellers gain material wealth, so her fall precipitates their financial loss.
598  When she dies, ‘the 
merchants of the earth’ ‘weep and mourn over her; for no man buyeth their merchandise 
anymore’, and ‘every shipmaster, and all the company in ships, and sailors, and as many as trade 
by sea’ lament the fall of the ‘great city’ ‘wherein were made rich all that had ships in the sea by 
reason of her costliness’.
599  Revelations provides a lengthy list of property lost through the 
Whore of Babylon’s fall, such as, ‘gold, and silver, and precious stones’, ‘pearls, and fine linen, 
and purple, and silk, and scarlet’, and ‘cinnamon, and odours, and ointment’, as well as ‘slaves, 
and souls of men’, putting on par the spiritual aspect of humankind with physical, material 
goods.
600  In addition to the theological and property-related meanings, the Whore of Babylon 
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also relates to national concerns, since the water ‘where the whore sitteth’ represents ‘peoples, 
and multitudes, and nations, and tongues’.
601 
Just as the Neoplatonic ideology is pinned together by a central female figure in ‘The 
Domain of Arnheim’, thematic strands are woven together in the figure of the Whore of Babylon 
in The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym.  The important difference between the two is that 
Ellison’s wife provides Ellison with the divinity that he can invest into the land because her love 
elevates his soul to a union with God, while, as a harlot, the Whore of Babylon embodies 
Pandemian love.  In this regard, she is the antithesis of Poe’s idealized women, and instantiates 
‘false religion’ in a twofold sense: by standing in for sentiments inimical to charity, and by 
idealizing property over the soul’s immortality.  Her presence in Pym sounds a religious tenor, 
pointing to and underscoring the precluded Neoplatonic ideals of Beauty, charity and the Spirit 
within the world of Poe’s novel.  The loss of these ideals, which inherently mean the loss of 
salvation, characterizes and delimits Pym’s journey of individuation from an identity established 
by property to one also constituted by the Holy Spirit and a union with God.  Referring back to 
the Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, Schlegel states that ‘Religion is the root of human 
existence.  Were it possible for man to renounce all religion, including that of which he is 
unconscious, and over which he has no control, he would become a mere surface without any 
internal substance’.  While Pym’s journey is a quest to find the religious grounding of his 
‘human existence’, it is also a movement ‘over which he has no control’, because it is 
unconsciously motivated by his mortal soul’s longing.  Coincident with Pym’s attempted 
development from being a ‘mere surface without any internal substance’ to a person with a 
religious essence, is an allegory about Jacksonian America, in which Poe presents a nation 
preoccupied with creating property, but without the poetic sentiment to invest into the land, 
thereby reneging on its national Ideality.  Further preventing the investment of the land with the 
poetic sentiment is an epistemology that Poe presents as preclusive to a true spiritual union with 
God and as a faulty method of theological understanding.  Specifically, Poe criticizes pantheistic 
models of knowing, particularly Transcendentalism, for assuming that theological ideals, such as 
the soul and God, are collapsed into nature, and for their assertions of a poet’s absolute 
knowledge of such a divinity through the imagination. 
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  Set against this theological and philosophical backdrop is Pym’s relationship with Dirk 
Peters and the colonial violence of Tsalal.  As outlined in Chapter Three, Poe invalidates tribal 
claims to the land, but simultaneously privileges indigeneity as an aspect of national Ideality and 
prerequisite to an essentialized national identity, thereby necessitating its naturalized 
incorporation into the American self.  This bipartite perspective of indigeneity is displayed in 
Pym through depictions of the Tsalalians and Peters, with the former embodying aboriginal 
irrationality and an inherent inability to invest nature with property, and the latter standing in for 
the indigenous aspect of the national root that must be recognized and incorporated into 
America.  This chapter will examine dismembered male bodies vis-à-vis colonial contact in Pym 
against this dual perspective of indigeneity by utilizing methodologies laid out in previous 
chapters.  Examination will involve discussion of Pym’s structure before outlining the pantheistic 
philosophies Poe debates against, and how this debate is enacted in both the novel’s theological 
imagery and tropes pertaining to the creation of knowledge.  Vis-à-vis this philosophical context, 
this chapter will then analyze Pym’s journey of spiritual individuation, and then assess ideologies 
related to property and how they bear on scenes of violence and dismemberment, particularly in 
the Tsalal episodes of Pym.  Discussion will then focus on the character of Dirk Peters as an 
embodiment of indigeneity that Poe portrays as necessarily incorporated into the American self 
in order to establish and claim national Ideality.    
 
Structure of The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of 
Nantucket 
  Just as Poe’s conceptions of teleology and identity are basically Neoplatonic, so is Pym’s 
literary structure.  Poe organizes his novel in accordance with Neoplatonic ideas that affected 
literary works of the Renaissance.  During the Renaissance, two of Augustine’s Neoplatonic 
ideas of particular importance were: one, that God is ‘the author of this universe’, that He created 
the world as his literary work, and that this world was created according to a divine plan; and 
two, that all acts of creation require a preconceived idea.
602  These two ideas affected literary 
structures through the Renaissance doctrine that poetry is a mimesis of nature; and this doctrine, 
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in turn, led to the argument that if the world is a poem, and God a poet, then the mimetic poet 
must also be a god, and his poem must also be another world that echoes the harmonies of the 
universe.
603  Maren-Sofie Røstvig explains this poetic reflection of the divine world: ‘Whenever 
nature is defined as the existing order of things, and when this order is believed to have been 
created by God according to a specific pattern, nature may be “imitated” by reproducing this 
pattern in the structure of the literary composition’.
604  Under this supposition, syncretistic works 
dealt with Christian themes, but ordered them within an arithmological frame.  One example of 
Neoplatonic structuring that also affects The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym is an emphasis on 
the centre, as opposed to denouement, of the literary work, with the mid-point generally marked 
by referents of elevation, sovereignty, or balance.  This emphasis on the narrative centre derives 
from an iconography of cosmic kingship, in which the Ptolemaic central cosmological 
positioning of the sun as the fourth of seven planets is conflated with the Christian notion of the 
Sol iustitiae, or Sun of justice, a reference to Christ’s return on judgement day as a mid-day sun.  
Such structuring invites chiastic schemes, such as ABCDCBA, and lends circularity to the 
literary work.
605 
  An example of this chiastic structuring that also influences Poe’s corpus is Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe, with its pivotal point being the discovery of the footprint on the beach.  
Immediately behind and ahead of this midpoint is Crusoe’s island section.  While the first part of 
this section follows Crusoe’s isolation and spiritual regeneration, the second part complements 
the first by showing Crusoe putting his Christianity into practice by converting Friday and 
confronting the cannibals.  Such a structural pattern is modelled after the mimetic tradition 
discussed above, and it organizes the narrative events by tracing the moral progress of the main 
character.
 606    
  Pym’s structure has received previous critical attention.  In the Introduction to the 
Penguin edition of Pym, Harold Beaver notices that with ‘perfect symmetry the two halves 
mirror each other, split down a central spine which (geographically) proves to be the equator and 
(fictionally) Pym’s rescue by the Jane Guy’, and he matches up corresponding events on both 
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sides of this textual meridian: ‘the initial treachery (of mutiny and revenge on the Grampus) is 
mirrored by treachery and revenge on Tsalal; murderous Seymour, the black cook, by 
unscrupulous Too-wit, the black chief; Pym’s confinement in the hold, by his confinement in the 
hills’.  This symmetrical structuring organizes a text that is far from ‘rambling and incohesive, as 
most earlier critics presumed’, and, for Beaver, ‘nothing could be more assured, more tightly 
woven or concise’ than the ‘matching images of these folded and reflecting halves’.
607  Richard 
Kopley comments on Pym’s structure too, observing that it is ‘composed of two distinct halves’ 
organized around a ‘meaningful midpoint’ that Poe draws attention to with such words and 
phrases as, ‘half-breed’, ‘half certainty’, ‘half whine, half howl’, and variations thereof up to 
forty times in the novel.
608  Although Kopley employs his interpretation to argue a more ‘psycho-
biographical’ point about Poe, his reading of Pym’s structure as providential is correct, and helps 
provide interpretive access into the novel.      
  The link between moral progress and structure in Crusoe is borrowed in Pym, and traces 
the protagonist’s innate spiritual drive to evolve from a mortal to an immortal soul through 
Ideality and the ‘life-giving Spirit’.  However, this desire is destined to remain unconsummated, 
the journey and journal to remain incomplete, because Pym is delimited by a certain type of 
pantheistic epistemology.  Embedded within such a knowledge system, Pym cannot comprehend 
‘actual’ divinity, even while his soul desires an unconscious union with God.  Harking back to 
‘The Poetic Principle’, Pym is like the poet who can recreate the world’s ‘forms, and sounds, and 
colours, and odours, and sentiments’, but fails to ‘prove his divine title’, because there is ‘still 
something in the distance which he has been unable to obtain’.  In other words, Pym’s soul is 
entrenched in the world of representation and unable to transcend it.  Pym’s ‘prophecy’ speaks to 
both his desire for transcendence and the knowledge system that prevents it: 
 
For the bright side of the painting I had a limited sympathy.  My visions were of 
shipwreck and famine; of death or captivity among barbarian hordes; of a lifetime 
dragged out in sorrow and tears, upon some gray and desolate rock, in an ocean 
unapproachable and unknown.  Such visions or desires – for they amounted to desires – 
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are common, I have been assured, to the whole numerous race of the melancholy men – 
at the time of which I speak I regarded them only as prophetic glimpses of a destiny 
which I felt myself in a measure bound to fulfil.
609  
  
The logic of monomania and its connection to theology permeates Pym’s ‘visions’ when he 
considers them to be ‘prophetic’ and attributes them to melancholia.  Again, melancholia denotes 
religious anxiety about being precluded from the divine grace of God.  It is likened to a ‘spiritual 
sickness’, with symptoms that include hallucinations of perdition, and can only be remedied by 
‘applying God’s Word’ to the ‘distressed soul’.  Like melancholia, monomania is also 
characterized by religious visions; but while melancholia’s visions are attributed to more 
theological causes, monomania attributes them to a faulty epistemology ‘infected’ by a religious 
fantasy that prevents a ‘true’ knowledge of God.  Pym’s melancholic visions reveal his spiritual 
sickness and indicate that he is out of tune with his ‘sphere’ and beyond God’s grace.  Yet while 
(and because) these visions are symptomatic of a detachment from God’s grace, they also gesture 
toward something ‘beyond’ the empirical world.  Placed within an epistemological frame, these 
visions, or fantasies, signify the edge of knowledge, standing in for the Spiritual and ineffable.  
However, Pym’s entrenchment in the representative world means he mistakes such fantasies for 
something similar to Beauty, that is, something that signifies and points to the ‘life-giving 
Spirit’; and this substitution of Beauty for melancholic fantasy is further communicated by 
Pym’s ‘limited sympathy’ for the ‘bright side’ of the ‘painting’, because paintings, for Schlegel, 
have the potential to carry Christ-like meanings in their depictions of the ‘boundless distance’ lit 
by a ‘magical light’ to reveal ‘what is least corporeal, namely, light and air’.  This concept of the 
painting – split between a ‘bright’ side with its soul-elevating aspects of Christ and Beauty, and 
the other dark, material side on which the painting is created – is the cynosure for reading Pym’s 
relationship to the representative world, because it literalizes the way his engagement with 
systems of representation and knowledge reaches its border at a materiality that is ‘dark’ due to 
the fact that it does not include Beauty and the ‘soul-elevating’ powers which necessarily 
coincide with the ‘life-giving’ powers of Christ.  Partially, the reason Pym is unable to 
comprehend the spiritual inherencies of Beauty is an epistemology that writes its own truth of 
absolute knowledge, particularly a pantheistically-inflected Transcendentalism. 
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Pantheism and Transcendentalism 
  Poe’s construction of an aesthetic theory grounded largely in Neoplatonism puts him at 
odds with pantheistically-inflected philosophies.  While pantheism shares a similarity with 
Neoplatonism in that both philosophies conceptualize a universe created by a beneficent God, 
they diverge in a significant manner for Poe: Neoplatonism asserts the existence of a World Soul 
and a Creator God outside and separate from the Universe, while pantheism conceives of a God 
that is part of, and imbues, the material world.
 610  As a more conservative Neoplatonism, Poe’s 
philosophy holds to the eighteenth-century idea of ‘Optimism’, the belief that the universe is as 
good as God could make it and that a divine hand shaped the heavens to mathematical perfection 
to create the world as the best possible expression of God’s benevolence.
611  Yet even while this 
Neoplatonism perceives external nature as unified and divine, it also emphasizes God’s 
transcendence.  Within such a paradigm, the universe is God’s handiwork, and humankind its 
observer and stranger, with no intimate relationship.
612  In contrast, the pantheistic worldview 
partially derives from the late eighteenth-century radical thought that the natural world is capable 
of perception, and is different from the World Soul because it is constituted by an infinity of 
sensations.
613  Although such philosophy is quasi-scientific, it has an attraction that presides in 
its religious and political deductions that read an evolutionary purposiveness in nature in its 
belief that the world is imperfect, but perfectible, and that its goodness is evolving towards a 
future fullness.
614 The main philosophical divergence, then, between Neoplatonism and 
pantheism is between a World of inanimate objects, however much imbued with a World Soul, 
and a living Nature endued with sensation and communication.
615 
Nineteenth-century pantheism also puts mind and matter on one plane, where, from the 
poet’s point of view, they are capable of an intimate relationship, asserting that God exists within 
the world and that He can be found and understood through an imaginative experience.
616  
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‘Imagination’, within the Romantic poetic expression, is the mental faculty by which the mind 
apprehends a world of matter that can be organized along the lines of the ‘real’ world, which 
impresses on the mind with its primary ‘real’ characteristics of an object’s extension and mass, 
and the ‘secondary’, ‘subjective’ qualities of an object’s colour, scent, and the like.
617  The 
Imagination delights in contemplating Ideas when the object that produces them is absent, and 
enlarges, varies and compounds them at pleasure.
618  Imagination also has the added meaning as 
the power operative in humankind’s experience of the external world, enabling one to recognize 
the sensibility, purpose, and the significance of natural objects.
619  This definition of the 
Imagination’s function can be traced to Diderot’s Encyclopédie: 
 
I ask if the universe, or the whole collection of feeling and thinking molecules, forms a 
whole or not.  If he replies that it does not, he shakes with that word the foundations of 
belief in the existence of God, by introducing disorder into nature. . . .  If he agrees that it 
is a whole . . . he must admit that in consequence of this universal amalgamation, the 
world, like a huge animal, has a soul; and that, as the world may be infinite, this soul of 
the world, I do not say is, but may be an infinite system of perceptions, and the world 
may be God.
620  
 
This theory of the world soul as a system of individual sensibilities conceives of Nature as 
bipartite: it makes the universe material, and, since matter has qualities of the spirit, it also makes 
it spiritual, with changes in emphasis enabling it to be seen as one or the other.
621  It also shows 
how the universe takes a providential interest in humankind, reading evolution not just as an 
adjustment to environment, but as a development of the spirit within Nature towards 
perfection.
622   
  Poe mentions pantheism directly in ‘Morella’, in the eponymous character’s study of 
‘theological morality’, which includes the ‘wild Pantheism of Fichte; the modified 
[reincarnation] of the Pythagoreans; and, above all, the doctrines of Identity as urged by 
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Schelling’.
623  Morella’s physical reincarnation rhetorically undermines the pantheistic idea of a 
spirit bound up in the physical world, and the epigram to the tale, a quote from the Symposium 
via H.N. Coleridge, ‘Itself, by itself, solely, ONE, everlastingly and single’, implies an Ideality 
debased into a physical form.
624  Poe’s reference of Fichte and Schelling gestures to Thomas 
Carlyle’s ‘State of German Literature’ essay, which discusses both pantheistic philosophers.  
Poe’s dislike of Carlyle is well-documented.  As Pollin points out, Poe makes more than twenty 
references to Carlyle in his work, all of them disparaging.
625  Yet although Poe’s jabs are often 
aimed at Carlyle’s supposed ‘obscurity’, ‘shallowness’, and ‘confusion’, his broadsides are not 
just against Carlyle solely. 
626  As Richard Fusco points out, Poe ‘lumped Carlyle’s ideas with 
American Transcendentalism without systematically studying (or even considering) their 
differences’.
627  We can trace the ideas that Poe took exception to first by looking at Carlyle’s 
essay and then Emersonian thought.   
When Carlyle discusses Fichte and Schelling, he does so in the context of laying down an 
epistemological border between the experiential and invisible, or ‘the boundary between true 
Science and this Land of Chimeras’.
628  For Carlyle, the field of human investigation is divided 
into an examination of the visible, meaning all that is seen by the ‘bodily eye’ and represented as 
a shape in the ‘mind’s eye’, and the invisible, or what cannot be seen by the human or mind’s 
eye, including what cannot even be pictured, imagined, or represented.  Carlyle clearly associates 
the invisible with the spiritual, requesting the reader ‘to consider seriously and deeply within 
himself what he means simply by these two words, GOD and his SOUL; and whether he finds 
that visible shape and true existence are here also the same’.
629  Against this demarcation, are 
methodologies that emphasize empiricism, and those that encompass completion, or wholeness   
– meaning investigative methods that encompass spirituality within materiality.  Carlyle extols 
‘the Transcendental Philosophers, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling’ for recognizing the extra-
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empirical spirituality within both the exterior and interior worlds.
630  He particularly places 
Kantian epistemology ‘in direct contradiction to Locke’, defining it as one that ‘commences from 
within, and proceeds outward’, as opposed to the Locke’s methodology, which commences from 
‘without’ and endeavours to ‘proceed inwards’.
631  While these are inverse philosophies, their 
end results are the same: to find an ‘indubitable principle’, or the ‘necessarily, absolutely, and 
eternally True’; that is, to locate the existence of God: ‘God is, nay alone is, for with like 
emphasis we cannot say that anything else is.
632  This is the Absolute, the Primitively True, 
which the philosopher seeks’.
633  However, while Lockean philosophy attempts to ‘prove the 
existence of God, Virtue’, and the ‘immaterial Soul’ through inferences drawn’ from ‘the world 
of sense’, Kant finds his proof ‘written as the beginning of all Philosophy, in obscured but in 
ineffaceable characters within our inmost being’.  Attempting to prove God’s existence through 
logical argument, ‘a Kantist might say, would be like taking out a candle to look for the sun; nay, 
gaze steadily into your candle-light, and the sun himself may be invisible’.
 634  By opening the 
‘inward eye to the sight of the Primitively True’, Kantian philosophy clears off ‘the obscurations 
of sense, which eclipse this Truth within us’.
635 
This same rejection of Lockean epistemology is seen in the writings of Emerson, whose 
dismissal of Locke is part of a larger dismissal of Unitarianism, which holds to a ‘benevolent, if 
distant, god, a demonstrable, rational world, and the possibility of moral perfection – all 
validated by a thriving materialistic culture’.
636  The Unitarian perspective was defined by many 
other philosophies that perceived human thought as dependent on the external world, such as 
British empiricism, and especially Scottish Common Sense.  Principally, though, it was John 
Locke’s theory of the tabula rasa, in which consciousness is shaped by external experience, 
which had the greatest influence on Unitarian theology.
637  In the 1830s the younger generation 
of Unitarians, including Emerson, rebelled against the certitude of empirical philosophy and 
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espoused instead a Kantian-inflected romantic idealism that favoured ‘individual instinct, self-
knowledge, and a belief in transcendent, eternal ideas’.
638   
The more spiritual underpinnings of Kant’s works were brought home to the 
Transcendentalists group by way of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s 1825 work Aids to Reflection.  
With a slightly misleading simplification, Coleridge divided Kant’s theory of human cognition 
into a dichotomy between Reason and Understanding.  For Coleridge, Reason is common to all 
humanity and includes inherent moral faculties as well as intuition, while Understanding 
evaluates the material world but, unlike Reason, varies among individuals; and due to the fact 
that one can ‘never be certain of transient external perceptions, the innate and eternal moral 
sentiments provided by Reason transcend (hence: Transcendentalism) what we learn through 
Understanding’.
639  Emerson acknowledged an understanding derived from experiencing external 
phenomenon, but believed that the more important and lasting truths were intuitive and internal.  
In his ‘poetic appeals for humankind restored to nature and instinct’ Emerson sought to affirm 
Romantic ideals obviated by enlightened philosophies.
640 
Emerson’s pantheistic engagement with the natural world through the imagination can be 
seen in Nature, in which he lays out his concept of the divided self when he observes that ‘all 
that is separate from us, all which Philosophy distinguishes as the NOT ME, that is, both nature 
and art, all other men and my own body, must be ranked under this name, NATURE’.  A few 
sentences later, though, Emerson defines the same term very differently: ‘Nature, in the common 
sense, refers to essences unchanged by man; space, the air, the river, the leaf’.  This dipartite 
concept of nature is paradoxical: figured initially as the ‘NOT ME’, nature is implicitly 
subordinate to the self; however, as ‘essences unchanged by man’, the second definition reverses 
the values of the first and positions the self as alienated and inessential to nature.
641  Within 
Emerson’s concept of nature, the self is divided because its body is defined as ‘NOT ME’.  
The division of the Emersonian self is emphasized when considering its position as 
nature’s reciprocal; and this idea of an inter-relation between inner self and external nature 
perpetuates a Puritan theology that Emerson inherits and endorses.  As Evan Carton explains, the 
Puritans believed in contradictory concepts of nature and the self.  While they extolled Nature as 
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God’s grand creation, they also perceived it as representative of man’s fallen state, both within 
the self, as sin, and without, as forests, Indians, famine, etc.  However, in a less negative light, 
individual, specific ‘signs’ and experiences of Nature could also relate to the self because of their 
potential to emblematize ‘an ongoing spiritual history’ and assume value ‘when converted or 
translated into knowledge of it’.
642  This conversion of Nature into spiritual emblem underscores 
the Puritans’ paradoxical perception of identity.  As Sacvan Bercovitch outlines, ‘every believer 
had to find his own way to God, but his success depended on his capacity, by grace, to purge his 
inherent discrete identity and transform himself into an exemplum fidei, a christic emblem of the 
faith’.
643  In other words, Puritanism asserted the sovereignty of the individual and endorsed 
spiritual self-realization, but defined individuality as the potential to achieve salvation through a 
self-annihilating process in which the self was transformed into a living, emblematic metaphor.  
Inevitably, though, the very act and artistry of interpreting emblems implied a subjective element 
of doubt that undermined hard-won spiritual truths and revelations, and for this reason, Puritan 
theocrats strictly controlled interpretive acts and encouraged mistrust of any ‘unauthorized 
literary activity’, or words that ‘fail[ed] to serve, or appear to serve, The Word’.
644   
The Puritans’ idea of nature as the ‘resistant but convertible materials of experience’ 
persisted for Emerson, who sought an interpretive project that could reunify the divided self, and 
not just classify its fragments, through an ego-relinquishment that would reintegrate the self with 
a Universal spirituality.
645  The project of self-cohesion that Emerson conceptualized relies on 
his two notions of art and originality: like nature, art is also defined dichotomously, grouped, on 
one hand, with the body as artificial, negative, and separate from the self, and, on the other, as 
the means by which man grabs hold of the essential when it is ‘applied to the mixture of will 
with nature’.  Art is an entity detached from the self, but it is also an intimate process by which 
the individual can approach the communal spirit of nature.
646  Essential to art’s commingling 
with nature is the idea of originality, characterized by novelty, and manifested in ‘a poetry and 
philosophy of insight’ and ‘action proportioned to nature’.  As Carton points out, Emersonian 
originality is ‘synonymous with creative self-assertion’, and much of Nature illustrates how an 
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‘original relationship with the universe’, requires an artistic act of imagination and imposition of 
the will on nature.
647  
  However, a second sense of the self’s relation to nature undermines the idea of originality 
when Emerson notes that the world ‘differs from the body in one important respect.  It is not, like 
that, now subjected to the human will.  Its serene order is inviolable to us.  It is, therefore, to us, 
the present expositor of the divine mind.  It is a fixed point whereby we may measure our 
departure’.  In this second sense, the world is impervious to human will, and instead of serving as 
man’s double, marks a ‘fixed point’ from which he has departed.
648  Man can only re-approach 
originality and the divine mind writ large in nature through self-abnegation, or by ‘purg[ing] the 
eyes’ so as to become a passive reader of nature’s ‘text’: ‘by degrees we may come to know the 
primitive sense of the permanent objects of nature, so that the world shall be to us an open book, 
and every form significant of its hidden life and final cause’.
649  As Carton asserts, ‘self-assertion 
is self-departure, self-annihilation is self-recovery’, and when man is divorced from nature an 
attitude of passivity enables the ‘open book’ of nature to be understood ‘by degrees’.
650  This 
attitude of passivity and ego-loss required to understand the ‘text’ of the world is instantiated in 
Emerson’s image of the transparent eyeball:   
 
In the woods, we return to reason and faith.  There is nothing that can befall me in life – 
no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes,) which nature cannot repair.  Standing on 
the bare ground, -- my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space, – all 
mean egotism vanishes.  I become a transparent eye-ball.  I am nothing.  I see all.  The 
currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God.
651 
 
Here, the reciprocity between self-annihilation and revelation is evinced in Emerson’s assertion 
‘I am nothing.  I see all’.  But also of note is Emerson’s heavy emphasis on ocular methods of 
knowing, through the image of the ‘transparent eyeball’ and the clause of ‘leaving me my eyes’ 
in order to benefit from the restorative powers of nature.  Looking back to Poe’s ‘The Man That 
Was Used Up’, we see how Emerson’s ocular methods of knowing find a physically bound 
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parallel in the narrator’s final encounter with John A.B.C. Smith.  The scene in Smith’s bedroom 
is also marked by ocular tropes when the narrator exclaims ‘my eye!!’ and Smith responds that 
the ‘Kickapoos are not so very slow at a gouge’, as well as tropes of passivity when the narrator 
‘stagger[s] into an armchair’ and with ‘staring eyes and open mouth’ awaits ‘the solution of the 
wonder’.
652  The narrator’s state of being struck dumb at witnessing the revelation of Smith’s 
existence parodies the attitude of passive receptiveness promoted by Emerson; and this parody is 
furthered, when, instead of encountering a totalizing knowledge, the narrator instead confronts a 
‘nondescript’, something which cannot be remarked upon.
653   
  Another Transcendental idea that Poe debates against is Emerson’s distinction in Nature 
between the ‘sacred’ and ‘literary’ teacher, the first being one who ‘speaks from with, or from 
experience, as parties and possessors of the fact’, and the second, one who speaks ‘from 
without’, ‘as acquainted with the fact on the evidence of third persons’.
654  The ‘fact’ or ‘vision’ 
that the sacred teacher claims to witness must come from without, lest it be considered a 
delusion; however, when the fact is communicated to others it must come from within, as the 
possessor’s experience.  This paradigm raises disturbing possibilities about the self and 
experience: if the sacred teacher speaks as possessor of the fact, is it possible that his attitude of 
reception is only a posture to disguise a self-manufactured vision?
655  Such a possibility 
coincides with Poe’s understanding of religious melancholy and monomania, particularly the 
idea that spiritual visions can be ‘crased phantasies’ projected outward ‘from inward causes, as a 
concave glass reflects solid bodies’, or partially caused by faulty epistemologies, while Carlyle’s 
idea of finding God and the soul, as well as Absolute knowledge, in the material world gives 
resonance to Egaeus’s mutilation of Berenice, by which he tries to locate his immortalized soul 
by collecting his wife’s teeth. 
In Pym, Poe’s debate against pantheistic ideologies is mobilized in the depictions of 
Spirituality as collapsed into the physical world and made subordinate to representation, and in 
the self-reflexive digressions that metaphorically stand in for the construction of truth.  Such 
digressions were characteristic of the nineteenth-century exploration narratives that Pym 
emulates, and were often written with the goal of objective knowledge accumulation and 
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dissemination in order to service the rising capitalist world system.
656  Yet while these 
exploration narratives were marketed as ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ accounts, they were sometimes 
cobbled from other literary sources.  One case in point is Benjamin Morrell’s Narrative of Four 
Voyages, which Pym borrows from and references.  Although the Narrative was actually based 
on Morrell’s notes and memoranda, it was ghost written by a poet and journalist named Samuel 
Woodworth.  When Harpers hired Woodworth to turn the raw materials into a coherent narrative 
they asked for ‘a valuable book of four or five hundred octavo pages’, and to meet this quota, 
Woodworth embellished liberally and borrowed from other sources. Yet for all its inaccuracy the 
Narrative was circulated as a genuine first-hand account.
657   
What Poe knew about the production of Morrell’s Narrative is uncertain; but what can be 
shown is Poe’s cognizance of the discursive construction of validation.  As Pym confesses in his 
Preface, ‘I feared I should not be able to write [. . .] a statement so minute and connected as to 
have the appearance of that truth it would really possess’; and this theme about creating the 
appearance of truth is developed in the novel’s digressions and nautical language, particularly in 
his vocabulary of stowage, ‘lying to’, and false modelling.
658  As can be shown, these digressions 
and terms are metaphors for literary structuring, the sly use of detail, and the practice of 
‘borrowing’ information, to create truth’s ‘appearance’.
659   
We can begin discussion of these metaphors by studying how Poe uses the term, 
‘stowage’.  As Pym explains, in order to prevent shifts in stowage, ‘great attention’ is paid ‘to the 
bulk taken in’, ‘the nature of the bulk’, and whether it be ‘full’ or ‘partial cargo’, and for most 
kinds of freight, ‘stowage is accomplished by means of a screw’.
660  As Hutchisson points out, 
this description of stowage is ‘errant nonsense’: boxes, hogsheads and crates cannot be screwed 
in because they would break.
661  Yet an underlying meaning to Pym’s ‘nonsense’ can be derived 
by considering the historical meanings of the term, ‘screw’, which was nineteenth-century 
college slang for ‘an excessive, unnecessarily minute, and annoying examination of a student by 
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an instructor’ marked by ‘stammering and stuttering – the unending doubtings and guessings’.
662  
In light of this definition, the stowage ‘screwed’ into a narrative frame implies information 
garnered from other sources and cobbled together with the ‘excessive’, ‘unnecessary’ minutia of 
detail to create a truthful ‘appearance’.  As shown in ‘Marginalia CXV’, Poe understands how 
detail builds a discourse that writes its own truth – a logic he calls ‘carrying-one’s-self-in-a-
hand-basket’.  In this passage, Poe takes to task The Popular Record of Modern Science for 
presenting his tale, ‘Mesmeric Revelation’, as possible based on its ‘internal evidence of 
authenticity’, and he points out how certain narrative details are singled out as evidential:  
 
“The Record” insists upon the truth of a story because of certain facts – because “the 
initials of the young men must be sufficient to establish their identity” – because “the 
nurses must be accessible to all sorts of inquiries” – and because the “angry excitement 
and various rumours which at length rendered a public statement necessary, are sufficient 
to show that something extraordinary, must have taken place.”  To be sure!  The story is 
proved by these facts – the facts about the students, the nurses, the excitement, the 
credence given the tale at New York.  And now all we have to do is prove these facts.  
Ah! they are proved by the story.
663   
 
This logic of self-authentification which Poe condemns is exactly what is being scrutinized in 
Pym through the ‘stowage’ ‘screwed’ into the frame, or by ‘the facts’ which ‘prove of such a 
nature as to carry with them sufficient evidence of their own authenticity’ that Pym mentions in 
his Preface.
664  Such rhetorical devices that write their own truths are alluded to again in Pym in 
the nautical practice of ‘lying to’, the meaning of which can be gleaned through its connection to 
stowage of ‘partial cargo’. As Pym states, a vessel ‘lying to’ but not ‘properly modelled’ can be 
thrown on her beam ends, and the ‘tremendous force of plunges’ can give a ‘terrible impetus to 
all loose articles’, making the necessity of cautious stowage obvious; however, no ‘serious 
consequences’ are felt, ‘provided there be a proper stowage’.
665  Implicit in this nautical idiom is 
the way a narrative that creates the appearance of truth can withstand scrutiny through the proper 
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use of detail and borrowed information.  The concept of ‘lying to’ is therefore a somewhat 
oppositional term to the ‘falsely modelled’ frame.  As Pym explains, ‘it becomes necessary to 
scud vessel’ when a strong blast of wind tears ‘in pieces the sail which is employed’ to bring ‘her 
head to the wind’, or when, due to ‘the false modelling of the frame’, ‘this main object cannot be 
effected’.
666  Although the idea of a ‘falsely modelled’ sailing vessel is a fabrication, because an 
imperfectly designed frame would not be deemed seaworthy, it makes sense in the context of 
Poe’s employment of nautical language as a metaphor for discourse.
667  Specifically, the ‘falsely 
modelled’ frame suggests the improper use of a contextualizing narrative, or genre, to provide 
the coherence and semblance of verity to detail and borrowed discourse.   
  The idea of using ‘technical’ terms, such as ‘stowage’ or ‘partial cargo’, to represent the 
practice of borrowing discourse to create the ‘appearance’ of truth occurs in The Journal of 
Julius Rodman as well.  Addendum to Rodman’s detailed list of the expedition’s cargo, is the 
‘editors’’ footnote on pemmican.  Noted for holding ‘great nutriment’ ‘in little bulk’, pemmican 
is also described in anecdotal relation to the ‘positive experience of an American surgeon’ who 
witnesses ‘the digestive process through an open wound in the stomach of a patient’, and 
demonstrates ‘that bulk is, in itself, an essential in this process, and that consequently the 
condensation of the nutritive property of food, involves, in a great measure, a paradox’.
668  The 
‘great nutriment’ brought about by the ‘little bulk’ alludes to the strategy of discursive borrowing 
to create the semblance of truth, with selective evidence and detail, or ‘little bulk’, contributing 
in a ‘great’ way to ‘verity’.  More importantly to an interpretation of Pym, though, is the 
connection of ‘bulk’, or constructed truth, with imagery of digestion and the stomach, a trope 
which also recurs throughout Pym’s narrative: one of the ring-leaders of the Grampus mutineers 
is a cook; the corpse of Hartman Rogers’s stomach is ‘swollen immensely’; a pelican is 
‘excellent eating’, as is the ‘perfectly white’ bear which the sailors devour ‘with avidity’; the 
biche de mer have no ‘prominent part’ except ‘absorbing’ and ‘excretory’ ‘opposite organs’; the 
filberts eaten by Pym and Peters cause a ‘severe griping of the bowels’; Parker is cannibalized to 
stave off famine; and Too-wit devours ‘yard after yard’ of the ‘palpitating entrails of a species of 
unknown animal’.
669  This motif’s meaning can be ascertained by recalling Plato’s idea of the 
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three human souls, with the soul subject to the appetites of food and drink ‘tied up’ in the 
stomach, as though it were a ‘savage’ joined to the previous two out of necessity.  Vis-à-vis this 
Platonic and tripartite human divinity, stomach imagery in Pym signals a mortal ‘earthy’ soul 
that foregoes immortal life and connects this soteriological status to faulty, self-validating 
epistemology.   
The connection of ‘bulk’ – i.e. borrowed, validating discourse – with stomach imagery in 
Rodman suggests that it is the production of narrative ‘truth’ which precludes a true knowledge 
of divinity; and this preclusive aspect of constructed truth is displayed most tellingly when Pym 
is immured in the hold of the Grampus, buried amidst the ‘narrow and intricate windings’ of 
‘lumber’.
670  Pym’s burial carries imagistic similarities to Poe’s complaint in ‘Marginalia 
CXXVIII’: 
 
The enormous multiplication of books in every branch of knowledge is one of the 
greatest evils of this age; since it presents one of the most serious obstacles to the 
acquisition of correct information, by throwing in the reader’s way piles of lumber, in 
which he must painfully grope for the scraps of useful matter peradventure dispersed.
671  
 
Stowed in a crate for ‘fine earthenware’ resembling a coffin, Pym sleeps for ‘three entire days 
and nights’ and wakes up to find that he is ‘entombed’ amidst metaphors for discourse.
672  
Contrasted against Christ’s resurrection, Pym cannot rise as well with the ‘quickening Spirit’, 
partly because the epistemological system that constitutes and confines him is self-validating and 
self-enclosed, collapsing spirituality into the world and representation.  Unlike Poe’s thoughts of 
thoughts, Pym’s constituting epistemology does not ‘attempt’ to signify what ‘cannot be known’, 
but, rather, assumes the eventual subsumption of ‘God, Spirit, Infinity’, etc., to the acquirement 
of knowledge. 
This subservience of divinity to representation is illustrated by Augustus’s ‘three-sided’ 
letter, which carries spiritual connotations as a ‘white slip’ ‘diffused’ with a ‘clear light’ 
throughout its ‘whole surface’, and in its elusion to specular readability: ‘barely’ ‘discerned’ 
when looked at ‘directly’, it only becomes ‘in some measure perceptible’ when Pym turns ‘the 
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exterior portions of the retina towards it’.
673 Such theological markings continue on the paper’s 
opposite side, which is not only etched in blood, but transmits the warning, ‘– blood – your life 
depends on lying close’.  As the ‘vague syllables’ of the letter fall ‘into the innermost recesses’ 
of his ‘soul’, Pym considers blood ‘that word of all words – so rife at all times with mystery, and 
suffering, and terror’.
674  The implied link between blood and the ‘innermost’ soul, and the 
terms, ‘mystery’ and ‘suffering’, all resonate with Christological meaning.  Yet even though Pym 
feels the message is soul-affecting and ‘trebly full of import’, he remains incapable of 
comprehending the spiritual aspects that lie ‘beyond’ the representation itself.
675  Pym’s inability 
to transcend the representative world is emphasized further through the realization that the 
‘three-sided’ letter is composed by Augustus on the back of a ‘duplicate of the forged letter from 
Mr Ross’ – that is, on the copy of a lie.  This ‘double-fake’ is organized by the same ideas that 
organize Poe’s theory about a representative art that only reiterates the material world without 
transcending it, thereby reneging on its ‘divine title’.  Characterized by this inability to transcend 
representation, the same knowledge system that constitutes Pym also presents a ‘forged’ divinity 
that necessarily renders the ‘mystical’ and ethereal ‘nothing but a dreary and unsatisfactory 
blank’.
676   
The self-reflexivity of Pym that serves to point out truth’s constructed nature relates to 
the novel’s spiritual manifestations that undermine pantheism’s collapse of the spiritual into the 
natural world.  Arguably the most striking image of Pym, and one which has generated much 
critical debate, is the ‘shrouded human figure, very far larger than any dweller among men’, with 
skin ‘the perfect whiteness of the snow’ who stands at the end of Pym’s narrative.
677  The 
‘shrouded human figure’ shares similarities with Kuhleborn, the ‘tall white figure’ of ‘gigantic 
dimensions’ in Undine; and just as Kuhleborn embodies the ‘earthy’ spirit, so does the white 
figure at the end of Pym’s journey, but inflected to comply with the novel’s under-riding concern 
with epistemology.  Within Poe’s novel, the white figure not only instantiates the collapse of the 
spiritual into the physical world, but represents the point where Pym itself, as an epistemological 
narrative, attempts to encompass divinity into its own system of knowledge, so that beyond it is 
nothing – or at least a ‘dreary blank’ on one hand, and, on the other, a spiritual realm ultimately 
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unknowable and unrepresentable to empirical experience.  Due to this double meaning, the 
narrative ends with the white figure and remains ‘incomplete’; and, by implication, so too does 
Pym, in that he never fully gains the elevated soul through love and the Holy Spirit, or come to 
understand or express Beauty, and therefore never transcends representation.  That is, he reports 
on the empirical world, but does not write the thoughts of thoughts that gesture to what is beyond 
it because he does not attain poetic sensibility.  It is no coincidence that the ‘remaining chapters’ 
mentioned in the ‘Note’ are ‘irrecoverably lost’ in an accident in which Pym himself perishes, 
thereby linking the missing chapters to the ‘spirit’s outer world’, or to what is ‘entirely out of the 
range of human experience’; and in this sense, the ‘Note’ comments, in a concrete way, on its 
own epistemological frame, which pretends to encompass such spiritual knowledge into itself, 
but which it cannot hold in accordance with its own methodologies, so that the ‘remaining 
chapters’ literally remain unrepresented.
678  
The descriptions contextualizing the white figure’s appearance all affirm the Spirit’s 
physicality and subservience to observation: the ‘grey vapour’ loses its ‘greyness of tint’; a 
‘gigantic curtain’ resembling a ‘limitless cataract’ rolls ‘silently into the sea from some immense 
and far-distant rampart in heaven’; and intermittent ‘rents’ emerge in the ‘veil’ to reveal, ‘a chaos 
of flitting and indistinct images’.
679  In other words, the spiritual world has become a 
geographical place that can be explored and measured.  Yet the details suggest something askew: 
the birds flying outwith the veil are ‘pallidly white’; the ‘sullen darkness’ ‘materially’ dims until 
‘relieved only by the glare of the water thrown back from the white curtain’; the canoe travels at 
a ‘hideous velocity’; and the veil emits ‘no sound’.
680  The negativity of these images is 
amplified further when compared with another canoe-ride, the narrator’s voyage through 
Arnheim: there the canoe proceeds ‘steadily’ and ‘magically’ towards the setting sun, to the 
‘divinest melody’, until finally reaching the ‘glittering’ architecture ‘sustaining itself by miracle 
in mid-air’.
681  The difference between ‘Arnheim’ and Pym, is that the former depicts the 
transubstantiation of property with the Spirit through the labour of the poetic sentiment, while 
the latter reverses this process, debasing the Spirit so that it becomes physical; and this 
physicality of the Spirit is represented by the ‘white powder, resembling ashes’ which nearly 
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overwhelms the canoe and settles on a ‘large surface of the water’, so that the World Soul is 
worn like a shroud. 
  Other key figures of the novel’s white colour scheme are the ‘singular-looking land 
animal’ ‘covered with a straight silky hair, perfectly white’, with claws and teeth of a ‘brilliant 
scarlet’, and the bear with ‘perfectly white’ wool and ‘blood red’ eyes.
682  Like the shrouded 
figure and inundation of whiteness at the narrative’s end, the animals also represent the spirit 
made physical, with the ‘scarlet’ suggesting blood, and repeating the novel’s Christ-related 
tropes.  The Arctic bear shares another similarity with the shrouded figure, in that it recalls 
similar imagery from Undine, particularly a scene in which Huldbrand spots ‘something black’ 
in the treetops of the haunted forest which he assumes to be a ‘bear’, before the black creature 
cries out, ‘If I did not gather the woods here, fool, on what would you be roasted in the coming 
midnight?’, and scares off Huldbrand’s horse before he can recognize ‘what kind of devil’s 
beast’ it ‘really’ is.
683  Like the creature in Undine, the beasts in Pym have ‘devil-like’ 
connotations that recall the ‘prodigious uncouth shapes’ associated with religious melancholy 
that persecute those who are led away from a union with God.  While the scarlet and white 
colours of the animals imply their spiritual tenor, their descriptions as ferocious beasts suggest 
that Poe portrays the pantheistic collapse of God and the soul into the physical world as 
spiritually dangerous. 
Another instance of ‘whiteness’ representing the collapse of the Spiritual world into the 
natural world to preclude the soul’s ‘elevation’ occurs when Pym disguises himself as Hartmann 
Rogers’s ‘disgusting corpse, or at least his spiritual image’.
684  The corpse of Rogers already 
bears the markings of salvation lost by the pantheistic collapse of God and soul into the physical 
world: after drinking poisoned ‘spirits’, Rogers’s face shrinks and is coloured a ‘chalky 
whiteness, except where relieved by two or three glaring red splotches’; and Pym’s disguise 
repeats these tropes when Peters rubs white chalk on his face and stains it with blood taken from 
‘a cut on his finger’, thereby re-emphasizing the compression of Spirituality into 
representation.
685  As Pym states when he observes his disguise in a ‘fragment of looking glass’, 
‘I was so impressed with a sense of vague awe at the recollection of the terrific reality which I 
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was thus representing, that I was seized with a violent tremor’.
686  Pym’s statement is ironic, 
because he does not fully comprehend anything beyond representation, even while he supposes a 
Christian afterlife.   
This disjuncture between Pym’s belief in a Christian teleology and his immurement in a 
pantheistic and representational world that foregoes the soul’s elevation is suggested again in the 
surviving crew’s confrontation with the ‘hermaphrodite brig’.  This encounter is chronologically 
ordered as a response to prayer, both after the crew throw themselves ‘on their knees to God’ and 
‘implore His aid in the many dangers which beset them’, and when they pour out their ‘whole 
souls in shouts and thanksgiving to God for the complete, unexpected, and glorious deliverance’ 
that is ‘so palpably at hand’ as they watch the brig’s approach.
687  There is a large discrepancy, 
though, between their ‘deliverance’ and the actuality of event, when crew discovers the brig is 
peopled by ‘twenty-five or thirty human bodies’, including ‘several females’, which ‘lay 
scattered about between the counter and galley in the last and most loathsome state of 
putrefaction’.
688  The theological disjuncture between Pym and the Spirit is suggested on several 
levels.  Recalling Byles’s sermon and the way the putrescent body signifies the unredeemed, 
Adamic soul, the hermaphrodite brig’s arrival as a response to the crew’s prayers suggests that 
the brig, with its putrescent passengers, reflects the soteriological condition of the Grampus’s 
remaining crew.  That Poe ties this lost salvation to a pantheistic world is suggested in the 
description of the brig as ‘hermaphrodite’.  Again, within Poe’s philosophy, women are figured 
as agents that elevate the soul through love, with the marital union also a union between the earth 
and spirit.  The classification of the brig as ‘hermaphrodite’ implies a union between the male / 
flesh and female / Spirit to be an entirely physical union into one body, so that in the world of 
Pym the soul is not elevated through the Spirit; and this idea is emphasized by the ‘several 
females’ included amongst the putrescent bodies.  This direct association between religion and 
putrefaction occurs throughout Pym, implying a discursively and pantheistically ‘blocked’ access 
to the elevated soul: recalling that the mid-day sun stands for Christ come in Judgement, 
Augustus dies at ‘twelve o’clock’ and becomes a ‘mass of putrefaction’; Rogers dies at ‘about 
eleven in the forenoon’; Pym emerges from his three-day sleep to find his food in ‘a state of 
absolute putrefaction’; and coincident with Augustus’s decay is the putrefaction of the crew’s 
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water, with water being the Platonic bridge between the earth and divinity, which becomes a 
‘putrid’ and ‘thick gelatinous mass; nothing but frightful-looking worms mingled with slime’.  
Indeed, immediately after witnessing the deceased crew of the hermaphrodite brig the crew 
cannot ‘help shouting to the dead for help’, begging ‘long and loudly’ to ‘those silent and 
disgusting images’ to ‘stay’ and ‘not abandon’ them, so that prayers to God are immediately 
transformed into prayers to the putrescent dead.
689 
 
Tropes of Property in Pym 
Within this theological and epistemological context is Pym’s unfulfilled individuation 
quest from an identity constituted by property to one constituted by a soteriological union 
between the flesh and Spirit.  The theme of property is apparent in the first sentence of the 
narrative.  As Whalen points out, pym, or ‘pim’, is a form of currency mentioned in the Bible, so 
the opening declaration, ‘My name is Arthur Gordon Pym’, is a statement about subjectivity 
defined by commercial property.
690  Pym’s constitution by property is further given by the fact 
that his father is a ‘respectable trader in sea stores’, and his ‘maternal grandfather’ owns a 
‘tolerable sum of money’ from speculations ‘in stocks of the Edgarton New-Bank’, which Pym 
expects ‘to inherit’ at ‘his death’.
691  Pym’s break from his grandfather becomes the initial step 
of his journey away from property: his grandfather threatens to cut off Pym ‘with a shilling’ 
when he discovers Pym’s plans to travel, and Pym last sees his grandfather just before he stows 
away on the Grampus.
692  With Pym’s departure from his grandfather an economy of loss and 
salvation begins and recurs throughout the narrative.  In the hold of the Grampus, Pym 
inventories his property then loses it either to putrescence or Tiger’s appetite.  Seeing his coffin-
like apartment for the first time, Pym lists its contents of ‘some books, pen, ink and paper, three 
blankets, a large jug full of water, a keg of sea biscuits, three or four immense Bologna sausages, 
an enormous ham, a cold leg of roast mutton, and half a dozen bottles of cordials and liqueurs’; 
then, with sentiments reminiscent of Robinson Crusoe, he ‘proceed[s] to take possession if [his] 
little apartment’ with ‘feelings of higher satisfaction’ than ‘any monarch ever experienced upon 
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entering a new palace’.
693  The duration of Pym’s immurement coincides with his gradual loss of 
property: he discovers his water jug empty, Tiger devours the ‘remnant of mutton’, his matches 
are in ‘fragments’, his taperwax is ‘mumbled by the dog’, he drinks all his cordials, he loses his 
‘morsel of hamskin’.
694  At last, with his ‘whole stock of provisions’ ‘reduced to a single gill of 
liqueur’, Pym drains the bottle ‘to the last drop’, and dashes ‘it furiously to the floor’.  As the 
echo dies away Pym hears Augustus calling his name, and his salvation is secure as his last item 
of property, the carving knife, drops and rattles against the floor.
695  
This same economy occurs on the wreck of the Grampus, after the crew cuts into the 
storeroom with the axe to gain more property and begin their inventory anew, with the jar of 
olives, ‘large ham’, ‘bottle of Madeira wine’, ‘four more small jars of olives, another ham, a 
carboy containing nearly three gallons of excellent cape Madeira wine’, ‘a small tortoise of the 
Gallipago breed’, in addition to rainwater stored in a jug.
696  Following this point, the crew loses 
their property again: the ham and two jars of olives are washed overboard despite ‘careful’ 
storage, and the tortoise has less meat than anticipated.
697  Finally, their ‘whole stock of 
provisions’ is lost as the hull overturns.  Immediately afterwards, Pym and Peters discover the 
‘nutritious’ barnacles and are rescued by the Jane Guy.
698   
By establishing a link between lost property and salvation in Pym, Poe restates his 
religious idea that property alone cannot be the constituting element for the self, and in fact 
obstructs the soul’ progress; rather, the soul elevated through Judeo-Christian salvation must be 
the foundation of the self, with the investment of the self’s divine principle into the land being 
the ‘greatest advantage’ toward fulfilling the ‘purposes for which the Deity had implanted the 
poetic sentiment in man’.  Yet although Poe prescribes this theological perspective, he also 
emphasizes how the soul’s elevation through the Spirit is precluded in Pym’s pantheistic 
teleology.  One of the novel’s prominent scenes that emphasizes this Spiritual loss is Parker’s 
immolation, which is presented as analogous to the Crucifixion and Communion but without the 
theological idea of the Holy Spirit.  The way Parker suffers ‘with great patience, making no 
complaint, and endeavouring to inspire’ the crew ‘with hope in every manner he could devise’, 
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and the way he makes ‘no resistance whatever’ at the ‘consummation of the tragedy of his 
death’, lend Parker Christ-like attributes.
699  A Eucharistic analogy follows Parker’s death when 
the crew appeases its ‘raging thirst’ with the ‘blood of the victim’, and devours ‘the rest of the 
body’.  Yet simultaneously, Parker’s cannibalization is also a ‘fearful repast’ beyond the power 
of words ‘to impress the mind with the exquisite horror of’ its ‘reality’, suggesting a Burkean 
sublimity grounded in terror and not the awe of confronting God.
700  Further emphasizing the lost 
‘soul-elevating’ aspects of Parker’s death is the way it is tied to representations of Spirituality 
collapsed into the natural world, such as the shrouded figure or white animals, when the seagull 
from the hermaphrodite brig alights from ‘the body upon which it had been feasting’ and drops 
the ‘horrid morsel’ of human flesh ‘immediately at the feet of Parker’, foreshadowing his 
destruction.
701   
While Parker’s ‘Spirit-less’ sacrifice brings into relief the theological reasons why Pym’s 
quest to reach a union with God fails, it also points out what Poe sees as a failure in America’s 
quest for land; namely, that it does not involve the investment of the land with the poetic 
sentiment, which, again, is related to Beauty, Christ, and the Spirit.  The connections between 
Pym’s quest and America’s quest for property is made in his dream about a fecund territory 
gained through conquest, and of industry, in which he sees ‘pleasing images’ of ‘green trees, 
waving meadows of ripe grain, processions of dancing girls, troops of cavalry, and other 
phantasies’, and the ‘predominant idea’ of ‘motion’, which passes before his ‘mind’s eye’ in an 
‘endless succession’ of  ‘windmills, ships, large birds, balloons, people on horseback, carriages 
driving furiously, and similar moving objects’.
702  This same connection is drawn as well when 
Pym reads the History of Lewis and Clark before he falls asleep in the hold of the Grampus, and 
it is also seen in the several narrative digressions following Pym’s rescue by the Jane Guy.
703  
With Pym’s two halves thematically mirroring one another, the second half reflects the notion of 
the foregone Spiritual and soul-elevating principle, but more particularly in regards to the 
national transformation of territory into property.  Pym’s description of Kerguelen Island 
metaphorically illustrates the ‘emptiness’ of land without the investment of the poetic sentiment 
when he tells how an early explorer originally mistook the island for ‘a portion of an extensive 
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southern continent’, as well as when Pym explains how upon ‘approaching the land’, ‘the 
navigator might be induced to suppose’ that the sides of its hills ‘are clothed with brilliant 
verdure’, when in fact this ‘deceitful appearance is caused by a small plant resembling saxifrage’ 
growing on a ‘species of crumbling moss’, and that there is scarcely any other ‘vegetation on the 
island’.
704  In other words, the land only offers the appearance of completion, fecundity, and 
production, but is actually an empty signifier.   
A similar theme of emptiness structures the description of Tristan d’Acunha Island as 
well.  Again literalizing the pantheistic conflation of the natural with spiritual worlds, Poe draws 
the island’s geography as reaching up to heaven in a physical sense with the island rising ‘more 
than a thousand feet perpendicularly from the sea’ to create a tableland, from which a ‘lofty 
cone’ rises, which is ‘barren’ and ‘covered in snow’, thereby symbolizing the land’s spiritual 
barrenness.
705  Connecting the island’s spiritual ‘barrenness’ to the American quest for property 
is the island’s history, which is marked by American annexation of the land for commercial gain.  
As Pym explains, Captain Patten, of the Industry, arrived on the island in 1790 for seven months 
to collect an abundance of sealskins.  He was followed by Captain Colqhoun of the American 
brig, Betsey, who plants ‘onions, potatoes, cabbages’, and other produce, and then Captain 
Heywood in 1811, who discovered three Americans ‘residing upon the island to prepare 
sealskins and oil’, one of whom called himself ‘the sovereign of the country’, and asserted he 
‘had cleared and cultivated about sixty acres of land, and turned his attention to raising the coffee 
plant and sugar cane, with which he had been furnished by the American minister in Rio 
Janeiro’.
706  An analogy between the island and America is again drawn when the American 
settlement is abandoned in 1817 and ‘taken possession of’ by English families who take up 
‘residence there independently of the government’; and again reiterating how the land is not 
invested with the national root, the ‘supreme governor’ of the independent colony is an 
‘Englishman of the name Glass’, whose name suggests he is cipher-like and without a divinely 
placed principle.
707  
Allegories about private property and citizenship are also drawn in relation to the missing 
poetic sentiment in the description of the penguin rookery.  Described as having a ‘very striking’ 
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‘resemblance to a human figure’, and ‘plumage’ in the colour of ‘two broad stripes of gold 
colour’, the ‘royal penguin’ is metaphoric for humanity constituted by property.
708  The creation 
of property through labour, and the blocked access to divinity are suggested by the construction 
of the rookery and the penguins’ ‘singular friendship’ with the albatrosses.  In Pym’s description 
of the rookery’s construction, the ‘birds assemble in vast numbers’ then ‘proceed, with one 
accord’, ‘to trace out, with mathematical accuracy, either a square or parallelogram’ that 
accommodates ‘all the birds assembled’.  Once inside the square, the birds clear it of ‘every 
species of rubbish’ and partition ‘the whole area into small squares exactly equal in size’ by 
‘forming narrow paths’ that cross ‘each other at right angles throughout’ the rookery.  At each 
intersection an albatross constructs a nest by ‘erecting a hillock about a foot high’ made from 
‘earth, seaweed, and shells’, while the penguin constructs a nest in the centre of the square by 
digging a ‘hole in the earth, very shallow’.
709  Due to the ‘thievish propensities prevalent in the 
rookery’, or ‘colony’, the inhabitants never leave an egg unattended.  While the main population 
of the rookery consists of penguins and albatrosses, it also includes a ‘variety of oceanic birds’ 
that enjoy ‘all the privileges of citizenship’.
710  In calling the rookery a ‘colony’, Poe makes an 
analogy between the penguin ‘society’ and America, focusing particularly on the investment of 
nature with labour to create property.  Recalling that the colour white represents the pantheistic 
conflation of the Spirituality into nature, the fact that the ‘whole atmosphere just above the 
settlement’ is ‘darkened with the immense number of albatrosses’, suggests that the penguin 
rookery, and American society, are unable to form a Spiritual union with God.   
Pym’s search to locate an identity constituted by divinity as opposed to just property is 
caught up with the Jane Guy’s search to find the ‘Aurora Islands’.
711  With some boats never 
‘finding them’ and others declaring ‘positively that they have seen them, and even been close to 
their shores’, the Aurora Islands’ intermittent physicality implies ethereality and metaphorically 
represents the national religious ‘root’.  The fact that neither the Jane Guy, nor the specifically 
‘American’ schooners Henry and Wasp, can find the Auroras reiterates how the national ‘root’ is 
missing from the American nation and replaced by property.
712  This substitution is implied by 
the fact that the Jane Guy’s inability to find the Auroras directly leads to the discovery of Tsalal, 
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because after failing to locate the Aurora Islands Captain Guy searches out ‘Glass’s Islands’ and 
then decides to ‘push toward the pole’.
713  This link between the missing Auroras and Tsalal 
implies that the national ‘root’ is forsaken in the colonial moment of the Jane Guy’s encounter 
with the Tsalalians.  Again, for Poe, a naturalized national ownership of the soil is contingent on 
the artistic investment of the land with the poetic sentiment through labour, and not necessarily 
conquest or exploitation, the reason being that such an investment necessarily requires an 
essentiality of the self, and acquires a bond with the national territory that realigns the land with 
the ‘Deity’s purpose’, or an Edenic state.  In contrast, the lack of this divine labour contributes to 
an ‘artificial’ subjectivity and nationhood.  As presented in ‘The Man That Was Used Up’, the 
inability to invest the land with a divinely placed principle is indicative of the soul’s mortal and 
‘un-elevated’ state, or a foregone union with God through the Spirit, so that such a preclusion 
also means the lost inspiration from ideals such as charity.  A society built on this preclusion 
thereby foregoes the idea of the ‘city on the hill’ as laid out in Winthrop’s ‘A Model of Christian 
Charity’, and establishes instead a ‘degraded Babylon’.  Yet at the same time Poe criticizes 
colonial exploitation he also presents aboriginal tribes as irrational, with ‘un-elevated’ souls 
themselves, so that they too cannot form an essential bond with the soil.  This conflict between 
the colonizer and colonized, in which both groups are lacking essentiality to invest into the land, 
is portrayed in the Jane Guy’s encounter with Tsalal.    
 
Tsalal 
The colonial desire to transform a newly discovered country into property is acted on at 
the outset of the Jane Guy’s arrival to Tsalal, when Captain Guy sights a Tsalalian eating biche 
de mer in ‘its natural state’ and calls for ‘a thorough investigation of the country, in the hope of 
making a profitable speculation of discovery’.
714  Further enacting the Lockean transformation of 
nature into property, the crew then begins ‘laying off the proper grounds, erecting a portion of 
the buildings, and doing some other work’ in order to harvest the biche de mer.
715  Yet while the 
Jane Guy’s crew invests the land with property through labour, their exploitive and militaristic 
relationship with the Tsalalians implies that they lack the ‘elevated souls’ and associated traits of 
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charity.  A dramatic irony inflects Pym’s tone when he describes as ‘perfectly satisfactory to 
both parties’ an unequal arrangement wherein the Tsalalians gather biche de mer under the 
superintendence of three crew members to receive ‘a stipulated quantity of blue beads, knives, 
red cloth’ while Captain Guy takes ‘advantage of the fine weather to prosecute his voyage to the 
southward’.
716  The same dramatic irony and lack of charity is portrayed when the Jane Guy’s 
crew establishes ‘a regular market on shore, just under the guns of the schooner’, where bartering 
is ‘carried on with every appearance of good faith’; and again when Pym asserts the crew 
‘entertained not the slightest suspicion’ of the Tsalalians’ possible treachery, although they arm 
themselves ‘to the teeth’ before travelling inland, and prepare the Jane Guy with ‘boarding 
nettings’, ‘double-shotted’ guns, ‘swivels loaded with canisters of musket balls’, and anchor her 
a mile off shore so ‘no canoe could approach her in any direction without being distinctly seen 
and exposed to the full fire of’ her ‘swivels’.
717 
  The ultimate fate of the Jane Guy’s crew indicates their ‘artificial’ claim to the land, and 
shows Poe’s pejorative attitude toward colonial military campaigns to establish property.  Buried 
under ‘more than a million tons of earth and stone’, the crew is metaphorically incapable of 
rising above an ‘earthy’ spiritual state.
718  As well, just as Crusoe and Friday bury the cannibals’ 
‘barbarous feast’, the Tsalalians bury any trace that their right to the land is contested; and their 
assurance of ownership through burial is matched by the disarticulation of colonizing bodies 
when the Jane Guy’s remaining crew is ‘borne down at once, overwhelmed, trodden under foot, 
and absolutely torn to pieces in an instant’.
719  The attempt by Captain Guy’s crew to militarily 
subdue Tsalal, and the emphatic meaning attached to the importance of arms, also exposes their 
‘artificiality’ of self.  While on board the Jane Guy, the Tsalalians believe the crew’s weapons to 
be ‘idols’ judging by the ‘care’ the crew has ‘of them’ and the ‘attention’ with which the crew 
watches the ‘movements’ of the Tsalalians while the weapons are in their possession.
720  The 
religious connotations attributed to the guns suggest that they replace a true religious ‘root’.  A 
similar implication is drawn in Rodman as well, when Rodman fires on the Sioux after they refer 
to his canon as a ‘big green grasshopper’.  Implicit in Rodman’s act of violence is a validation of 
the canon’s meaning; that is, he affirms what he perceives is an essentiality of the self, even 
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though the canon is a material, as opposed to Spiritual or ‘poetic’, justification to claim the land; 
and this false sense of essentiality is underscored in Pym when the muskets and cutlasses become 
‘lost among the loose earth at the bottom of the chasm’.
721  
  Contrasting the way Captain Guy’s crew creates property by mixing their labour with 
nature, the Tsalalians cannot create property at all.  While the crew sets ‘about to work in good 
earnest’ the task of felling trees, the Tsalalians stand in ‘great astonishment’; and while Pym 
provides a detailed list of biche de mer prices in Canton down to the eighth degree of quality, the 
Tsalalians offer ‘their commodities frequently without a price’.
722  This inability to establish 
property is further apparent in the state of their village, which is made up of dwellings of ‘the 
most miserable description imaginable’, ‘unlike those even of the lowest of the savage races with 
which mankind are acquainted’: some shelters consist of a felled tree with ‘a large black skin 
thrown over it’, while others are built with rough limbs reclined against a bank of clay; still 
others are ‘mere holes dug in the earth’ and covered over with branches, and the majority are 
‘small shallow caverns’ scratched in the ledge of dark stone ‘resembling fuller’s earth’.
723  
Basically, the Tsalalians are creatures of the earth, or ‘of the earth, earthy’, without the divinely 
placed soul to invest into nature.   
  In fact, everything about Tsalal embodies a lost divinity: the ‘formidable serpents’ that 
infer Adam’s fall from Eden; the way the pelicans, white symbols of spirituality, never travel to 
the ‘dwellings of the savages’; the water that forms ‘distinct veins’ and does not ‘commingle’, 
suggesting that there is no bridge between the earth and the Spirit; and the reiteration of this 
trope in relation to the earth, with is marked by a ‘singular stratification’.
724  The lacking divinity 
is implicit as well in the black, white, and red colour scheme woven through the novel and 
highlighted in the Tsalal episodes.  When Pym originally sights the hermaphrodite brig, he 
mistakes the dead sailor to be a man with ‘very dark skin’ and ‘the most brilliantly white teeth’ 
nodding in a ‘rather odd way’, and later realizes that the sailor is a corpse resting on a rope, 
being ‘swayed to and fro by the exertions of the carnivorous’ seagull, and it is this motion that 
originally impresses the crew with the belief that the dead man is ‘alive’.
725  This image of the 
dead sailor emblematizes humanity in the pantheistic cosmos of Pym, with the white seagull, a 
                                                           
721 Poe, Pym, p. 210. 
722 Poe, Pym, p. 204. 
723 Poe, Pym, pp. 195-196. 
724 Poe, Pym, pp. 197, 196, 194, 211. 
725 Poe, Pym, pp. 131-132. 197 
 
manifestation of the physical spirit, animating a man whose death and putrescence signals a 
precluded union with God, while the fact that the seagull removes itself from the body ‘with 
much apparent difficulty’ and rises above it implies that it becomes separated from the body.
726    
A connection is drawn between the dead sailor with ‘dark skin’ and the Tsalalians, with their ‘jet 
black’ complexion and ‘skins of an unknown black animal’, that implies a similar lack of an 
ethereal soul; instead, their ‘souls’ are instantiated in their physical being.
727  In fact, the 
Tsalalians manifest Egaeus’s theological perspective of the soul in ‘Berenice’, in that their teeth 
are their souls, and the fact that they are ‘never disclosed’, suggests that their teeth are the 
‘invisible’ aspects of their identities.
728  Nu-Nu’s last act of lifting his upper lip with his 
forefinger to display his black teeth just before he dies is analogous to the soul’s departure from 
the body at death.
729  The soteriological condition of the Tsalalians gains clarity by again 
recalling how women are drawn as reflections of the male souls in Poe’s writing.  Although there 
are very few women in Pym, a marital union is implied by the identical surnames of Captain Guy 
and the Jane Guy.  This implied ‘marriage’ suggests that the Jane Guy is a reflection of Captain 
Guy’s own soul, which itself is bound up in the worldly cares of property.  Like Egaeus, the 
Tsalalians perceive the representations of the soul as the soul itself, as suggested when they 
consider the Jane Guy to be ‘a living creature’ and are ‘afraid of hurting it with the points of 
their spears’; and this idea is displayed further when the ship’s cook strikes his axe ‘into the 
deck, making a gash of considerable depth’ and prompts Too-wit to sympathize with the 
‘sufferings of the schooner’ by ‘patting and smoothing the gash with his hand, and washing it 
with a bucket of sea water’.
730  In this light, Nu-Nu’s explanation to Pym for the Tsalalians’ 
attack on the Jane Guy’s by showing his teeth points to their dislike of a spirituality existent 
beyond the physical self, because such a divine spirit can be invested into nature.  This distrust is 
illustrated when Too-wit encounters the ‘two large mirrors’ on board the Jane Guy, ‘with his 
face to one and his back to the other’, and then throws ‘himself upon the floor, with his face 
buried in his hands’, not wishing to acknowledge the possibility of a dipartite self divided into 
physical and spiritual aspects; and it is also shown in their avoidance of white representations of 
spirituality, such as when they ‘recoil’ from the ‘complexion’ of ‘the white race’, commence a 
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‘loud jabbering’ ‘intermingled with occasional shouts’ when they see the white handkerchief, 
refuse to approach the carcass of the white animal and avoid white items, like ‘the schooner’s 
sail, and egg, an open book, or a pan of flour’.
731   
With this theological perspective in mind, the Tsalalians’ destruction of the Jane Guy is 
also the destruction of the divine ‘property’ that can be invested into the land.
732  Reifying the 
destroyed ‘divine’ principle that enables the colonial annexation of land into property are the 
dismembered bodies that are ‘absolutely torn to pieces in an instant’.  Inversely, the Tsalalians’ 
destruction of the Jane Guy becomes their own destruction as well, when they attempt to loot 
‘spoils’ from the ship and are obliterated in an explosion that fills the atmosphere with a ‘wild 
chaos of wood, and metal, and human limbs’, leaves many Tsalalians ‘desperately mangled’, and 
covers the surface of the bay with ‘the struggling and drowning wretches’.
733  This connection 
between the Tsalalians’ gain of property and their destruction enacts an ideology that justifies the 
preclusion of tribal ownership of property by supposing their inherent lack of rationality, which, 
in turn, is also a divine lack.  Fittingly, the Tsalalians are destroyed by fire, the symbol of 
divinity, in an image painted with Poe’s Neoplatonic symbols: smoke emerges from the decks, 
resembling a ‘black and heavy thundercloud’, and, ‘as if from its bowels’, a ‘tall stream of vivid 
fire’ rises from the lower decks to a height of ‘a quarter of a mile’.
734  While the pillar of fire 
infers a scene of biblical judgement, the symbols read together tell the story of the Tsalalians’ 
downfall: the fire emerging from the ‘bowels’ of the ship infers a ‘savage’ soul encompassed by 
the corporeal appetites, and the fact that it ascends to a ‘black’ cloud, symbolizing the deathly 
and mortal state, again reasserts how they do not have the proper divine condition to own 
property.   
 
Dirk Peters 
  Again, Poe’s perception of Native Americans is dipartite, even contradictory.  On one 
hand, he presents tribal populations as inherently and essentially incapable of owning property; 
and this ‘inherency’ neatly invalidates their competing claims to the national soil.  On the other, 
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within his own Neoplatonic theory, Poe considers indigeneity an aspect of the national ‘root’, 
and integral to an investment of the land with a poetic labour so that it can express the Beautiful.  
The difference between these two tangential perspectives on Native Americans is the same 
difference between the Tsalalians and Dirk Peters.  While the Tsalalians embody the national 
justifications for annexing tribal lands, Peters represents America’s right to the soil gained by 
first recognizing aboriginal claims to the land, and then incorporating aboriginal populations into 
the body politic.  As discussed in Chapter Three, Poe attempts to locate a national Ideality that is 
‘indigenous’ and springs from the ‘country itself’.  Part of the process of claiming Ideality 
thereby requires asserting an indigenous right to the land.  One way that Poe represents 
America’s ‘indigenous’ ownership is by figuring Native Americans as metonyms for the land, 
and then incorporating Native Americans themselves into the American self.  In Pym, Poe draws 
this incorporation in two ways: through Peters’s eventual displacement of Augustus as Pym’s 
primary friend and colleague, and through Peters’s own progression into rationality.     
  Pym’s close friendship with Augustus is clearly stated.  Pym often goes ‘home’ with 
Augustus to ‘remain all day, and sometimes all night’.  They even occupy ‘the same bed’.  And 
after recounting his ‘prophecy’ Pym says, ‘Augustus thoroughly entered into my state of mind.  
It is probable, indeed, that our intimate communion had resulted in a partial interchange of 
character’.
735  Basically, Pym’s relationship with Augustus is presented as analogous to a 
marriage, with an implied spiritual union, so that Augustus reflects the state of Pym’s soul and its 
capacity to achieve soteriological completion.  As the reflection of Pym’s soul, though, Augustus 
also represents what Pym needs to evolve from; that is, an identity defined by commercial 
property and not a religious ‘root’.  The spiritual connection between Pym and Augustus is 
suggested just before the mad ‘freak’ on the Ariel, when Pym is just about to fall ‘into a doze’ 
and Augustus starts up and swears he will ‘not go to sleep for any Arthur Pym in 
Christendom’.
736  For Poe, the moment of dozing off is the moment when ‘the confines of the 
waking world blend with those of the world of dreams’.
737  Poe calls such moments ‘fancies’, but 
clarifies, ‘I use the word fancies at random, and merely because I must use some word; but the 
idea commonly attached to the term is not even remotely applicable to the shadows of shadows 
in question’.  Such fancies are ‘rather psychal than intellectual’, arising ‘in the soul’, and giving 
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‘a glimpse of the spirit’s outer world’.
738  When Augustus wakes up just as Pym dozes off, he 
stands in for what should be Pym’s access to the ‘spirit’s outer world’.  In this regard, Pym’s 
‘ethereality’ is confined by an identity defined by property; and this religious undercurrent is 
emphasized when Augustus claims he will not sleep for ‘any Arthur Pym in Christendom’.  The 
confining effect of property to Pym’s spiritual ‘elevation’ is illustrated further by the destruction 
of the Ariel.  With air being one of the unifying elements between the earth and fire, Pym’s and 
Augustus’s journey on the Ariel is metaphoric for the soul’s condition.  Recalling Pym’s 
description of the penguin rookery as an allegory for the creation of property through labour, but 
without the poetic sentiment, the fact that the Ariel’s ‘frame’ gets smashed ‘to pieces’ by the 
Penguin metaphorically means that the soul’s potential to form a union with God through the 
Spirit is destroyed by the worldly concerns of property.
739  The fact that Augustus pilots Pym’s 
boat into the condition that causes the accident suggests that the property-related aspects that 
Augustus stands for are guiding Pym’s soul, while Augustus’s own struggle during the Ariel’s 
destruction further emphasizes how he blocks access to spiritual salvation through a spatial 
metaphor for ‘elevation’ when he feels himself ‘going rapidly upward’ before his head strikes 
‘violently against a hard substance’, implicitly linking him to a limited ‘ascent’.
740 
  As Beaver rightly notices, once Pym is out of the hold of the Grampus, the equilibrium 
between Augustus and Pym ‘snaps’ and ‘Augustus’s role is displaced; to be replaced by the 
hybrid “line manager”’.
741  This displacement is part of a shift from an ‘artificial’ subject without 
a religious ‘root’ to a subject that has an indigenous claim to the national land.  Peters is 
metonymic for the indigenous ‘principle’, an uncontested and naturalized right to the land, which 
can enable an artistic labour to be invested into the territory to raise it up to Beauty.  As the 
embodiment of the principle of the land that can be developed into Beauty, Peters’s evolution 
from savagery to reason parallels Pym’s own spiritual journey, and this evolution is measured in 
relation to the novel’s organizing trope of ‘halfness’.
742  Right from the Preface, Peters is called a 
‘half-breed Indian’, and his halfness is noted throughout the narrative’s first half: not only does 
Pym often refer to the ‘line manager’, Peters, as a ‘hybrid’, but after the tempest, Pym finds 
Peters with ‘a thick line’ ‘pulled so forcibly around his loins as to give him the appearance of 
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being cut nearly in two’.
743  An explanation of Peters’s ‘half’ status can be acquired by referring 
to Schlegel’s Lectures, particularly his discussion of Caliban.  As Schlegel states, Caliban is ‘a 
by-word for the strange creation of a poetical imagination.  A mixture of the gnome and savage, 
half-demon, half-brute, his behaviour is the traces of native disposition and the influence of 
Prospero’s education’.
744  Schlegel’s outline of Caliban is apparent in Peters, a ‘dusky, fiendish, 
and filmy figure’, whose ‘ruling expression’ resembles that ‘of a demon’; and this Schlegelian 
influence continues in Peters’s form, with his face ‘devoid of natural pliancy’ and his limbs, ‘of 
the most Herculean mould’, which appear ‘to possess no flexibility whatever’.
745  In short, Peters 
is likened to a classical statue.  This statue-like appearance refers to Schlegel’s theory of the 
ancient art as plastic and the modern as picturesque, with the plastic art being the product of a 
religion that deifies the ‘powers of nature and of the earthly life’, and disallows any higher 
character than that of a ‘refined or ennobled sensuality’.
746  In short, Peters does not have an 
elevated soul, and as a demon and statue he is barely human as well.  Indeed, his hands ‘hardly’ 
retain ‘a human shape’, and his ‘mouth’ extends ‘ear to ear’, and has ‘exceedingly long and 
protruding teeth’, so that he is aligned with the Platonic soul that resides in the stomach like a 
‘savage’ tied up out of necessity.
747   
  Tracing further Peters’s connection to Schlegel’s reading of Caliban means also to 
acknowledge Peters’s comparison with a ‘half-gnome’.  This trope of the ‘half-gnome’ gains 
resonance by again referring to Fouqué’s Undine, particularly a scene in which Huldbrand 
encounters a ‘dwarf’ while travelling through the forest who stops him for money, then holds up 
the coin, screaming, ‘false gold! – false coin – false coin! – false gold!’, and then shows 
Huldbrand a vision that is later recounted to Undine:  
 
Then, on the sudden, it seemed to me that I could look through the firm green earth as if 
it were green glass, and its surface appeared round as a ball, within which a multitude of 
gnomes were playing with gold and silver.  On their feet and on their hands they rolled 
themselves around, flung the precious metals at each other in sport, and mockingly 
powdered their faces with the gold-dust.  My hideous companion stood half within, half 
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without; the others below reached up to him quantities of gold, which he again flung, 
with a ringing sound, into the immeasurable abyss below.
748 
 
Huldbrand’s vision enforces Poe’s themes about property as detrimental to the soul’s salvation, 
particularly the way the dwarf mentions the ‘false coin’, and throws gold into the ‘immeasurable 
abyss’.  Yet while the dwarf and gnomes embody the baseness of property, they are also 
physically merged with the earth, with the dwarf even standing ‘half within, half without’ the 
soil.  These fantastic figures thereby instantiate a direct link between the earth and creation of 
property.  Connecting Peters to ‘half-gnome’ imagery implies that he is associated with both the 
correlation of land with  property, and that he is merged, or part of, the land itself, like the dwarf 
who is ‘half within’ the soil.  When Peters displaces Augustus he also implicitly shares an 
‘interchange of character’ with Pym; and this collapse of identity gestures outward to a national 
context in which Native American connections to the land are acknowledged in order to become 
incorporated into the American self.  For this reason, it is crucial that Peters, as an incorporated 
aspect of Pym, be able to achieve a spiritual evolution, because the transubstantiation of Peters 
means that the national land can be elevated as well. 
  Some explanation about this link between Peters and American geography can be gained 
by comparing Pym with Rodman.  Since Poe never completed Rodman it is impossible to offer 
conclusions about his final intentions for the fragment.  Still, though, themes can be 
foregrounded by comparing the two works, especially considering their mutual references to The 
History of the Expedition under the Command of Lewis and Clark:  Pym reads ‘the expedition of 
Lewis and Clark to the mouth of the Columbia’ just before he falls asleep in the hold of the 
Grampus, while Rodman’s ‘editor’ alludes to Lewis and Clark by way of M. Michau, the French 
botanist who accompanied Lewis and Clark as far as Kentucky.
749  In a way, Rodman and Pym 
are ‘flip-sides’ of Lewis and Clark, in which the former seems to prelude transcendence, while 
the latter is immured in a nightmare world of ‘desolation’.  Several details in Rodman conjure 
forth themes from ‘The Domain of Arnheim’: Rodman calls an island a ‘terrestrial Paradise’; the 
‘editors’ refer to a ‘beautiful rivulet’ near a ‘kind of park’; Rodman admires the ‘voluptuous 
beauty of the country’; the prairies exceed ‘in beauty anything told in the Arabian Nights’; the 
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creek beds look ‘more like Art than Nature’; the shrubberies create ‘paths’ like ‘the alleys in an 
English flowergarden’; Rodman sees hillocks which may be ‘of natural or artificial 
construction’; and the voyageurs proceed ‘with spirit’ to ‘one of the most fairy-looking’ islands 
in the world, which fills his ‘mind with the most delightful and novel emotions’, and resembles 
what he ‘had dreamed of when a boy, than an actual reality’.
750  As well, similar to the banks of 
flowers in ‘Arnheim’, the island is interspersed with ‘the most brilliant flowers, in full bloom, 
and most of them of fine odour – blue, pure white, bright yellow, purple, crimson, gaudy scarlet’, 
so that the whole bears ‘a wonderful resemblance to an artificial flower garden’ but is ‘infinitely 
more beautiful – looking rather like some of those scenes of enchantment which we read of in 
old books’.
751  In short, Rodman’s landscape verifies Ellison’s assertion that in ‘the most rugged 
of wildernesses – in the most savage scenes of pure nature – there is apparent the art of a creator; 
yet this art is apparent to reflection only; in no respect has it the obvious force of a feeling’.
752  
Although the Creator’s ‘art’ is ‘apparent to reflection only’, as the editors point out, Rodman 
‘was, indeed, the man to journey amid all that solemn desolation which he, plainly, so loved to 
depict.  His was the proper spirit to perceive; his the true ability to feel’.
753  While Rodman’s 
discipline of mind means that his observational statements ‘always fall within the truth’ without 
‘the exaggeration of facts’, in ‘points which relate to effects’, Rodman’s ‘temperament leads him 
to excess’, and accord with the ‘hue of his own spirit’, so that ‘his impressions from these facts 
must have, to ordinary perceptions, a love of exaggeration.
754  Yet there is no falsity in this 
exaggeration, except in view of a general sentiment upon the thing seen and described’.
755  
Basically, Rodman differs from Pym by being able to perceive beyond observational facts to 
soul-elevating effects.  He has the ‘proper spirit to perceive’, and the importance of this 
perception is signalled in Poe’s italicized emphasis on Rodman as ‘the man’, pointing out how 
his poetic sensibility makes him one of the ‘True Men’ with the poetic sentiment that can unify 
beauty and property.   
The unification of land and spirit is exemplified when Rodman watches a stream stretch 
‘away to the westward, until the waters’ meet ‘the sky in the great distance’, before he ruminates 
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‘on the immensity of territory through which those waters had probably passed, a territory as yet 
altogether unknown to white people, and perhaps abounding in the magnificent works of God’, 
and feels ‘an excitement of soul’.
756  In other words, his quest across the national territory is one 
for Beauty, and his elevated soul is signalled in the elements of water meeting the sky, reaching 
upward to divinity.  Naturally corresponding with this divine quest is the gradual relegation of 
commercial property.  While the expedition’s initial drive is for a ‘source of profit’, over the 
course of its progression, ‘the pecuniary benefit to be afforded’ becomes ‘the last thing upon 
which’ the voyageurs speculate, so that men ‘who had travelled thousands of miles through a 
howling wilderness’ ‘leave behind them without a sigh an entire cache of fine beaver skin rather 
than forego the pleasure of pushing up some romantic-looking river’.
757  
Like the Tsalalians in Pym, the Native Americans in Rodman lack the elevated soul that 
enables them to stake a claim to the land, as implied when the same snake imagery associated 
with the Tsalalians that signals Adam’s fall from Eden is associated with the Native Americans 
as well: a deserted Indian camp is full of rattlesnakes, a Native American chief is named ‘Little 
Snake’, and a tribe of Sioux are called the ‘Big Devils’.
758  Also remarkable is the way Native 
Americans lack any commercial or military agency.  Twice Rodman affirms that he will not 
engage in trade with the ‘Indians’, stating, ‘It was not our design to trade with the Indians’, and 
that the skins acquired during the expedition are ‘to be obtained, principally, by hunting and 
trapping, as privately as possible, and without direct trade with the Indians’.
759  In part, 
Rodman’s refusal to trade with the Native Americans stems from the racial and military rhetoric 
of Indian warfare which he repeats when he calls the ‘Indians’ ‘a treacherous race, not to be dealt 
with safely in so small a party as ours’.
760  Such rhetoric continues in his multiple references to 
Native Americans as ferocious, treacherous, and infesting the country.
761  As well, Rodman 
seems to share Hamilton’s sentiment in The Federalist Papers, that the ‘savage tribes’ ‘ought to 
be regarded as our natural enemies’, when he calls the Sioux ‘our enemies at heart’, and he 
echoes military justifications for Indian warfare when he says the Sioux ‘could only be restrained 
from pillaging and murdering us by a conviction of our prowess’, and that he would ‘rather 
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provoke hostilities than avoid them’ because that is ‘our true policy’.
762  However, Rodman itself 
self-consciously makes reference to this rhetoric through the editorial voice, which notices that 
the Sioux are ‘Mr Rodman’s bugbears par excellence, and he dwells upon them and their 
exploits with peculiar emphasis’.
763  Furthermore, the canon used to subjugate the Sioux is 
‘carved and ornamented with serpents’, thereby suggesting that military conquest does not 
establish the poetic bond with the land.
764  The undermining details associated with Indian 
warfare continue again when Rodman’s conscience bothers him with the statement, ‘it is human 
blood which thou hast shed’ after he kills six Sioux.
765   
Thus, while Rodman’s journey seems to head in the direction of Beauty and 
transcendence and Pym’s ends in failure, the two texts share a similarity in their dipartite 
representations of ‘the Indian’: on one hand, tribal groups are outwardly depicted as lacking the 
‘true’ poetic and spiritual connection to the land; on the other, Native Americans are 
incorporated into the Anglo-American self insofar as indigenous rights to the land become settler 
rights.  This incorporation is suggested in the ‘interchange’ of character between Peters and Pym, 
and in Rodman an incorporation of indigeneity is suggested in the way Poe limns the title 
character with physical traits he associates with Native Americans.  Specifically, an analogy 
between Peters and Rodman is suggested in their similarity of appearance: while Peters is ‘short 
in stature’ with arms and legs ‘bowed in a most singular manner’, Rodman is also ‘short in 
stature, not being more than five feet three or four inches high – strongly built, with legs 
somewhat bowed’.
766   
Yet while Rodman’s ‘proper spirit’ enables him to experience the elevation of soul 
through the land’s inherent Beauty, it is Peters – the metonymy for American territory, and, more 
specifically, for naturalized American rights to its territory – who becomes elevated toward 
divinity in Pym, as signalled by his progression from irrationality to rationality.  In the first half 
of Pym, Peters is ‘instigated from the most arbitrary caprice alone’ so that it is ‘difficult to say if 
he’ is ‘at any moment of sound mind’, and this undsoundness is exemplified when Peters dances 
‘about the deck like a madman, uttering the most extravagant rodomontades, intermingled with 
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howls and imprecations’ after sighting the hermaphrodite brig.
767  At the same time Peters acts 
‘like a madman’, he also presents a half-rationality when he restrains the black cook from further 
butchery, saves Augustus from the ‘brutality of the cook’ and uses ‘language of a consolatory 
nature’ toward Augustus, which occasions Pym ‘no less surprise than pleasure’, after Captain 
Barnard is set adrift.
768   
This half-rationality becomes more pronounced following a series of symbolic 
developments, with the mid-point of Peters’s progression coincident with the mid-point of Pym’s 
narrative, the moment of Christ’s judgement.  At this pivotal turn, the Grampus heels over, 
symbolizing death and rebirth: Pym goes ‘completely beneath the vessel’, and resigns himself ‘to 
die’, only to remerge with the hull’s rebound; and once on top the overturned brig, Pym and 
Peters weep ‘aloud like children’, their ‘intellects so disordered’ that they cannot be considered 
‘in the light of rational beings’.
769  Shortly thereafter, they are collected by the Jane Guy, which, 
as noted above, carries spiritual connotations as the reflection of Captain Guy’s soul, so that their 
rescue further implies their spiritual rebirth, even though this new soul is one that is kept 
‘earthly’ by worldly concerns of property, as implied by the fact that it is on a ‘sealing and 
trading voyage’ ‘for any cargo which might come most readily to hand’.
770   
However, while Pym is delimited in his quest to find an Ideal aspect of himself, Peters 
will necessarily be more successful, because he partially represents an Ideal aspect of the nation.  
The split between the two is implied after the moment of rebirth, when Peters emerges ‘from the 
opposite side of the hull’, and his evolution towards rationality is foreshadowed after his rebirth, 
when Pym notes that ‘Peters, it will be seen, evinced a stoical philosophy nearly as incredible as 
his present childlike supineness and imbecility’.
771  More metaphorically, Peters’s evolution is 
suggested when he kills the Arctic bear, one of the symbols for the collapse of the spirit into the 
natural world, thereby foreshadowing how he will transcend the pantheistic barriers to a ‘true’ 
spirituality.  The Arctic bear’s death even echoes the overturning of the hull when the bear 
tumbles ‘into the sea, lifeless, and without a struggle, rolling over Peters’ as it falls; and just as 
                                                           
767 Poe, Pym, pp. 102, 130. 
768 Poe, Pym, pp. 84, 87, 102. 
769 Poe, Pym, pp. 157-158. 
770 Poe, Pym, p. 162. 
771 Poe, Pym, p. 157, 158. 207 
 
Peters throws Pym ‘the end of a rope’ to pull him out of the ocean, a rope is thrown to Peters so 
he can secure ‘the carcass before entering the boat’.
772   
The change of Peters’s spiritual state is drawn more clearly following his burial in the 
landslide.  In contrast to his ‘howls’, Peters now calls to Pym ‘for aid in the name of God’, and 
this spiritual change is matched by a rational one when Peters endeavours ‘to ascertain precisely 
the extent’ of their calamity.
773  The culmination of Peters’s spiritual progression occurs when he 
and Pym emerge from the burial as ‘the only white men on the island’.
774  Peters’s remarkable 
transformation into a ‘white man’ gestures outward to the novel’s historical context of 
incorporation of tribal populations into the American body politic.  At the same time, it also 
perpetuates the novel’s spiritual tropes, in that Pym’s consideration of himself and Peters as 
‘white’ signals their spiritual resurrection, but still within a pantheistic and representational 
context.  In effect, the physicality of their spiritual resurrection inverts Rodman’s relationship 
with the American territory.  Whereas Rodman’s journey across the land leads him to the 
transubstantiation of spirit by recognizing the Beauty inherent in nature so that a type of 
internalization takes place, Pym and Peters are literally in a union with the earth, with associated 
imagery emphasizing their spiritual mortality when Pym laments being ‘entombed alive’ in the 
‘damp earth’, and sharing ‘the allotted portion of the dead’.
775   
Yet while Pym and Peters are both ‘white’, in particular respects Peters necessarily 
surpasses Pym’s spiritual progression: it is Peters who correctly recognizes the ‘indentures’ on 
the cliff wall as ‘alphabetical characters’, while Pym convinces ‘him of his error’; and although 
Peters cannot read the hieroglyphics, he recognizes the sign pointing ‘to be white’ and ‘the 
region of the south’.
776  Finally, while Pym perishes, Peters returns to the national territory as a 
‘resident of Illinois’, and since Peters is the one who can ‘afford material for a conclusion of Mr 
Pym’s account’, it is him who has information of the ‘spirit’s outer world’, so that divinity 
becomes associated with him in a literal way.
777  It is for this reason that Augustus’s leg comes 
off in Peters’ grasp, and why he becomes a ‘mass of putrefaction’ in Peters’ arms specifically: 
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Peters represents the potential for divinity found in the American land, while Augustus 
represents the accumulation of commercial property without divinity. 
 
Conclusion 
Referring back to Poe’s allusion to the Whore of Babylon, we see that as a trope she also 
carries national concerns, since the water ‘where the whore sitteth’ represents ‘peoples, and 
multitudes, and nations, and tongues’.  Although women exist in Pym only through incidental 
mention and metaphor, they still maintain an organizing absence; specifically, the nonexistence 
of idealized women signals an ontological setting and structure in which Beauty and charity are 
lost.  Implicit with this loss is the missing agency to elevate souls in the Pauline sense to the ‘true 
humanity’.  In Pym, this missing essentiality is intrinsically interwoven into nationhood, first in 
relation to individual subjects, and then writ large as an allegory about the nation’s foundation 
through the colonial appropriation of land from tribal populations to create property and establish 
citizenship.  For Poe, the elevated soul also equates with the poetic sentiment, and he privileges 
labour deriving from this sentiment and invested into nature as one which fulfils the ‘Deity’s 
purposes’.  The creation of property without the poetic sentiment both establishes and is created 
by an artificial person- and nationhood that is not founded on a national root, or on national 
Ideality.  In regards to Schlegelian theory, the national ‘root’ is an attempt to essentialize 
something that is constructed, namely, the nation-state, and thereby emolliate any national 
disturbances or anxieties.  For Poe, the national root serves a similar endeavour to find 
essentiality, but in a way that privileges the artist and his property.  Part of what necessarily 
constitutes national Ideality is an indigeneity ‘springing from the country itself’, and this ideal 
causes a bipartite construction of the Native American in Poe’s criticism and literature generally, 
including Pym by way of the Tsalalians and Dirk Peters.   Colonial violence and male 
dismemberment in Pym are structured by the Neoplatonism that inflects how Poe perceives 
Lockean and national ideologies relative to property: the Jane Guy’s crew cannot invest the land 
with the poetic sentiment through labour and their dismemberment and burial reflects their lack 
of essentiality, while dismemberment drawn in relation to the Tsalalians perpetuates an ideology 
that precludes aboriginal title based on inherent rational and spiritual deficiencies.  Putting these 
concerns about theology, property, and violence within an epistemological frame is Poe’s debate 209 
 
against pantheistically-informed philosophies, which coincides with and unifies the tropes 
pertaining to Poe’s central focus on the forsaken union with God and divinity.     
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Chapter Summaries 
  The aim of this thesis was to investigate the trope of male corporeal disarticulation at 
colonial contact zones in the fiction of Edgar Allan Poe.  This investigation required a 
methodology that assessed how the economic and ideological context of Jacksonian America 
bore on the intrinsic Neoplatonism of Poe’s written corpus.  Discussion of Poe’s historical period 
focused on the establishment of civic identity on ‘inalienable’ property ownership and the 
recurring literary trope in Jeffersonian and Jacksonian popular literature of masculine identity 
dismembered through contact with Native Americans as the disruption of this ‘inalienable’ 
connection.  The examination of Neoplatonism in Poe’s fiction took as its focal point the way its 
structure hinged on the female figure.  This methodology provided interpretive leverage into 
Poe’s conceptualizations of property, Native Americans, and imagery of masculine 
dismemberment instigated by colonial struggles over land and the rights to property.  Chapter 
One outlined the historical factors relevant to the argument of this thesis, including the political 
and economic importance of land in early America, the ideologies that made civic identity 
contingent on property ownership, and the literary image of dismembered masculinity as 
indicative of the anxious site where the right to property is destabilized.  The same chapter also 
examined how Poe positioned himself and his artistic labour within Jacksonian America by 
assessing how his class ideology organized his extolment of land-ownership, and his self-
perception as owning a divine essentiality that enabled the creation of property through his 
artistic labour.  Chapter Two detailed the Neoplatonic philosophies in Poe’s corpus, assessing 
first the Platonic influence on his critical essays, ‘The Poetic Principle’ and ‘The Philosophy of 
Composition’, and then the Pauline inflections in both works.  Chapter Two also analyzed the 
role of women in Poe’s theories and tales; it considered the Neoplatonically-inflected criticism 
and literature that influences Poe’s work, and examined how the married female body in 
particular instantiates ‘The Mirror of God’, or ‘Mirror of Ideality’, reflects the soteriological 
potential of the male soul.  Chapter Three applied to Poe’s fiction the methodologies put forward 
in the previous chapters, looking specifically at ‘The Oblong Box’ and ‘The Domain of 
Arnheim’ to outline Poe’s ideas of property and its relation to identity.  Discussion of ‘The 211 
 
Oblong Box’ pointed out how Poe limns identity constituted by property, but without the 
‘elevated soul’, as ‘artificial’, or as an empty signifier, and how he argues these spiritual 
deficiencies are characteristic of his national context.  Analysis of ‘The Domain of Arnheim’ 
showed both how Poe idealizes the artist’s relationship with land, and how he figures the 
investment of the poetic sentiment, or elevated soul, into nature through labour as a way to 
elevate the landscape to a ‘pre-Adamic’ Edenic state.  Discussion of ‘The Oblong Box’ and 
‘Domain of Arnheim’ gained resonance by outlining Augustus Schlegel’s idea of the national 
Ideal, and its expression through national art: while the first tale depicts how subjective 
‘artificiality’ is caused by the lack of national essence, ‘The Domain of Arnheim’ echoes 
Schlegel’s project to express the national ‘root’.  Chapter Four described how Poe’s 
conceptualization of Native Americans oscillates between sympathy and a drive to displace 
justified by ‘inherent’ aboriginal irrationality, with discussion of ‘The Masque of the Red Death’ 
relating the lack of sympathy back to the mortal, ‘un-elevated’ soul and the putrescent body.  
Analysis of ‘The Man That Was Used Up’ in Chapter Five utilized the methodologies put 
forward in Chapters One and Two to interpret the disarticulation of Brevet-Brigadier General 
John A.B.C. Smith as indicative of both a de-naturalized claim to the land and a lost principle of 
divinity or immortality as limned within Neoplatonic philosophy.  Chapter Six also employed the 
methodologies laid out in previous chapters to interpret masculinity dismembered at colonial 
sites in the context of The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket.  Analysis of male 
dismemberment focused on the Tsalalian scenes of colonial violence, but also considered this 
violence within both the larger frame of Pym’s attempted journey of individuation from an 
identity constituted solely by property to one containing spiritual essence, and the context of 
Poe’s debates against pantheism and Transcendentalism.  In Pym, the destruction of Anglo-
American subjects was read as a sign of an inability to invest nature with an elevated divinity, or 
‘poetic principle’, while the disarticulation of tribal corpora was interpreted as a perpetuation of 
national  ideologies that prohibited Native American ownership of property. 
 
Future Research 
As Leland S. Person observes that ‘scholars have devoted little attention to Poe’s male 
characters’, and while the study of masculinity in Poe’s fiction addresses this significant 212 
 
knowledge gap, more significant to the study of Poe is how the incohered male figure points to 
what is most important to his constructions of identity: a naturalized essentiality.
778  The 
importance of examining masculinity is underscored by again referring to Bhabha’s and Butler’s 
conceptualizations of masculinity.  Bhabha defines masculinity as ‘that ubiquitous member’, ‘the 
pronoun of the invisible man’, and ‘the object of humanity personified’ that ‘normalizes and 
naturalizes difference’; and this definition can be expanded on with Butler’s assertion that 
‘heterosexuality sets itself up as the original, the true, the authentic’, ‘the norm that determines 
the real’, even while it performs an ‘imitation of an imitation’, or ‘a kind of imitation for which 
there is no original’.
779  Awareness of masculinity’s drive to ‘normalize and naturalize’ itself and 
assert its privileged place as the ‘object of humanity personified’ can frame an examination of 
identity in Poe’s fiction, and of early American masculinity more generally, especially the modes 
by which European-American men centralized their selves in Enlightenment discourse to the 
detriment of Other subjectivities, and in their preoccupation with property to ideologically 
delimit and ground civic identities.  Dismembered male bodies thereby indicate where 
ideological assumptions and naturalizations are most in crisis in a way that Other bodies cannot 
for the reason that they were not considered ‘humanity personified’ in the same way that Anglo-
American propertied men of Jacksonian America were.  In this light, while examining 
masculinity’s constructedness means to interrogate what is ‘universal’ and ‘natural’, taking up 
this examination vis-à-vis Poe’s fiction also reveals what is most central to his concerns, 
specifically, property and its relation to essence.  Studying the trope of dismembered masculinity 
in an historical context also leads to central concerns within the Poe’s corpus, specifically 
showing how disarticulation and putrescence signal what for Poe is a lack of essentiality as 
defined by Christian and Platonic discourses.  Embedded within a particular historical moment 
that valued ‘self- and money-making’, Poe also sought a naturalizing ‘property’ that could 
essentialize identity and give his self ‘value’; that is, a divine spirituality that facilitated the 
creation and recognition of Beauty and marked him as a ‘true man’.  In this regard, while Poe’s 
depictions of dissolute and disarticulate male corpora signify his condemnation of Jacksonian 
society, they also project anxieties and excise fears that his own masculinity lacks an essential, 
cohering property. 
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Future analysis of Poe’s masculinities would further consider his cognizance of this link 
between property and essentiality in ‘Metzengerstein’, ‘The Business Man’, and ‘Thou Art the 
Man’, tales which restate the theme put forward in ‘The Oblong Box’ about ‘artificial’ identity 
constituted with property but without a spiritual ‘root’.  Future work would also include 
examination of ‘A Tale of the Ragged Mountains’ for its concerns with destabilized masculinity, 
national territory, and coloniality.  In this tale, themes about an appropriated ‘aboriginal’ 
inheritance of the national territory are evinced when its central character, Augustus Bedloe, 
journeys into the ‘virgin’ tract of land, where he feels ‘that the green sods and grey rocks’ ‘had 
been trodden never before by the foot of a human being’.
780  Yet this implied assumption of 
national ownership, and national essentiality, is undermined when, in the Ragged Mountains, 
Bedloe experiences a vision of Chait Singh’s colonial insurrection against Warren Hastings in 
India, thereby suggesting an occluded national ‘root’.  Poe freely appropriates the physical and 
textual details of the insurrection from Macaulay’s biography of the life of Hastings; and this 
allusion is significant because, as Macaulay tells it, Hastings’s biography is, at heart, a story 
about a life-long pursuit to regain lost ancestral property.
781  Macaulay recounts how Hastings 
dreamt of regaining his forefathers’ lost estate, how there arose in his mind ‘a scheme which, 
through all the turns of his eventful career, was never abandoned.  He would recover the estate 
which had belonged to his fathers’.
782  The fact that Poe transposes a British narrative about 
regaining ancestral property onto the context of American territory undermines both a sense of 
ownership and of essence.  This lack of essentiality is paralleled by Bedloe’s own occluded 
consciousness and spirituality, when he is placed under the influence of Templeton’s 
metempsychosis, or ‘transmigration of souls’.
783  Future research would examine how the 
precluded national and spiritual essences tie into the occlusion of Bedloe’s identity by the British 
soldier, ‘Oldeb’, and their similar deaths by poison.
784  
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  In addition to analysing Poe’s constructions of masculinities, this thesis also addressed 
knowledge gaps relative to his depictions of women.  While several critics acknowledge Platonic 
elements in Poe’s ‘married women stories’, and recognize the identificatory collapse between his 
male narrators and their wives, a full examination of how such tropes are structured by an 
underlying Neoplatonic philosophy has not been put forward.  This knowledge gap can be drawn 
through brief reference of some of the criticism surrounding ‘Berenice’ and ‘Ligeia’.  Monika 
Elbert points out that Poe scholars, such as Eliza Richards and Karen Weekes, acknowledge ‘a 
mirroring effect between women’s spirit and Poe’s sense of imagination’.  While Richards 
contends that Poe ‘drains women of their poetic potency while claiming that the transfer of 
powers is in the spirit of feminine mimicry’, Weekes states that Poe’s meditations on women are 
means to access his own poetic powers, so that ‘rather than his ideal as a partner, Ligeia is Poe’s 
ideal of himself’.
785  Elbert herself asserts that Poe’s identification with ‘the female psyche is so 
intense that the narrator’s expression of the female voice often becomes somatised, so that there 
are real visceral symptoms for the teller of woman’s story’.
786  In ‘The Identity of Berenice, 
Poe’s Idol of the Mind’, Joan Dayan argues that Egaeus’s mutilation of his wife results from a 
totalizing cathexis of her mouth, so that Egaeus’s ‘final pulling out of her teeth’ is ‘an extraction 
of identity so total and so purified of separateness that the final irradiation of the teeth rattling 
across the floor writes out the derangement of the brain’.
787  A similar interest in identity is 
expressed in Catherine Carter’s argument that Ligeia represents the ‘creative aspect of the mind’, 
and that Poe viewed his creative capabilities as ‘so Other to “himself” that he cast it in the most 
Other terms that a gentleman of his day could conceive: those of gender’.
788  Turning to the 
Platonic aspects in ‘Berenice’, Jules Zanger argues that the central conflict of the tale emerges 
because ‘Berenice belongs to the evanescent, sensible world of time and history’, while ‘Egaeus 
aspires to the world of changeless and eternal objects’, and so extracts her teeth because they 
represent her one ‘relatively unchanging aspect’.
789  In a separate article, the same author points 
up the Christian theological imagery, stating that Morella and Ligeia represent ‘the principle of 
forbidden female sexuality originally embodied in the Garden myth’, even though ‘there is no 
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evidence to suggest that’ Poe’s Biblical references ‘are employed as anything but poetic 
metaphors of proven power and recognisability’, and his ‘stories employ religious symbolism but 
are hardly religious in any other regard’.
790  Even though Zanger recognizes the Platonic and 
Christian elements in Poe’s fiction he does not relate them to the Neoplatonic structure that gives 
such elements a unified meaning.  In bringing to the foreground the Neoplatonic structure 
underpinning many of Poe’s tales, this thesis addresses the critical gaps pertaining to Poe’s 
works, including those relative to the recurring arguments that tie women to male expression and 
the flawed methodological tendency to conflate Poe’s voice with those of his narrators.  By 
putting forth a model that considers the Neoplatonic conceptualization of women as spiritual 
reflections of men, this thesis explains how the relationships of Poe’s husbands and wives are 
organized by the ‘Mirror of God’, with the various female resurrections, reincarnations, and 
dismemberments characterized by how this reflective dynamic is altered in relation to pantheistic 
discourses.        
  Future analysis of Poe’s depictions of women would expand on the methodology put 
forward in this thesis by examining further his ‘married women’ stories.  Details from ‘The Fall 
of the House of Usher’, ‘Ligeia’, and ‘Morella’ suggest that they are also inflected by the 
Neoplatonic elements outlined in this thesis.  In ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’, Usher’s 
painting of the ‘immensely long and rectangular vault or tunnel’ built at ‘an exceeding depth 
below the surface of the earth’, with no ‘outlet’ ‘observed in any portion of its vast extent’, yet 
still flooded with ‘intense rays’ of a ‘ghostly and inappropriate splendour’, serves as a metaphor 
for a spiritual belief, or ‘perspective’, that is earth-bound and dissociated from a true divine 
union, and thereby provides an interpretive ‘key’ for examining the epistemological frame of the 
story.
791  Within this frame, Usher’s relationship with Madeline is drawn in a similar fashion to 
Egaeus’s relationship with Berenice, with both women instantiating the male spiritual condition, 
and with Madeline’s burial and unearthing representing a ‘non-spiritual’ resurrection.  In 
‘Ligeia’, Neoplatonic aspects are present through suggestions of the ‘ladder of erotics’, in which 
the lover guides the beloved through fields of knowledge to the Beautiful.  The narrator describes 
Ligeia’s ‘learning’ as ‘immense’, ‘gigantic’ and ‘astounding’, notes how she comprehends ‘all 
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the wide areas of moral, physical, and mathematical science’, and resigns himself ‘with a child-
like confidence, to her guidance through the chaotic world of metaphysical investigation’.
792  
Combined with these Platonic ideas are Christian soteriological ones pertaining to a union with 
God when Ligeia says before she dies, ‘O God!  O Divine Father! [. . .]  Are we not part and 
parcel with Thee?’.
793  At the same time, these Neoplatonic elements are in conflict with  
pantheistic epistemologies when the narrator notes how Ligeia’s instruction renders ‘vividly 
luminous the many mysteries of the transcendentalism in which’ they are ‘immersed’.
794        
Written one month after ‘Berenice’, ‘Morella’ also engages with notions of Platonic Ideality, its 
epigram referencing Plato’s Symposium and H.N. Coleridge’s Study with its epigram of ‘Itself, 
by itself solely, ONE everlastingly, and single’.
795   The narrator’s mention of ‘identity which is 
termed personal’ as defined by ‘Mr. Locke’, and his chagrin at the ‘too perfect identity’ shared 
between mother and daughter, alludes to Locke’s questions of identity retained after the 
resurrection; and this soteriological theme is carried further when the narrator says that the 
child’s eyes ‘too often looked down into the depths of my soul’.
796  When Morella foresees the 
narrator wearing his ‘shroud on earth, as do the Moslemin at Mecca’, implying his soul will be 
physically incarnated, she displays a cognizance of her function in the dynamic of the ‘Mirror of 
Ideality’; and this awareness is further suggested when she tells the narrator, ‘The days have 
never been when thou couldst love me’.
797  Like Berenice, Morella reflects the condition of her 
husband’s soul, and the lack of ‘soul-elevating’ love is written in her corporeal condition, so that 
the narrator’s resurrection is wholly a physical one, as suggested by her ‘rebirth’ immediately 
following her death.      
  In his essay on Poe, D.H. Lawrence argues that Poe’s best works, such as ‘Ligeia’ and 
‘The Fall of the House of Usher’ are really ‘love stories’, or the ‘ghastly stories of the human 
soul in its disruptive throes’.
798  Although Lawrence relates his argument to an implied 
psychoanalytic model of Eros and Thanatos, he hits on an important undercurrent in much of 
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Poe’s fiction.  The Neoplatonic philosophy that influences Poe’s writing and positions his 
women as ‘Mirrors of God’ is organized around the concept of love as a component of the Spirit 
that elevates the soul to a union with God.  Since it is the wife’s love for her husband that 
transforms her body into a mirror of the male soul, the disfigured and reincarnated bodies of 
Berenice and Morella are signs of unrequited love stories.  Even Poe’s stories about property, 
coloniality, and dissolute and dismembered masculinity are structured to an extent by theological 
figurations of love that basically define all sins as transgressions against charity, with the broken 
bodies of Brevet-Brigadier General John A.B.C. Smith and Augustus Barnard instantiating souls 
that are not elevated to a union with God.  In part, Poe’s depictions of broken male bodies stem 
from his recognition that property is essential for the constitution of the male self, but also from 
his condemnation of its extolment over charity.  In turn, this nuanced attitude towards property 
ownership reflects the way Poe saw himself as both a poet and as one of an ‘aristocratic’ class 
with a superior capability for creating property, as noted in the way he values ‘love’, ‘the 
intellect’, ‘beauty’, and ‘moral health’, and in his letter to Helen Whitman, in which he requests 
her financial aid to finance the Stylus and remarks, ‘Would it not be “glorious” [. . .] to establish, 
in America, the sole unquestionable aristocracy – that of intellect – to secure its supremacy – to 
lead & to control it’.
799  At the same time, this is not to ‘overly-romanticize’ Poe, who still 
subscribes to ideologies that presuppose Anglo-America’s rational superiority over racialized 
Others.  This racialized hierarchy is prevalent in his bipartite depictions of Native Americans as 
both objects of sympathy and irrational beings to be displaced, as enacted in the difference 
between the Tsalalians and Dirk Peters, and it can be redrawn by reading Poe’s review of J.K. 
Paulding’s Slavery in the United States, in which he speaks of ‘the moral influences flowing 
from the relation of master and slave, and the moral feelings engendered and cultivated by it’ 
before mentioning how the ‘peculiar nature’ ‘of the negro’ is grounded in the ‘essential changes 
in the different races of animals’.  These ‘essential changes’ are explained as appurtenant of ‘the 
will of God’ and point up a Pauline teleology when Poe states, ‘[African-Americans] are, like 
ourselves, the sons of Adam, and must therefore, have like passions, and wants and feelings and 
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tempers in all respects.  This, we deny, and appeal to the knowledge of all who know’.
800  This 
tension and dialectic between the ‘poetic principle’ and racialized discourse in Poe’s work is 
approached by John Carlos Rowe, who argues, ‘It is thus not just the conventionality of Poe’s 
racist and imperialist fantasies that we should condemn but also the extent to which Poe 
employed his undisputed powers as a creative writer to weave such fantasies into what has for so 
long been appreciated for its aesthetic qualities’.
801  Rowe’s statement points to the central 
dilemma of studying Poe.  On one hand, and at heart, many of Poe’s tales are well-written 
engagements with ideals of love, whether as condemnations of material gain over charity, or 
meditations on love’s unknowability by empirical means.  On the other, the same rhetoric of 
Beauty and the ‘elevated soul’ is interwoven with an ideology that justifies a racial hierarchy and 
a colonial appropriation of Native American lands.  Studying the disarticulate male body in 
Poe’s fiction against his historical and ideological backdrop uncovers the underwritten logic that 
ties together displacement and dismemberment with charity and love.  
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